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Summary 
Sovereign rating downgrades have led to strong criticism of the criteria used by the 
three major rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. But which criteria 
do rating agencies actually use for evaluating the creditworthiness of sovereign states? 
The existing literature points to a few basic macroeconomic factors. This book shows 
that, in addition, rating agencies take political factors into account, in particular a 
country’s economic liberalization policies, international economic agreements, and 
political institutions. 
The book demonstrates the importance of political factors for sovereign ratings based 
on a new data set for 145 rated countries, which is the largest sample analyzed in the 
literature thus far. Methodologically, the study combines panel econometric evidence 
with a text analysis of a unique database of more than 1,200 rating announcements. In 
72 per cent of these rating announcements, rating agencies refer to political factors as a 
key rating determinant. 
This book argues that rating agencies have good reason for taking political indicators 
into account as well. Since creditors cannot enforce sovereign debt repayment, rating 
agencies not only have to evaluate a country’s ability, but also its willingness to repay. 
Political factors can play two crucial functions in rating assessments of this willingness 
to repay. First, rating agencies can use market-friendly economic liberalization policies 
and international agreements as signals of a country’s willingness to repay. These 
policies and agreements are credible signals if they are costly to reverse. Second, rating 
agencies’ analysis of political institutions can show which domestic political actors may 
prevent a government from defaulting. If a country has more veto players, it is less 
likely to default on its debt. 
Overall, this book shows that political factors are at the core of rating agencies’ risk 
analysis. Rating agencies take political factors into account for almost all rated 
countries, regardless of the country’s stage of economic development. 
 1 Introduction  
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1 Introduction 
 
“Keep in mind, if we don’t do that, if we don’t come to an 
agreement, we could lose our country’s AAA credit rating, not 
because we didn’t have the capacity to pay our bills -- we do -- but 
because we didn’t have a AAA political system to match our AAA 
credit rating.” 
Barack Obama, President of the United States, 29 July 2011 (White 
House 2011) 
 
“S&P has no authority to make that kind of vague political 
judgment.” 
Paul Krugman, Economist, 5 August 2011 (on the day of the first 
downgrade of the United States) (Krugman 2011a) 
 
“There is a point at which a government will decide that the 
economic, social and political costs of repaying the debt are higher 
than those of not repaying it. There are no quantitative-based 
approaches that satisfactorily replace analysts’ disciplined 
judgment on this question.” 
Moody’s, Sovereign Rating Methodology 2008 (Moody’s 2008) 
 
A few days after Obama’s statement, the United States was downgraded from its top-
notch AAA rating for the very first time. The downgrade by Standard & Poor’s provoked 
strong criticism by politicians, academics, and columnists. For instance, in the 
quotation above Paul Krugman called into question the authority of Standard & Poor’s 
political judgment. In the European debt crisis, sovereign rating downgrades also led to 
strong political criticism of the three major rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, 
and Fitch. European officials, such as Commissioner Michel Barnier, complained about 
the “considerable power” (Financial Times 2010) and about the “disproportionate role 
played by rating agencies” (Barnier 2010). European Commissioner Viviane Reding 
demanded that “Europe cannot let itself be destroyed by three American private 
companies” (DW World 2011) and suggested that other countries “should create 
independent European and Asian rating agencies" (ibid.). 
These comments vividly illustrate the common perception that the three major rating 
agencies are prominent sources of financial market pressure on sovereign states. With 
their sovereign ratings, rating agencies evaluate the likelihood of sovereign debt 
 1 Introduction  
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repayment. As in Obama’s statement, the AAA rating has become the standard measure 
of high credit quality that countries strive to achieve in order to pay lower interest 
rates on their debt. An analysis of sovereign ratings can therefore contribute to the 
broader academic debate about the constraints that international financial markets 
place on national governments (see section 1.1). 
If financial market participants focus only on a few basic macroeconomic outcomes and 
do not care how countries achieve theses outcomes, countries still have considerable 
scope to make their own political decisions. In contrast, if market participants also 
evaluate the details of a country’s policies, national governments will have to bear 
higher interest rates on their debt if they do not want to follow financial market’s policy 
preferences. To analyze the room to move that financial market participants leave to 
sovereign states, we thus need to find out what financial market actors demand from 
sovereign states. In this book, I will show that credit rating agencies, one of the central 
actors in the sovereign debt market, do not only take into account macroeconomic 
outcomes, but also evaluate a country’s policies and political institutions. 
The previous empirical literature focuses only on a few basic macroeconomic criteria 
that rating agencies use as sovereign rating criteria (see section 1.2). However, based 
on a new comprehensive database for 145 countries, I will demonstrate that rating 
agencies also take political factors such as economic liberalization policies and political 
institutions into account in making their sovereign risk assessments. As there is no 
credible international mechanism to enforce sovereign debt repayments, rating 
agencies have to assess both a country’s ability and its willingness to repay. Previous 
studies focus on a country’s repayment record as a proxy for its willingness to repay 
(Tomz 2007, Reinhart & Rogoff 2009). But, as I will argue, policies and political 
institutions can also serve as an important indicator for a country’s willingness to 
repay. 
In this introduction, I will first explain in section 1.1 why I focus on rating agencies and 
how this study contributes to the wider debate about financial market constraints on 
national governments. In section 1.2, I will review the limited empirical evidence on 
sovereign rating criteria thus far and present the central argument of this book: that 
rating agencies take into account political factors in their risk assessments. Section 1.3 
summarizes my main contributions to the literature on economic liberalization policies 
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(chapter 4), political institutions (chapter 5), and international agreements (chapter 6). 
Section 1.4 presents the structure for the rest of the book. 
1.1 Rating Agencies in the Sovereign Debt Market 
The criticism of credit rating agencies is part of a wider public and academic debate 
about the pressures of increasing capital flows on national governments. In the mid-
1990s, some scholars claimed that international financial integration significantly 
constrains the policy choices of national governments (Andrews 1994, Cerny 1994, 
Strange 1996, Rodrik 1997). Other scholars emphasized that domestic political 
institutions and conditions can at least partly insulate national governments from being 
forced to adjust their policies according to the preferences of financial market 
participants (Garrett 1998, Swank 2001, Basinger & Hallerberg 2004). 
This entire debate depends on the preferences of financial market participants. If, as 
Mosley (2003a) argues, financial market participants consider only a few 
macroeconomic indicators when making their investment decisions, then governments 
remain largely unconstrained in their policy choices. If market actors only care about 
macroeconomic outcomes, countries can still choose how to achieve these outcomes 
without fear of being punished by markets for their choices. As long as a country 
achieves preferred macroeconomic outcomes, such as high growth or low inflation, 
market actors might not care about a country’s economic liberalization policies or its 
political institutions. In order to determine the impact of financial markets on a 
country’s policies and political institutions, it is thus crucial to analyze the criteria 
financial market participants use to evaluate sovereign states. 
Although the pressures of financial globalization are widely studied, many scholars 
analyze financial market participants only in general terms as “global financial 
markets” (Held et al. 1999: 288). Gilpin, for instance, discusses “how international 
financial flows have constrained domestic economic policy” (2001: 277). To 
understand the influence of these global financial markets or international financial 
flows on national governments, it is necessary to disentangle the influence of different 
specific market actors and to analyze their respective criteria for judging the policies of 
national governments. An analysis of the criteria used by specific market actors will 
therefore help to shed light on the extent of the constraints that financial markets place 
on national governments. 
 1 Introduction  
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I will focus on credit rating agencies (CRAs) because they are central actors in the 
sovereign debt market. Over the last few decades, their sovereign ratings have become 
the most important standard of sovereign creditworthiness (see chapter 2). Until the 
1980s, CRAs rated few countries, most of which got the best rating. Since then, the 
rating business has increased considerably to the extent that the credit quality of more 
than 100 countries is currently assessed by each of the three major rating agencies, 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s), and Fitch Ratings 
(Fitch). 
Sovereign ratings have proven to be reliable indicators of default risk for investors. 
According to Standard & Poor’s, a sovereign default is the failure of a sovereign “to 
meet a principal or interest payment on the due date contained in the original terms of 
a debt issue” (S&P 2011a). It occurs when the “government either fails to pay scheduled 
debt service on the due date or tenders an exchange offer of new debt with less-
favorable terms than those of the original issue” (ibid.). Since 1975, more than 80 
countries have defaulted, many of them several times (S&P 2006a). In the 180 
sovereign debt restructurings that have taken place since 1970, investor losses have 
amounted to an average of 37% (Cruces & Trebesch 2013). In contrast to other rating 
products, sovereign ratings have a good track record as a measure of default risk (see 
section 2.3). No country with an investment grade rating, i.e., with one of the highest 
ten rating categories, has ever defaulted on its bonds in the subsequent year. This 
provides an incentive for investors to use ratings as one indicator in their assessments 
of the likelihood of sovereign debt repayments. 
In contrast to other measures, sovereign ratings provide a “pure” measure of financial 
market’s assessments of default risk. Government bond yields and spreads are 
alternative measures that are widely used in the political economy literature to assess 
financial markets’ default risk expectations (see, e.g., Mosley 2003a, Bernhard & 
Leblang 2006, Hallerberg & Wolff 2008, Gray 2009). However, interest rates not only 
reflect expectations of default risk but also of market liquidity, exchange rates, 
monetary policy rates, and inflation rates. An extensive empirical literature shows that 
sovereign rating decisions have indeed an impact on government borrowing costs and 
a country’s domestic economy (see Table 4 in section 2.2.3). If countries want to pay 
lower interest rates on their debt, they will have to pay attention to CRAs’ demands. 
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As we have seen above, rating agencies and the criteria they apply are widely criticized 
by policymakers and academics alike. In particular, many commentators focus on 
rating agencies’ political judgments. But what are the criteria that CRAs promote by 
including them in their sovereign rating assessments? Do CRAs actually take political 
factors into account and demand certain policies from national governments or do they 
only analyze a narrow set of general macroeconomic indicators? 
1.2 Argument: Why Rating Agencies Take Political Factors into 
Account 
As I will show, political factors are central criteria in rating agencies’ evaluation of a 
country’s willingness to repay. In the literature thus far, there are many claims that 
CRAs are in favor of certain economic policies (Sinclair 2005, Sassen 1996, Datz 1994), 
political institutions (Biglaiser & Staats 2012, Beaulieu et al. 2012), and international 
agreements (Kapstein 1994, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2003). However, there 
is limited empirical evidence that CRAs include these political factors in their sovereign 
risk assessments. Previous econometric studies analyzed a few basic macroeconomic 
indicators, such as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, debt ratios, and inflation 
rates, as determinants of sovereign ratings. Recently, a few econometric studies have 
gone beyond this narrow set of macroeconomic indicators and include political factors 
as well. However, the results on political factors are either insignificant (Biglaiser & 
DeRouen 2007, Archer et al. 2007) or contradict each other (Biglaiser & Staats 2012, 
Beaulieu et al. 2012). Moreover, there is still no comprehensive theoretical explanation 
for why and which political factors matter for CRAs’ sovereign risk assessment. 
Rating agencies have good reason to go beyond the narrow set of macroeconomic 
indicators and to also take political factors into account. Since creditors cannot enforce 
sovereign debt repayment, CRAs not only have to assess a country’s ability but also its 
willingness to repay. If a company simply decides not to repay its debt, domestic 
bankruptcy courts can force the company to hand over assets and can eventually even 
liquidate the company. For sovereign states, these legal enforcement procedures are 
limited (Schumacher et al. 2013). In foreign courts, sovereign immunity laws have for a 
long time protected sovereigns from creditor suits (see Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer 
2006: chapter 3). Even if creditors successfully litigate in foreign courts, there are few 
possibilities for creditors to get their hands on assets from the sovereign’s territory. 
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Countries do indeed default at high and low debt levels and in economic bad and good 
times (Tomz & Wright 2007). More than half of all defaults by middle-income countries 
occur when external debt to GDP is still at a manageable level of below 60% (Reinhart 
& Rogoff 2009: 54). Without a credible mechanism for enforcing sovereign debt 
repayment, CRAs also have to evaluate the willingness of national governments to 
repay their debt. 
CRAs know that they also have to assess a country’s willingness to repay. In its most 
recent methodology, Standard & Poor’s explains that its ratings assess a “sovereign’s 
ability and willingness to service financial obligations” (S&P 2011a: 3). Moody’s argues 
in its methodology that “governments, by the singular nature of sovereignty – i.e., the 
freedom from higher authority – can make the deliberate choice to not repay their debt. 
There is no way to compel them to do so, and nor there is a way for a sovereign to 
commit to hand over its assets if it defaults” (Moody’s 2008: 6). Fitch also explains that 
due to the limitations of international law, its “analysis of sovereign credit risk must 
take into account the willingness to pay, as well as financial capacity“ (Fitch 2012a: 2). 
Previous literature mainly uses a country’s past debt repayment record as a proxy for a 
country’s willingness to repay. In the sovereign debt literature, Eaton and Gersovitz 
(1981) argue in their seminal theoretical model that creditors permanently exclude 
states from capital markets following a default. In this vein, reputational costs of default 
have played a central role in the theoretical sovereign debt literature (see Panizza et al. 
2009: 9-14 for an overview). For instance, Tomz (2007) argues that financial market 
participants punish inexcusable defaults and reward countries for repayment in 
difficult times. Cruces and Trebesch (2013) provide empirical evidence for the 
reputational costs of default. Previous empirical research on sovereign rating 
determinants also focuses on past default history as a proxy for a sovereign’s 
willingness to repay (see, e.g., Cantor & Packer 1996, Archer et al. 2007, Biglaiser & 
DeRouen 2007, Borensztein & Panizza 2008, Afonso et al. 2011a). 
I argue that CRAs have good reason for taking additional, political factors into account 
in assessing a country’s willingness to repay. First, market-friendly domestic policies 
and international agreements can serve as further signals of a government’s 
willingness to repay if these policies and agreements are visible and costly to reverse. 
Second, CRAs’ analysis of a country’s political institutions can show which actors may 
prevent a government from defaulting. 
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These two lines of argument are very similar to the pioneering literature on central 
bank credibility. According to this literature, countries can build an inflation-fighting 
reputation (Barro & Gordon 1983, Backus & Driffill 1985) and delegate powers to an 
independent central bank (Rogoff 1985) to solve the time-inconsistency problem 
(Kydland & Prescott 1977). In a similar vein, countries can build a creditor-friendly 
reputation by following market-friendly domestic policies and international 
agreements and can limit the executive’s leeway by establishing domestic veto players. 
First, political factors can serve as signals of a government’s willingness to repay under 
two conditions: if they are visible and if they are costly to reverse. Political factors have 
to be visible and easily interpretable for an external actor because market actors, such 
as CRAs, have limited resources and it is too costly for them to use these to analyze the 
details of every country’s domestic political economy in the local language of the 
country. I argue that CRAs can use economic liberalization policies as a short-cut 
because a government can only implement these visible policies if these policies are in 
the interest of its major supporters. Economic liberalization policies can serve as a 
device for a government to credibly signal its investor-friendliness. Moreover, the 
ability of a government to implement these costly liberalization policies also sends a 
signal regarding its general willingness to reform and to reverse an unsustainable fiscal 
trajectory in times of crisis. A government can also show its market-friendliness by 
committing to relevant international agreements, for instance related to property 
rights, free financial flows, and economic reforms. In contrast to domestic policy 
announcements, international agreements are not in the local language and are very 
easily understandable for rating agencies. 
Economic liberalization policies and international agreements can only serve as 
credible signals if it is costly for a government to change these policies later on. If a 
government can easily reverse its decisions, the policy or agreement is only cheap talk 
that market actors will not regard as a credible signal. Therefore, I expect that some 
liberalization policies, such as privatizations, will be read as more credible signals 
because it is very difficult and costly to reverse these policies. A government will have 
to expropriate current owners if it wants to reverse its privatization program, which 
will lead to visible protests that can be observed by any external actor, including CRAs. 
The commitment to an international agreement is only credible if there is some actor, 
such as the International Monetary Fund, which can credibly enforce a country’s 
international commitment to reforms. Without credible enforcement or high costs for 
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reversing the decision, policy announcements and international agreements are only 
cheap talk. 
Second, in addition to liberalization policies and international agreements as signals of 
a government’s investor-friendliness, I argue that CRAs also have good reason for 
taking political institutions into account. Even if a country’s executive is not investor-
friendly and wants to default on its debt, veto players can prevent the executive from 
implementing this decision. I expect that the higher the number of actors – such as a 
parliament, an independent central bank or independent judiciary – that have to agree 
on a default decision, the less likely a country is to default. The higher the number of 
veto players, the more likely it is that some actor will have an interest in preventing the 
default decision. Therefore, CRAs have an incentive to take political institutional 
constraints into account in their sovereign default risk assessment.  
In contrast to claims made in previous studies, I thus do not argue that CRAs promote 
certain policies, political institutions, and international agreements because of a certain 
ideology. Several scholars claim that CRAs have a “neoliberal” agenda and that is why 
they embrace certain policies (Sinclair 2005, Sassen 1996, Datz 2004). Krugman also 
claims that CRAs demand certain policies from national governments because of their 
“ideological agenda” (Krugman 2011b). In the European debt crisis, Italy’s then Prime 
Minister Berlusconi argued that the “assessments by Standard & Poor’s appear [...] to 
be tainted by political considerations” (Financial Times 2011).  
Sovereign ratings are indeed political judgments in that CRAs do take political factors 
into account. But there is no indication that CRAs care about political factors because 
they are driven by an ideology. Rather, taking political factors into account makes sense 
if it improves rating agencies’ assessment of a country’s likelihood to repay. As CRAs 
also have to assess a government’s willingness to repay, they cannot neglect political 
factors as one indicator for this willingness. Instead, they have to take into account the 
number of political veto players that can constrain the executive’s decision to default 
and investor-friendly policies that signal a government’s willingness to reform and 
repay in difficult times. Therefore, CRAs do not only care about a country’s 
macroeconomic outcomes, but also about the policies and the political process through 
which countries try to achieve these outcomes. 
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1.3 Contributions and Findings 
I will analyze which political factors CRAs take into account by using two new 
comprehensive data sets for 145 countries. First, I have compiled a new panel data set 
of sovereign ratings for more than 100 countries from 1980 to 2010. The econometric 
analysis is thus based on a far more comprehensive data set than some of the previous 
studies on political factors, which include only between 16 and 50 countries (Archer et 
al. 2007, Biglaiser & DeRouen 2007). In the panel econometric analysis, I aim to re-
engineer CRAs’ rating model by explaining sovereign ratings as dependent variable 
with macroeconomic and political indicators. 
Second, I analyze what CRAs demand from national governments in their sovereign 
rating announcements. For each rating change, CRAs publish an announcement to 
explain their decision. This unique data source, consisting of 1,222 announcements for 
all 137 countries with rating changes since 1995, has never been compiled and 
analyzed before although it is the central way in which CRAs communicate their 
demands to governments and the wider public. Before giving an overview of the primer 
on sovereign ratings in chapter 2 and the literature, my empirical approach, and newly 
compiled data sets in chapter 3, I will summarize in the following how I aim to solve 
three puzzles in the political economy literature in chapters 4-6. Overall, these 
empirical chapters show that political factors are at the core of rating agencies’ 
sovereign risk analysis. 
1.3.1 Promotion of Economic Liberalization Policies (Chapter 4) 
First, in the literature thus far, theoretical claims and empirical evidence on sovereign 
rating criteria have been inconsistent. Many scholars claim that CRAs promote 
economic liberalization and have thus contributed to the spread of liberalization 
policies over the last few decades (Sinclair 2005, Sassen 1996, Datz 2004). However, 
these studies rely on a small number of rating announcements. Biglaiser & DeRouen 
(2007) more rigorously test for economic liberalization policies, but in their small 
panel of Latin American countries CRAs do not seem to care about economic reforms. 
In chapter 4, I use the new, more comprehensive panel data set to show that economic 
liberalization policies indeed lead to better sovereign ratings. Moreover, rating 
agencies also consistently promote economic liberalization policies in their sovereign 
rating announcements. In their 1,222 announcements, rating agencies make judgments 
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on economic liberalization policies in more than a third of all rating actions. For more 
than 80% of these judgments, rating agencies take a positive stance on economic 
liberalization policies, in particular on domestic economic reforms such as 
privatization. In their announcements, CRAs often refer to these policies as credible 
signals that a government is investor-friendly. Overall, the econometric and the content 
analysis provide first comprehensive evidence on the importance of economic 
liberalization policies for CRAs’ assessments of sovereign states. If countries want to 
get a better rating to pay lower interest rates on their debt, they will therefore have an 
incentive to implement liberalization policies. 
1.3.2 Rating Political Institutions (Chapter 5) 
Second, in the political economy literature, there is a lively debate on whether 
sovereign creditors are in favor or skeptical of democratic decision-making because of 
the institutional constraints placed on the executive. According to this literature, 
democratic states pay lower borrowing costs on sovereign bond markets and hence 
enjoy a “democratic advantage” (Schultz & Weingast 2003). However, a number of 
recent papers fail to confirm this democratic advantage for recent sovereign rating data 
(Archer et al. 2007, Biglaiser & Staats 2012) even though such an advantage seemed to 
exist for sovereign debt data for historical cases. Hence, the recent literature tries to 
solve the puzzle, “Where is the democratic advantage?” (Beaulieu et al. 2012). 
In chapter 5, I offer a simple explanation for this puzzle. Regimes with contested 
elections actually never had better borrowing conditions. If we use the same definition 
of electoral democracy that is used in the literature on recent debt data for the studies 
on historical data, we do not find any evidence for a democratic advantage. Instead, for 
the historical cases, it is a higher number of veto players that led to lower borrowing 
costs. 
I show that this mechanism still holds for recent sovereign rating data. A panel 
econometric study and a text analysis show that credit rating agencies favor constraints 
on the executive but not regimes with contested elections, and they are particularly 
wary of the electoral uncertainty associated with electoral democracy. All other things 
being equal, a country that has more veto players has more actors that can prevent a 
government from making a decision to default. It is therefore countries with many veto 
players and not electoral democracies that enjoy an advantage in sovereign bond 
markets. 
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1.3.3 The Enforcement of International Agreements (Chapter 6) 
Finally, I contribute to the debate on the enforcement of international agreements. In 
response to past international financial crises, states have promised to implement 
many international agreements. Several international organizations and scholars 
expect that rating agencies help to enforce these international agreements, such as the 
key international financial standards, by including them in their sovereign risk 
assessments (Kapstein 1994: 13, IMF 2003: 18, Arner & Taylor 2009: 2, IMF 2013a). 
But do rating agencies actually take international agreements into account in their 
sovereign rating assessments? 
In chapter 6, I show that rating agencies only care about international agreements to 
the extent that international organizations and other states either already enforce these 
agreements or provide financial support. Based on the new data set of rating 
announcements, I test whether rating agencies take into account international financial 
standards, arrangements with the International Monetary Fund, and membership of 
international and regional organizations. International financial standards are seldom 
mentioned in sovereign rating announcements. As substantive compliance with these 
agreements is not enforced by an international institution, rating agencies have no 
reason to regard the adoption of these standards as a credible commitment that shows 
a government’s willingness to repay. In contrast, IMF programs and the European 
Union accession process require substantive policy reforms. Rating agencies refer to 
these international agreements in more than a third of all announcements for a total of 
87 countries for two reasons: first, due to the financial support linked to these 
agreements and second, as signals of a government’s willingness to repay. The findings 
highlight that rating agencies only care about international agreements to the extent 
that they are already enforced. International organizations and governments should 
thus be wary of relying on market enforcement by rating agencies alone. 
1.4 The Structure of the Book 
Before presenting my findings in more detail in chapters 4-6, I will provide a primer on 
sovereign ratings in chapter 2 and review the previous literature on sovereign rating 
criteria and present my empirical approach and newly compiled data sets in chapter 3. 
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In chapter 2, I will explain what rating agencies and their sovereign ratings are (section 
2.1), why they matter (section 2.2), and how they have performed thus far (section 2.3). 
First, I will argue why I focus on the three main CRAs and why these CRAs have 
dominated the sovereign rating business over the last few decades. Moreover, I provide 
a clear definition of sovereign ratings and the different types and rating categories that 
CRAs provide. Second, I explain why the sovereign rating business has increased 
considerably over the last few decades. In particular, I will show how regulatory 
measures and central bank endorsements have increased the importance of sovereign 
ratings. A review of the empirical literature highlights that sovereign ratings indeed 
have an impact on government bond prices and the domestic economy. Finally, I will 
analyze CRAs’ track record thus far. Based on a comprehensive data set, I show that 
sovereign ratings are relatively stable and good predictors of default risk. 
In chapter 3, I will review the previous literature on sovereign rating criteria showing 
that there is limited evidence on the importance of political factors for sovereign 
ratings thus far (section 3.1). This leads to the research question of this book: Do rating 
agencies take into account political factors and if so, which political criteria do they use 
(section 3.2)? Initial evidence from an analysis of sovereign rating methodologies 
indicates that CRAs take political factors into account (section 3.3). In section 3.4, I will 
introduce the data sets and methods used in this book to identify which political factors 
CRAs endorse.  
In the following chapters, I will present the empirical evidence on economic 
liberalization policies (chapter 4), political institutions (chapter 5), and international 
agreements (chapter 6), summarized in section 1.3 above. As these chapters show, 
CRAs take liberalization policies, political institutions, and some international 
agreements into account as indicators for a government’s willingness to repay. 
In the conclusion, I will discuss the implications of my findings for rated countries and 
regulators (section 7.2). Moreover, I will have a closer look at recent developments, in 
particular rating agencies’ and regulators’ responses to the European sovereign debt 
crisis (section 7.3). In the light of my findings, I will finally propose avenues for further 
research (section 7.4). Overall, as the summary of my empirical findings shows (section 
7.1), political factors are a major rating determinant for almost every country and for 
almost three quarters of all rating decisions, regardless of the country’s initial rating 
and whether the country is upgraded or downgraded. Rating agencies do not only take 
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into account a country’s macroeconomic outcomes, but also the policies and political 
procedures that a country uses to achieve these aims. Political factors are at the core of 
rating agencies’ sovereign risk analysis. 
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2 A Primer on Sovereign Ratings: What They Are and 
Why They Matter 
Sovereign ratings have become the key standard of creditworthiness over the last few 
decades. In this chapter, I will first explain what rating agencies and their sovereign 
ratings are and who pays for them (section 2.1). I will then argue why the number of 
rated countries has increased substantially since the 1980s (section 2.2.1). In 
particular, I will examine the important role of regulatory endorsements on the 
domestic and on the international level (section 2.2.2). A review of the empirical 
literature will highlight the strong influence that sovereign ratings now have on 
government bond prices and the domestic economy (section 2.2.3). Finally, in section 
2.3, I will analyze the track record of sovereign ratings thus far based on a 
comprehensive database. 
2.1 Rating Agencies and Their Sovereign Ratings: What They 
Are 
2.1.1 Rating Agencies: Three Dominant Companies 
The bond rating business first emerged at the beginning of the 20th century (White 
2010: 211). In 1909, John Moody started to assess the likelihood of default for railroad 
bonds in the United States (US) (Sylla 2001: 6-7, Cantor & Packer 1994: 2). Fitch 
Publishing House was founded a few years later in 1913 by John Knowles Fitch and 
provided its first ratings in 1924 (Fitch 2013d). Around the same time, Poor’s 
Publishing and Standard Statistics began rating corporate bonds and municipal 
securities (S&P 2013c). In 1941, the two companies merged to become Standard & 
Poor’s and were acquired by their current owner, the publishing house McGraw-Hill, in 
1966 (ibid.). Fitch Ratings is currently part of the Fitch Group, which is jointly owned 
by the New York-based media company Hearst Corporation and the Paris-based 
holding company Fimilac (Fitch 2013d). Moody’s Investors Service is now part of the 
publicly traded company Moody’s Corporation (Moody’s 2013c). 
These three rating agencies have dominated the rating business for the last decades. In 
1975, they were the first companies recognized by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) 
(White 2010: 214). As a consequence, only ratings by these three companies could be 
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used in the US to fulfill regulatory requirements (see section 2.2.2). The three main 
CRAs were also the first to expand globally beyond the US market. S&P opened its first 
office in London in 1984 and has now offices in more than 20 countries (S&P 2013c). 
Currently, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch account for about 96% of all SEC-recognized ratings 
and employ 93% of all rating analysts (SEC 2012: 7-8). Up to 10% of their staff is 
responsible for producing sovereign ratings (ibid.). Standard & Poor’s employs about 
80 sovereign rating analysts (Reuters 2011). Moody’s has a team of over 60 sovereign 
and sub-sovereign analysts worldwide (Moody’s 2013e). Fitch’s core team includes 19 
sovereign rating analysts, twelve based in London, five in New York, and two in Hong 
Kong (Fitch 2013e).  
Over the last few decades, few companies tried to enter the rating market and their 
attempts were generally unsuccessful. In the decades before the turn of the millennium, 
the SEC had recognized four new CRAs: Duff & Phelps in 1982, McCarthy, Crisanti & 
Maffei in 1983, IBCA in 1991, and Thomson Bank Watch in 1992 (Cantor & Packer 
1994: 8). However, following the merger of these companies with Fitch, there were 
again only three NRSROs left by 2000 (White 2010: 217). Since then, the SEC has tried 
to promote competition in the rating market by recognizing eight new CRAs. Two of 
these, A.M. Best Company and Morningstar Credit Ratings, do not issue sovereign 
ratings. One CRA, Egan-Jones Rating, previously claimed it had been rating government 
bonds since 1995. However, the SEC later found out that Egan-Jones had actually only 
started to rate these bonds in 2008 and consequently barred Egan-Jones from issuing 
NRSRO-designated sovereign ratings (SEC 2013b). Table 1 gives an overview of the 
remaining five new entrants and the number of countries that they currently rate (as of 
July 2013). The Canadian-based Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) was the first 
new entrant, but it only provided ratings for 16 countries up until May 2011. The other 
CRAs were only recently recognized and do not have a track record in the sovereign 
rating business. This is also the case for the new entrants that have been recognized 
since December 2010 by the European Union’s (EU) CRA registration process 
(European Commission (EC) 2013b). In addition to the three main CRAs, the EU had 
recognized 17 additional CRAs by the end of 2012 (European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) 2013a). However, only four of these CRAs provide sovereign ratings 
and one CRA, Capital Intelligence (Cyprus) limited, has already withdrawn most of its 
sovereign ratings (ibid.). 
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Table 1: New SEC-Recognized Competitors in the Sovereign Rating Market 
Name Headquarter 
Date of SEC 
Recognition 
Number of 
Countries Rated 
Dominion Bond Rating 
Service 
Canada 24/2/2003 26 
Rating and Investment 
Information 
Japan 21/5/2007 44 
Japan Credit Rating 
Agency 
Japan 23/5/2007 33 
Kroll Bond Rating 
Agency/LACE 
US 11/2/2008  59 
HR Ratings de México, S.A. 
de C.V. 
Mexico 5/11/2012 1 (Mexico) 
Data: Dominion Bond Rating Service 2013, HR Ratings de México 2013, Japan Credit Rating 
Agency 2013, Kroll Bond Rating Agency 2013, Rating and Investment Information 2013, SEC 
2013a 
 
Without official recognition, it has been difficult for new entrants to challenge the 
established CRAs that have a long track record in the sovereign rating business. 
Moody’s began its sovereign rating activities in 1918 when it rated the foreign 
government bonds of ten countries (Gaillard 2012: 4). Fitch, Standard Statistics, and 
Poor’s Publishing followed suit in the 1920s (ibid., S&P 2013d: 29). However, during 
World War II, Standard Statistics withdrew most of its sovereign ratings (ibid.) and the 
other agencies also suspended all of their sovereign ratings except for the Americas 
(Gaillard 2012: 5). After World War II, the three CRAs provided few ratings. S&P 
suspended all of its sovereign ratings except for the US and Canada (S&P 2013d: 29). 
Moody’s rated only six sovereigns from the end of World War II until the end of the 
1970s (Moody’s 2013d) and Fitch suspended its rating business entirely until the 
1990s (Gaillard 2012: 7). During the last thirty years, the sovereign rating market has 
picked up again to the point that the three main CRAs now each evaluate the 
creditworthiness of more than 100 sovereigns (see section 2.2.1 for the reasons of this 
increase). 
2.1.2 Sovereign Ratings: Definition and Types 
Sovereign ratings are assessments of the likelihood of debt repayment by sovereign 
states to private investors (see S&P 2013a: 3, Moody’s 2008: 4, Fitch 2012a: 1). 
According to the three main CRAs’ rating methodologies, sovereign ratings assess: 
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 “a sovereign’s ability and willingness to service financial obligations 
to nonofficial (in other words, commercial) creditors” (S&P 2013a: 
3) 
 “the risk facing an investor who holds the debt securities of a given 
government” (Moody’s 2008: 4) 
 “a sovereign’s capacity and willingness to honour its existing and 
future obligations in full and on time” (Fitch 2012a: 1) 
A country is rated as being in default either when the sovereign fails to pay on time or 
when debt is exchanged at terms less favorable than those of the original issue (S&P 
2013d: 28). Sovereign ratings are not an absolute cardinal measure of default risk, but 
only a relative ranking (S&P 2009a: 4, Moody’s 2008: 5, Fitch 2010: 1). This relative 
ranking is provided on a rating scale from “AAA”/“Aaa”, the lowest default risk, to “D” 
for countries currently in default. Countries rated “BBB-”/“Baa3” or higher are often 
referred to as investment-grade and countries below this threshold as speculative-
grade rated (S&P 2013f). Table 2 gives an overview of the rating scales for the main 
CRAs. 
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Table 2: Rating Scales and Definition 
S&P Moody’s Fitch Definition by S&P 
AAA Aaa AAA extremely strong 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 
very strong AA Aa2 AA 
AA- Aa3 AA- 
A+ A1 A+ 
strong A A2 A 
A- A3 A- 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 
adequate (BBB-/Baa3 last investment grade rating) 
 
BBB Baa2 BBB 
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ “Less vulnerable in the near-term but faces major 
ongoing uncertainties to adverse business, financial 
and economic conditions.” 
BB Ba2 BB 
BB- Ba3 BB- 
B+ B1 B+ “Adverse business, financial, or economic 
conditions will likely impair the obligor's capacity 
or willingness to meet its financial commitments.” 
B B2 B 
B- B3 B- 
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ “Currently vulnerable and dependent on favorable 
business, financial and economic conditions to meet 
financial commitments.” 
CCC Caa2 CCC 
CCC- Caa3 CCC- 
CC Ca CC 
“Currently highly vulnerable.” 
  C C 
D, SD   
DDD,DD, 
D,RD 
“Payment default on financial commitments.” 
Definitions are based on S&P (2013f) and S&P (2009a: 11). 
 
In contrast to S&P and Fitch, Moody’s does not use a category for “Default” (D), 
“Selective Default” (SD) or “Restricted Default” (RD). Moody’s continues to rate the 
defaulted bonds and indicates the magnitude of the expected loss to investors with its 
lower categories (Moody’s 2013f). On Moody’s scale, countries rated “C” are “typically 
in default, with little prospect for recovery of principal or interest” (Moody’s 2013a: 5) 
and countries rated “Ca” are “likely in, or very near, default, with some prospect of 
recovery of principal and interest” (ibid.). S&P and Fitch introduced sovereign recovery 
ratings in 2007 and 2005 respectively for countries close to or currently in default (S&P 
2007, Fitch 2013a). These recovery ratings serve the same purpose as Moody’s lower 
rating categories and indicate the expected losses given a default (ibid.). 
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Over the last few decades, CRAs have introduced several different rating types, 
depending on the denomination and the maturity of the bonds, but all these rating 
types are based on the same sovereign risk assessment. 
First, CRAs distinguish between domestic currency and foreign currency ratings. 
According to S&P’s methodology, the domestic currency rating is based on the foreign 
currency rating assessment (S&P 2013a: 36-37). A country can get an additional 
upgrade of up to two notches for its domestic currency rating due to the sovereign’s 
ability to issue local currency (ibid.). Moody’s foreign currency ratings are the same as 
the domestic currency ratings except for the fact that it takes additional balance of 
payments risks into account (Moody’s 2008: 13-14). Fitch’s domestic currency ratings 
are also directly linked to the foreign currency ratings and are usually one or two 
notches higher “reflecting the sovereign’s greater access to local currency” (Fitch 
2012a: 3). 
Second, in addition to rating sovereign states as issuers, CRAs also provide ratings for 
specific sovereign bonds. These issue ratings can incorporate the seniority structure or 
support arrangements, such as guarantees (S&P 2009a: 13, Moody’s 2013a: 8, Fitch 
2012a: 1). In almost all cases, these issue ratings are the same as the relevant sovereign 
issuer default ratings (ibid.). One of the few exceptions was a $250 million series of 
Argentinean sovereign bonds, which were guaranteed by the World Bank and rated 
AAA by S&P (S&P: 2001_11_06_Argentina) and Fitch (Fitch: 2001_12_03_Argentina) 
despite the imminent sovereign default.  
Third, CRAs introduced short-term ratings, which are directly derived from the long-
term sovereign ratings, but reflect the default risk for sovereign bonds with an original 
contractual maturity of less than 12-13 months (Moody’s 2013a: 7, Fitch 2012a: 3, S&P 
2013b: 4). 
Finally, CRAs also provide outlooks and reviews to signal potential changes to their 
sovereign ratings. Outlooks are categorized as “positive”, “neutral” or “negative” and 
indicate the likely development for the next six months to two years (S&P 2009b: 2, 
Moody’s 2013a: 32, Fitch 2013b). Rating reviews (Moody’s), rating watches (Fitch), or 
credit watches (S&P) indicate that a rating is currently under revision with changes 
likely in the following couple of months (S&P 2009b: 3, Moody’s 2013a: 32, Fitch 
2013b). If Standard & Poor’s puts a rating on credit watch, the rating has a one-in-two 
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likelihood of a rating change within the next 90 days (S&P 2009b). Moody’s concludes 
half of all rating reviews with a rating change after 180 days (Moody’s 2013a: 32). 
Despite this multitude of different categories, all rating types are based on the 
sovereign risk assessment developed for long-term foreign-currency issuer ratings 
(S&P 2013a: 36-37, Moody’s 2008: 13-14, Fitch 2012a: 4). Therefore, I will focus in the 
following on these long-term foreign currency ratings and refer to them in short as 
sovereign ratings. 
2.1.3 Who Pays for Sovereign Ratings? 
For sovereign ratings, CRAs moved relatively late from an investor-paid to an issuer-
paid model. Until the end of the 1970s, investors generally had to pay if they wanted to 
receive rating information. However, these assessments could be easily replicated 
following the introduction of photo-copy machines (Cantor & Packer 1994: 4). 
Moreover, the default of Penn Central Transport Company in 1976 and the increasing 
regulatory need for ratings increased the pressures on companies to signal their 
creditworthiness (White 2010: 214ff.). Sovereigns only began to pay for their ratings at 
the beginning of the 1990s (see Gaillard 2012: 36). Most of the sovereign ratings issued 
today by the three main CRAs are solicited, i.e., requested by the sovereign. Of the 127 
sovereigns currently rated by S&P, only 16 ratings are initiated by the CRA without a 
request by the sovereign (S&P 2013e). Only eight of Moody’s 52 EU-issued sovereign 
ratings are unsolicited (Moody’s 2013b). As a newcomer in the sovereign rating 
business, almost a third of Fitch’s sovereign ratings, 31 of 106, are not paid for by the 
sovereign state (Fitch 2013c). The few states that do not pay any rating agency are 
mainly developed countries with good ratings, such as Germany, Switzerland, France, 
and the United Kingdom. CRAs maintain these unpaid ratings because the sovereign 
rating is an essential component in the rating of domestic companies in these countries 
(S&P 2012d). Moreover, sovereign ratings can help a CRA to generate publicity. 
Therefore, for some rating actions, members of a CRA’s communication team are 
directly involved in the rating decision (ESMA 2013b: 9). 
2.2 Central Actors in the Debt Market: Why They Matter 
Since the 1980s, CRAs have started to rate more and more countries and scholars have 
begun to recognize the importance of sovereign ratings in the debt market. In the 
following sections, I will first explain the resurgence of sovereign ratings in the past 
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decades (section 2.1.1). In particular, I will highlight how regulatory endorsements 
increased the importance of sovereign ratings (section 2.2.2). In section 2.2.3, I will 
finally give an account of the literature on sovereign ratings’ impact on government 
bond prices and the domestic economy. 
2.2.1 The Resurgence of Sovereign Ratings 
Over the last few decades, more and more countries have been rated by the three main 
CRAs (see Figure 1). There are five major reasons for this increase in the number of 
rated countries: the liberalization of financial markets, the shift from bank- to bond-
based sovereign lending following the 1980s debt crises, investors’ and regulators’ 
interest in curbing risk-taking by banks and investment and pension funds, active 
promotion by the US and international organizations, and finally the importance of 
sovereign ratings for companies that want to raise debt in international markets. 
First, financial liberalization has led to an increase in the number of sovereign ratings. 
Given asymmetries of information and costs of gathering information, ratings are an 
important informational short-cut, especially for foreign investors. However, following 
World War II, private international financial markets were tightly controlled, which 
meant that market participants had few opportunities to invest abroad (see 
Eichengreen 2008: chapter 4). When the US imposed a tax on all new issues of foreign 
securities sold in the US, the Interest Equalization Tax (Helleiner 1994: 85), most 
sovereign ratings were suspended (S&P 2013d: 29, Moody’s 2013d). In addition to the 
US, S&P continued to rate only Canada, which was exempt from the new tax (ibid.). The 
liberalization of international financial markets was therefore an important 
precondition for the resurgence of the sovereign rating business. S&P and Moody’s 
started to increase their coverage following the US abolition of capital controls in 1974 
and the United Kingdom’s (UK) abolition of all exchange controls in 1979 (see Helleiner 
1994: 111ff. on details of the liberalization processes). 
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Figure 1: Number of Rated Countries 
 
 
Second, the developing country debt crisis in the 1980s highlighted that sovereign 
default risk is not an abstract risk for investors. Following World War II and tight 
controls on private international finance, few countries defaulted on their external debt 
(Reinhart & Rogoff 2009: 95-96). But the defaults of more than twenty countries in the 
debt crisis showed that sovereign default risk could not be neglected and could lead to 
serious financial consequences for sovereign creditors. On the one hand, investors 
therefore became aware of their need for detailed sovereign risk assessments. On the 
other hand, sovereigns had to show investors that, in contrast to some of their peers, 
they would not default. 
Even more important than the sovereign debt crisis as such was the way it was solved, 
a debt exchange scheme proposed by the US treasury secretary Nicholas Brady. From 
1989 to 1997, seventeen countries exchanged their defaulted bank loans for new so-
called Brady bonds (Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer 2006: 18). Until these exchanges, 
direct bank lending had dominated the sovereign debt market. Since then, bonds have 
begun to replace bank debt (Panizza et al. 2009: 21). In contrast to large international 
banks, individual bondholders have a higher need for external credit risk assessments 
because it is too costly for each individual investor to undertake a detailed sovereign 
risk analysis. Similar to the 1920s, rating agencies could play an important role by 
providing information and risk assessments for these bondholders. 
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Third, although large international banks and investment and pension funds are well-
informed and hence do not need rating information (White 2001:4), these institutions 
have to rely on sovereign ratings to solve principal-agent problems. The clients of 
pension funds and investment funds, as principals, need to find ways to curb risk-
taking by their agents, investment managers (Fridson 1999, Cantor 2004). CRAs 
provide an assessment of sovereign credit risk independent of the investment 
managers’ interests. Sovereign ratings can be incorporated into fund manager’s 
internal guidelines, forcing them to invest only in sovereign bonds with a certain credit 
rating (IMF 2003: 18). According to the SEC and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), 
ratings are widely used as triggers in private contracts (SEC 2009: 17, FSB 2010). In a 
survey of 200 plan sponsors and investment managers in the United States and Europe 
by Cantor et al. (2007), ratings are explicitly referenced in more than 80% of the 
investment guidelines. Moreover, public regulators want to limit risk-taking by private 
financial institutions. I will explain this central driver of the increase and importance of 
sovereign ratings in more detail in section 2.2.2 below. 
Fourth, the coverage of rated sovereigns increased because the US government and 
international organizations promoted the introduction of sovereign ratings for 
developing countries. In 2002, the US financed a conference for sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries to “educate them about the benefits” of sovereign ratings (US 
Department of State 2013). Sovereign ratings were meant to push developing countries 
to open “their books to public scrutiny”, adhere “to liberalization policies and reform 
efforts”, “promote realistic monetary and fiscal policies throughout SSA, even in the 
face of political opposition”, and to “strengthen a government's commitment to market-
oriented growth strategies and improve its credibility” (ibid). Following this 
conference, the US government paid Fitch to issue sovereign ratings from 2002-2006 
for 12 sub-Saharan African countries that were previously not rated by the three main 
CRAs. In a similar way, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been 
cooperating with S&P since 2003 (S&P 2010a). With support from UNDP, S&P issued 
sovereign ratings for several developing countries, including Ghana, Cameroon, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Kenya, Macedonia, Georgia, and Sri Lanka (ibid.). According 
to S&P, “behind the scenes, other international organizations and national development 
agencies have also encouraged governments to request credit ratings from Standard & 
Poor's” (ibid.). 
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Finally, although several countries do not issue external sovereign debt, they still 
request sovereign ratings to promote private sector borrowing. Until the early 2000s, 
sovereign foreign currency ratings were used as rating ceilings for private domestic 
companies by the CRAs (Gaillard 2012: 24-25). Since then, the three CRAs have 
introduced special ratings for this purpose, but the country ceiling still moves 
“invariably in tandem” with the sovereign rating (Fitch 2012a: 5). Sovereign ratings are 
hence a precondition for domestic companies to access international capital markets. 
According to S&P, Chile, for instance, requested a sovereign rating in 1992, ten years 
before their first rated external government bond, to “enhance the private sector's 
access to capital markets and help attract foreign direct investment” (S&P 2010a). As 
seen in section 2.1.3, CRAs also maintain a sovereign rating although the country does 
not pay for the rating if the rating is an essential component for the rating of important 
domestic companies in the country (S&P 2012d). 
Financial liberalization, the shift from bank- to bond-based lending, investors’ and 
regulators’ need to curb private sector risk-taking, promotion by the US and 
international organization, and the need to maintain sovereign ratings for the rating of 
domestic companies all led to a strong increase in number of rated sovereigns over the 
last few decades. S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch now rate more than 100 countries. 
These factors also explain why sovereign ratings have become more important for 
investors and sovereign states. Foreign investors and small bondholders take sovereign 
ratings into account due to information asymmetries. Investors and regulators can 
solve principal-agent problems by using sovereign ratings as an external check of 
financial institutions’ risk-taking. Finally, sovereign ratings have become such an 
important standard in financial markets that sovereign states feel the need to apply for 
a rating to enter the debt market themselves or to allow their domestic companies to 
raise money on international markets. 
2.2.2 Regulatory Endorsements 
Sovereign ratings’ inclusion in public regulation is one of the main drivers of their 
increase in importance. Regulators on the domestic and on the international level as 
well as central banks have endorsed sovereign ratings over the past decades. On the 
domestic level, the US already began to include ratings into their regulatory framework 
following the 1929 financial crisis. Regulators wanted to limit the risk-taking by 
financial companies. For instance, from 1931 onwards, banks were only allowed to hold 
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publicly rated bonds of at least BBB at book value (Cantor & Packer 1994: 6). In 1975, 
the SEC decided to recognize the three main CRAs as nationally recognized statistical 
rating organizations for different regulatory purposes (White 2010: 214). Until the 
2008/2009 financial crisis, ratings were used in more than 100 federal laws and 50 
regulations (Cantor et al. 2007: 14, Congressional Research Service 2009: 2, Partnoy 
1999). Section 939A(c) of the new Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act requires the US regulatory agencies to remove this reliance on ratings 
and replace them with other standards of creditworthiness (SEC 2011). In other 
countries, credit ratings are also widely used in national legislation, regulations, and 
supervisory policies as a recent review by The Joint Forum (2009) for the world’s 
largest economies shows. Although most countries aim to reduce their reliance on 
ratings, there has been “overall slow progress to date” (FSB 2012: 1).1 
On the international level, the incorporation of ratings into the standardized approach 
of the Basel II capital requirements has further boosted the importance of CRA 
judgments (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 2004, King & Sinclair 
2003, Redak 2006). Under the original Basel Accord of 1988, bonds from member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
were assigned a 0% risk weight, while claims in foreign currency on non-OECD 
governments resulted in a 100% risk weighting (BCBS 1988: 21-22). With the 
introduction of the Basel II Accord in 2004, banks that are not allowed to use their own 
internal ratings are forced to hold capital in accordance with CRA risk assessments, 
ranging from 0% risk weight for sovereigns rated at least “AA-“ to 150% for below “B-“ 
rated sovereigns (BCBS 2004: 15). Because of these capital requirements, sovereign 
ratings influence a bank’s costs of holding government bonds. Although large banks can 
use internal rating models, these models strongly rely on CRA assessments (Hau et al. 
2013: 296). 
The new Basel III framework did not remove this reliance on rating agencies (BCBS 
2011: 51ff.). In its implementation of the Basel III framework, the European Union also 
did not reduce its references to external ratings. According to the European 
Commission, “sometimes external ratings – however imperfect – remain the best 
solution available” (EC 2013a). For them, “the alternatives (e.g. country based method 
                                                          
1 In section 7.3.2 of the conclusion, I will have a closer look at current regulatory responses to 
the crisis. 
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for banks, internal ratings) may misguide markets, be too costly or lack objectivity” 
(ibid.). 
Due to the Dodd-Frank requirements, the US aims to implement Basel III without any 
reliance on the main CRAs as external credit assessment institutions. Instead, the US 
regulatory agencies want to use the OECD’s country risk classification as an alternative 
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2012: 21, BCBS 2012: 23). However, the OECD 
strongly objects to the US’ use of its country ratings. According to the OECD, its 
“country risk classifications are not sovereign risk classifications and should not, 
therefore, be compared with the sovereign risk classifications of private credit rating 
agencies“ (OECD 2013a, emphasis in original). The OECD’s ratings are transfer and 
convertibility ratings which serve the same purpose as the main CRAs’ country ceilings. 
These ratings do not measure the risk of default, but the risk of controls that prevent a 
company from exchanging and transferring funds outside the country (ibid.). According 
to the OECD measure, Greece was still rated in the best category until the end of 2012 
(OECD 2013b). Despite these objections, the US regulatory agencies went ahead with 
their reference to the OECD risk scale. In response, the OECD stopped rating all high 
income OECD and Euro area countries from 2013 onwards (OECD 2013c). “Although 
every effort has been made to eliminate misconceptions about the country risk 
classifications being sovereign risk classifications, many in the outside world continue 
to make use of the classifications as if they were measurements of sovereign credit 
risk” (ibid.). The failed EU and US’ attempts to find alternatives shows the difficulties of 
removing reliance on sovereign ratings from public regulation. 
In addition to the inclusion in domestic and international regulation, central banks also 
rely on sovereign ratings for their collateral frameworks. Banks can only use bonds as 
collateral at a central bank if the bonds are deemed eligible for central bank credit 
operations. Most central banks use ratings as one central eligibility criterion. Until the 
European sovereign debt crisis, this regulatory endorsement by central banks has been 
mainly overlooked by the literature.  
In the Euro area, the European Central Bank (ECB) relies on the assessments of four 
external credit assessment institutions for government bonds (ECB 2013a). In addition 
to the three major CRAs, the ECB has also used ratings by the Canadian-based 
Dominion Bond Rating Service since 2008 (ECB 2007). Before the financial crisis, 
government bonds had to get a minimum rating of A-/A1 to be deemed eligible as 
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collateral at the ECB. Due to the financial crisis, this rule had been amended to a 
minimum of a BBB- rating until the end of 2010 (Financial Times 2009). Although the 
ECB first emphasized that they would not change plans just to accommodate Greece 
(ibid.), the ECB announced on 25/03/2010 that they would extend looser collateral 
rules into 2011 (Reuters 2010). Following further downgrades, the ECB finally 
exempted bonds of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal from its minimum rating 
requirements (ECB 2010, 2011a, 2011b). Despite these exemptions, the ECB continues 
to rely on CRAs’ sovereign risk assessments. Ratings are not only used to assess the 
eligibility of collateral, but also to calculate valuation haircuts (ECB 2013b). These 
haircuts determine the amount of ECB credits that banks will get for certain 
government bonds. Currently, the ECB requires higher haircuts for government bonds 
rated below A- (ibid.). 
Table 3: Eligibility of Foreign Government Securities as Central Bank Collateral 
Central Bank Minimum Rating Rating Agencies 
European Central Bank 
BBB- (S&P, Fitch) 
Baa3 (Moody’s) 
BBB (DBRS) 
(higher haircuts below A-)  
S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, DBRS 
US Federal Reserve 
BBB- 
(higher haircuts below AAA) 
“approved ratings agencies” 
if more than one, then 
“most conservative” 
Bank of England AA-/Aa3 S&P, Moody’s, Fitch 
Swiss National Bank AA-/Aa3 S&P, Moody’s, Fitch 
Reserve Bank of 
Australia 
AAA 
S&P or “another major 
rating agency” 
Bank of Japan AA 
“by at least two rating 
agencies which the Bank 
considers to be 
appropriate” 
Data: European Central Bank 2013a, 2013b, Federal Reserve 2013a, 2013b, Bank of England 
2010, Swiss National Bank 2009, Reserve Bank of Australia 2013, Bank of Japan 2013 
 
Table 3 gives an overview of the reliance by central banks on minimum ratings as 
eligibility criterion for collateral. In contrast to the ECB, other central banks do not 
require a minimum rating for their own government’s bonds. However, foreign 
government bonds need to get a minimum rating by one of the major CRAs. As the ECB, 
these central banks want to maintain some room for maneuver. For instance, the 
Reserve Bank of Australia exempts New Zealand government bonds from this 
requirement (Reserve Bank of Australia 2013). The Bank of England only changes the 
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bond’s eligibility after it sought “to understand the circumstances of the downgrade” 
(Bank of England 2010). Despite these exemptions, sovereign ratings have also become 
engrained in major central bank’s collateral frameworks. 
Overall, the domestic and international endorsement of sovereign ratings has assigned 
CRAs a “quasi-regulatory function” (Weber & Darbellay 2008: 5). Sovereign ratings do 
not only matter for bondholders because of the information that the ratings provide. 
Bondholders also take sovereign ratings into account because ratings determine how 
much capital bondholders have to hold and whether they can use the bonds as 
collateral. By giving ratings the force of law, CRAs can sell “regulatory licenses” 
(Partnoy 1999: 711) and act as “quasi-public regulators” (Kerwer 2004: 14). 
2.2.3 Impact on Government Bond Prices and the Domestic Economy 
Due to their informational and regulatory value, we can expect that sovereign ratings 
have a direct impact on government bond prices and the domestic economy. Table 4 
gives a summary of studies on sovereign ratings’ impact on sovereign bond spreads, 
bond yields and credit default swap (CDS) spreads. Despite different definitions of the 
dependent variable, the sample size, and the specification, all of these studies find that 
sovereign ratings lead to changes in the dependent variable in the expected direction. 
Though most studies focus on emerging market economies, earlier studies by Cantor 
and Packer (1996) and Larraín et al. (1997) confirm this result for a data set including 
developed countries from 1987-1994 and 1989-1996 respectively. For 18 high- and 
middle-income countries, Cantor and Packer show that relative sovereign bond spreads 
rise 0.9 percentage points on the day and the following in response to a negative rating 
announcement and fall 1.3 percentage points for a positive announcement (1996: 46). 
Afonso et al. (2011b) and Kiff et al. (2012) show that these findings also hold for 
developed countries’ CDS spreads. 
Table 4 also provides a summary of the conditions under which sovereign ratings have 
a stronger impact on government bond and CDS spreads. First, downgrades have 
generally a stronger impact than upgrades. Second, rating changes in and out of 
investment grade have a particularly strong impact. Third, sovereign ratings matter 
more in crises episodes. 
 2 A Primer on Sovereign Ratings: What They Are and Why They Matter  
 
40 
 
Table 4: Studies on the Impact of Sovereign Ratings on Government Bonds 
Study Data Set Finding and Dependent Variable (DV) 
Cantor & 
Packer 1996 
1987-1994, 
18 high- and 
middle-income 
countries, 
S&P and Moody’s 
 DV: dollar bond yield spread compared to US Treasury 
rate 
 for two-day event window: increase by 0.9 percentage 
points for negative announcements and decrease by 
1.3 percentage points for positive announcements 
 stronger impact for: 
 speculative-grade countries 
 Moody’s announcements 
Larrain et al. 
1997 
1987-1996,  
26 countries,  
S&P and Moody’s 
 DV: spreads to 10-year US treasury bonds 
 stronger impact for: 
 emerging-market countries 
 review for possible downgrade 
Reisen & von 
Maltzan 1999 
1989-1997, 29 
countries, 
S&P, Moody’s, 
Fitch 
 DV: relative dollar bond yield spreads 
 for two-day event window: change of 0.6 percentage 
points 
 stronger impact for: 
 downgrades 
Sy 2001 
1994-2001, 
17 emerging 
markets, 
S&P and Moody’s 
 DV: EMBI+ sovereign spreads, monthly data 
 decrease in sovereign spread by 14% 
Kaminsky & 
Schmukler 
2002 
1990-2000, 16 
emerging markets, 
S&P, Moody’s, 
Fitch 
 DV: EBMI or EBMI+ sovereign spreads 
 average yield spreads increase by 2 percentage points 
Gaillard 2009 
1993-2007, 32 
emerging markets, 
S&P, Moody’s, 
Fitch 
 DV: EMBI Global stripped spreads 
 stronger impact for: 
 downgrade from investment grade to speculative 
grade 
 Moody’s upgrades and S&P downgrades 
Ismailescu & 
Kazemi 2010 
2001-2008, 22 
emerging markets, 
S&P 
 DV: sovereign CDS spreads 
 for upgrade and positive outlooks: decrease in average 
CDS spread by 11 basis points from day -1 to day 1 
(2.23% drop in CDS premia) 
 for downgrades and negative outlooks: increase by 67 
basis points (5.77%) 
Jaramillo & 
Tejada 2011 
1997-2010, 35 
emerging markets, 
average of S&P, 
Moody’s, and Fitch 
 DV: EMBI Global spreads, monthly data 
 upgrade to investment grade decreases spreads by 
35% or 160 basis points (beyond what is implied by 
macroeconomic factors) 
 5-10% reduction for investment grade rated 
 no significant impact for speculative grade rated 
Afonso et al. 
2011b 
1995-2010, EU 
countries, 
S&P, Moody’s, 
Fitch 
 DV: sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads 
 negative announcement increases yields by 0.08 (CDS 
spreads by 0.13 percentage points), a positive 
announcements decreases CDS spreads by 0.01 
percentage points 
 stronger impact for: 
 negative announcements 
Kiff et al. 
2012 
2005-2010, 72 
countries,  
S&P, Moody’s, 
Fitch 
 DV: sovereign CDS spreads 
 stronger impact for: 
 negative credit warnings 
 upgrades and downgrades in and out of investment 
grade 
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Despite these clear findings, the empirical studies cannot show why bond spreads move 
in the expected direction following a sovereign rating change. In some cases, sovereign 
rating changes might coincide with other events driving the bond price changes. 
Moreover, these studies cannot take into account market expectations of sovereign 
rating changes. Finally, none of these studies is able to distinguish whether sovereign 
ratings matter because of their informational or because of their regulatory value. 
However, two recent studies aim to distinguish between these two effects for corporate 
bonds. In a sample of US corporate bond issues from 2000-2008, Bongaerts et al. 
(2012) show that Fitch ratings only matter when they can be the tie-breaker at 
regulatory thresholds between Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. Kisgen and Strahan 
(2009) analyze market reactions in response to the decision by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission to recognize Dominion Bond Rating Service as a fourth 
nationally recognized statistical rating organization. DBRS ratings could only be used 
for regulatory purposes due to this decision. According to their study, corporate bond 
yields change in exactly the direction of a company’s rating by Dominion Bond Rating 
Service, which indicates the importance of rating inclusion in public regulation. 
In addition to sovereign ratings’ impact on the rated country, several studies 
demonstrate that sovereign ratings also have an impact on other countries. Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (2002) first test for these spillover effects on the bond spreads of other 
countries for a sample of 16 emerging market economies from 1990-2000. They show 
that these effects are stronger at the regional level and during crisis episodes. In a 
sample of 34 developed and developing countries, Gande and Parsley (2005) find that 
negative rating announcements lead to contagion to other countries. Ismailescu and 
Kazemi (2010) confirm spillover effects for emerging-market economies’ CDS from 
2001-2008 and Arezki et al (2011) for Euro area government CDS from 2007-2010. De 
Santis (2012) highlights the direct spillovers from downgrades for Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal for other Euro area government bond yields. In the most extensive study thus 
far, Böninghausen and Zabel (2013) confirm earlier results for a sample of 73 
developed and emerging market economies for all three CRAs from 1994-2011. 
Spillovers are generally stronger for downgrades and within the same region. 
Beyond its impact on governments bonds, many studies demonstrate that sovereign 
ratings also have direct impact on the domestic economy. Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2002) show that domestic stock market returns decline by about one percentage point 
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following a domestic downgrade. Brooks et al. (2004) and Hooper et al. (2008) confirm 
this result for wider samples. In an extensive sample of 101 countries from 1990-2006, 
Hill and Faff (2010) highlight that this impact is particularly strong during crisis 
episodes. 
It is not surprising that sovereign ratings influence the valuation and creditworthiness 
of domestic companies because sovereign ratings often have a direct impact on 
companies’ ratings. Until the early 2000s, foreign currency ratings served as ceilings for 
domestic companies’ ratings and since then, the new country ceiling ratings also move 
in tandem with foreign currency ratings (see above, Fitch 2012a: 5, Gaillard 2012: 24-
25). Fitch demonstrates that about half of its 958 international rating changes of 
corporate, bank and insurance companies outside of North America can be explained 
by sovereign rating changes (Fitch 2008: 1). Borensztein et al. (2007) show that 
sovereign ratings have an impact on companies’ ratings even after controlling for 
country-specific macroeconomic factors and firm-level variables. 
The link between sovereign and companies’ ratings is especially pronounced for 
domestic banks. The sovereign-bank nexus has become very clear in the European debt 
crisis (see IMF 2012: 33-34, Mody & Sandri 2012). As bondholders, banks are directly 
affected by a sovereign rating downgrade. The lower market value of the government 
bonds held by the bank in turn leads to a higher bailout risk. The need for more bank 
bailouts increases the sovereign default probability, which also lowers the probability 
that the sovereign will be able to bailout all insolvent banks. Beyond the European 
crisis, Williams et al. (2013) find that sovereign ratings also have a direct impact on 
bank ratings for emerging market countries in their sample of 54 countries from 1999-
2009. 
Overall, these empirical findings show the direct impact of sovereign rating changes on 
government bond prices and the domestic economy. This provides countries with an 
incentive to closely take into account what rating agencies demand from them. 
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2.3 Descriptive Statistics: Stability and Performance of 
Sovereign Ratings 
As sovereign ratings are embedded in public regulation and as they have an influence 
on government bond prices, it is important to understand their performance thus far. 
Following the 2007-2009 financial crisis, CRAs were widely criticized for their 
contribution to the subprime crisis (see Pagano & Volpin 2010). The US Department of 
Justice even filed a complaint against S&P in a Los Angeles federal court (Economist 
2013). He et al. (2011) find that CRAs indeed assigned more positive ratings to large 
issuers of structured finance products before the crisis. Efing and Hau (2013) also 
demonstrate that CRAs gave asset- and mortgage-backed securities a better rating if the 
issuer provided the CRA with more rating business. Moreover, Hau et al. (2013) show 
that large banks also received better ratings if the banks bought more structured 
finance ratings. In contrast to these failures in rating structured finance products and 
banks, CRAs have thus far a good track record for sovereign ratings. 
Table 5: Number of Sovereign Ratings 
Rating Agency Countries Year-End Ratings 
S&P 129 1,888 
Moody’s 109 1,823 
Fitch 111 1,295 
Total 147 5006 
Data: for S&P from 1980-2010 (S&P 2011b), for Moody’s from 1980-2009 (Moody’s 2011), for 
Fitch from 1994-2010 (Fitch 2012c) 
 
Since the resurgence of sovereign ratings, the three main CRAs have rated 147 
countries and issued 5,006 ratings at the end of the year (year-end ratings) (see Table 
5).2 Since 1980, S&P and Moody’s both issued more than 1,800 year-end ratings. Fitch 
provided about 1,300 year-end ratings since re-entering the rating market in 1994. 
About 20% of all year-end ratings were for countries with a AAA/Aaa rating (see Figure 
2). Until the end of the 1980s, the majority of countries were still rated AAA/Aaa. But as 
more and more countries received a rating, a lower percentage was rated AAA/Aaa. As 
a result, most rating changes occurred since the mid-1990s. 87% of S&P’s and 85% of 
Moody’s sovereign rating changes have taken place since 1995.  
                                                          
2 In the following, all sovereign rating data are from 1980-2010 for S&P (S&P 2011b), from 
1980-2009 for Moody’s (Moody’s 2011) and from 1994-2010 for Fitch (Fitch 2012c). 
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Figure 2: Proportion of AAA-rated Countries by Rating Agency 
 
 
Over time, sovereign ratings have been relatively stable, which indicates that CRAs 
seldom had to change their assessments fundamentally. Table 6 shows a transition 
matrix for all year-end ratings for the three main CRAs. Ratings are especially stable for 
better-rated countries. Countries with a AAA rating at the end of one year still got a 
AAA rating at the end of the next year in 97.5% of the 981 cases. Almost all rating 
changes within a year are only by a few rating notches. One of the few exceptions was 
South Korea during its financial crisis. From 1996 to 1997, all three CRAs downgraded 
Korea’s sovereign rating by several notches, S&P and Fitch even from AA- to B+ and B- 
respectively. For most rating categories, more than 70% of all ratings are not changed 
from one year to another. If a country comes close to default, its ratings change more 
often and by more rating notches. 
To measure the performance of sovereign ratings, we have to analyze ratings prior to 
sovereign defaults. In contrast to government bond yields, sovereign ratings do not 
reflect exchange rate expectations, monetary policy rates or inflation rates, but are only 
a measure of default risk. If CRAs fulfill their task, their ratings should be good 
predictors for defaults. Thus far, 24 countries defaulted that were rated by at least one 
of the three main CRAs one year prior to the day the default occurred. Table 7 shows 
the default date and the foreign-currency rating one year before the default. No 
investment grade-rated country ever defaulted one year later. Greece was the country 
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with the best rating one year prior to the default with a BB+/Ba1-rating assigned by all 
three CRAs. In contrast to other rating products, all three CRAs have therefore thus far 
not failed in their sovereign default risk assessments. 
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Table 6: Transition Matrix for Sovereign Ratings 
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Table 7: Foreign-Currency Ratings One Year Prior to a Sovereign Default 
Default Date Country S&P Moody's Fitch 
27/02/2012 Greece BB+ Ba1 BB+ 
06/11/2001 Argentina BB B1 BB 
27/01/1999 Russia BB- Ba2 BB+ 
16/05/2003 Uruguay BB- Ba2 BB+ 
30/12/2004 Grenada BB-   
29/01/1999 Pakistan B+ B2  
August 1999 Ecuador  B1  
13/02/2003 Paraguay B B2  
July 2003 Nicaragua  B2  
07/08/2008 Seychelles B   
14/01/2010 Jamaica B B1 B 
30/03/1999 Indonesia B- B3 B- 
January 2000 Ukraine  B3  
23/04/2002 Indonesia B- B3 B- 
June 2002 Moldova  B3 CC 
18/01/2005 Venezuela B- Caa1 B- 
15/12/2008 Ecuador B- Caa2 CCC 
21/08/2012 Belize B- B3  
08/10/2012 Grenada B-   
17/04/2000 Indonesia CCC+ B3 B- 
June 2008 Nicaragua  Caa1  
01/02/2005 Dom. Republic CCC B3 CCC+ 
05/12/2012 Greece CCC Ca CCC 
07/12/2006 Belize CCC- Caa3  
Data: Default dates are from S&P (2013d: 17-18) and from Moody’s (2013d) for those countries 
not rated by S&P. Sorted by S&P’s foreign-currency rating one year prior to a sovereign default. 
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3 Sovereign Rating Criteria: What We Know and How to 
Find Out More 
 
“The bankers, the rating agencies and the financial institutions 
have a much bigger voice in matters which are basically political. 
And, the idea that the bankers and rating agencies can just tell a 
democratically elected government to ignore altogether the will of 
the population seems to go against everything that democracy 
stood for.” 
Amartya Sen, Economist, 1 June 2011 (Sen 2011) 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, rating agencies have an impact on government bond prices 
and the domestic economy. Therefore, it matters what the agencies demand from 
national governments. As Amartya Sen in the citation above, many scholars claim that 
CRAs are in favor of certain policies and political institutions (see section 3.1.1). 
However, most empirical studies on sovereign rating criteria test only for a few basic 
macroeconomic indicators without controlling for political factors. Some scholars have 
built on these studies to analyze political factors, but their results are inconclusive (see 
section 3.1.2). This leads to the research question of this book: Do rating agencies take 
into account political factors and if so, which political criteria do they use (see section 
3.2)? The methodologies and databases that the main CRAs publish can give us a first 
indication of CRAs’ criteria. In these methodologies, CRAs indeed emphasize that they 
go beyond simple macroeconomic indicators and also take political factors into account 
to measure a government’s willingness to repay (see section 3.3). Section 3.4 provides 
an overview of the data and quantitative and qualitative methods used in the following 
chapters to understand which policies and political institutions CRAs regard as 
indicators for a country’s willingness to repay. 
3.1 Literature on Sovereign Rating Criteria 
3.1.1 Claims on Political Criteria 
Many scholars claim that rating agencies favor certain policies and political institutions. 
In particular, they expect that CRAs take economic liberalization policies, certain 
domestic political institutions, and the adoption of and compliance with international 
institutions into account. In this section, I will only summarize these claims briefly, as I 
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will provide a more comprehensive review on these political factors in the following 
chapters (section 4.1, 5.1 and 6.1). 
First, several scholars claim that CRAs promote certain economic policies, in particular 
economic liberalization policies. Sinclair, a political scientist who has published on 
CRAs for twenty years, claims that CRAs promote “institutional arrangements of a 
neoliberal form” (Sinclair 2005: 139) and an “American-derived mental framework” 
(ibid.: 71). Sassen, a sociologist, supports this perspective by arguing that ratings aim 
for an “undistorted price signal and little if any government involvement” (Sassen 
1996: 111). Datz, an expert on Latin America, argues that “sovereign ratings are 
embedded in a neoliberal strategy of development” (Datz 2004: 311) which is based on 
the “Washington-Wall Street ‘consensus’ on neoliberal reforms” (ibid.). 
Second, there is a lively debate on whether CRAs view democratic political institutions 
more favorably than other political regimes. Schultz and Weingast (2003) first argue 
that democratic states have to pay lower borrowing costs on sovereign bond markets 
and hence enjoy a “democratic advantage”. Beaulieu et al. (2012) provide evidence that 
such a democratic advantage exists for sovereign ratings, which is disputed by Archer 
et al. (2007) and Biglaiser and Staats (2012). 
Finally, scholars and international institutions expect that CRAs take the adoption of 
and compliance with international agreements into account (Kapstein 1994: 13, IMF 
2003: 18, Arner & Taylor 2009: 2, IMF 2013a). This provides countries with an 
incentive to adopt and comply with these agreements in order to gain a better 
sovereign rating. 
3.1.2 Limited Empirical Evidence 
Despite these many claims on CRAs’ political criteria, the empirical literature thus far 
provides limited evidence that CRAs actually take political factors into account. Most 
econometric studies focus only on a few basic macroeconomic factors. Table 8 presents 
an overview of the main econometric studies on sovereign rating criteria. Despite their 
different methods and data sets, these studies identify similar statistically significant 
macroeconomic indicators which determine a sovereign’s credit rating. In most of these 
studies, GDP per capita explains already more than half of the variation in sovereign 
ratings. Moreover, GDP growth and current account surpluses have a positive influence 
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on sovereign ratings. In contrast, higher inflation and higher debt ratios lead to a lower 
sovereign rating. 
In addition to these criteria that measure a country’s ability to repay, the literature 
mainly takes past default history as a proxy to assess a sovereign’s willingness to repay 
(see, e.g., Cantor & Packer 1996, Archer et al. 2007, Biglaiser & DeRouen 2007, 
Borensztein & Panizza 2009, Afonso et al. 2011a). A country’s repayment history has 
not only played a central role in the rating literature, but also more generally in the 
theoretical sovereign debt literature (see Panizza et al. 2009: 9-14 for an overview). In 
Eaton and Gersovitz’s (1981) seminal theoretical model, creditors permanently exclude 
countries from the sovereign debt market following a default. Tomz (2007) also argues 
that financial market participants punish inexcusable defaults and reward countries for 
repayment in difficult times. Cruces and Trebesch (2013) provide empirical evidence 
that financial markets take a country’s payment record into account. 
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Table 8: Overview of Main Econometric Studies on Sovereign Rating Criteria 
 Method Data Significant Explanatory Variables 
Cantor & 
Packer 1996 
OLS, cross-section, 
linear transformation 
49 developed & 
developing 
countries, 
29/09/1995, S&P, 
Moody’s 
(+) GNP per capita, GDP growth, 
indicator for economic development  
(-) inflation, external debt, indicator 
for default history 
Ferri et al. 
1999 
random effects, linear & 
non-linear 
transformation 
17 countries, 1989-
1998, Moody’s 
(+) GDP growth, development 
indicator 
(-) external debt, budget deficit, 
current account balance 
Mulder & 
Perrelli 2001 
pooled OLS, feasible 
generalized least 
squares, static & 
dynamic, linear 
transformation 
25 countries, 1992-
1999, S&P, Moody’s 
(+) GDP growth, fiscal balance, 
investment to GDP 
(-) inflation, debt over exports, default 
history 
Afonso 2003 
OLS, linear, logistic & 
exponential 
transformation 
81 countries, June 
2001, S&P, Moody’s 
(+) GDP per capita, GDP growth, level 
of economic development 
(-) external debt, default history 
Rowland 2004 
OLS, cross-section, 
linear transformation 
49 countries, S&P, 
Moody’s, end of July 
2003 
(+) GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
reserves to GDP 
(-) inflation, debt ratio 
Borio & 
Packer 2004 
OLS (including year 
dummies), linear 
transformation 
52 countries, 1996-
2003, average of 
S&P and Moody’s 
(+) GDP per capita, GDP growth 
(-) inflation, corruption, political risk 
score, original sin, default history 
Afonso et al. 
2007 
pooled OLS, random 
effects, fixed effects; 
ordered probit (robust), 
random effects ordered 
probit 
78 countries, 1995-
2005, S&P, Moody’s, 
Fitch 
(+) GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
government effectiveness, external 
reserves 
(-) government debt, external debt, 
default history 
Archer et al. 
2007 
OLS with panel-
corrected standard 
errors (PCSE), linear 
transformation 
50 countries, 1987-
2003, S&P, Moody’s, 
Fitch 
(+) GDP growth, trade to GDP 
(-) inflation, default history 
Biglaiser & 
DeRouen 2007 
OLS with PCSE, linear 
transformation 
16 Latin American 
countries, 1992-
2003, S&P, Moody’s 
(+) trade liberalization 
(-) inflation, default history 
Borensztein & 
Panizza 2009 
OLS, cross-section of 
three-year average, 
linear transformation 
68 countries, 
average of 1999-
2002, S&P 
(+) GDP per capita 
(-) inflation, external debt over 
exports, default, public debt to GDP 
Jaramillo 
2010 
random effects binomial 
logit model (investment 
vs. non-investment 
grade) 
48 emerging market 
countries, 1993-
2008, S&P, Moody’s, 
Fitch 
(+) broad money to GDP, exports to 
GDP 
(-) potential GDP growth, external 
public debt to GDP, domestic public 
debt to GDP 
Afonso et al. 
2011a 
linear regression 
(random effects), 
random effects ordered 
probit 
66 countries, 1995-
2005, S&P, Moody’s, 
Fitch 
short-run: (+) GDP per capita, GDP 
growth, (-) government debt, 
government balance 
long-run: (+) current account balance, 
government effectiveness, foreign 
reserves, (-) external debt, default 
history 
Biglaiser & 
Staats 2012 
linear regression, OLS 
with LDV, PCSE and 
country- and year-fixed 
effects 
36 countries, 1996-
2006, S&P, Moody’s, 
Fitch 
(+) GDP growth, trade to GDP, 
inflation, rule of law, judicial 
independence, protection of property 
rights 
(-) external debt to GDP 
(+) statistically significant positive effect, (-) statistically significant negative effect 
 
 3 Sovereign Rating Criteria: What We Know and How to Find Out More  
 
52 
 
A few recent studies on sovereign ratings go beyond default history as a proxy for a 
sovereign’s willingness to repay and start to analyze policies and political institutions. 
However, the results of these econometric studies are conflicting and face many 
empirical limitations. 
Jensen (2003) shows that democratic institutions are associated with better sovereign 
ratings and he thus affirms the “democratic advantage” hypothesis (Schultz & Weingast 
2003). Using a larger panel of data for different credit rating agencies, Archer et al. 
(2007) contradict these results. In their analysis, regime type is not a statistically 
significant factor. Except for the tenure of the chief executive’s party in power, all other 
political criteria they test for are not statistically significant, including the chief 
executive’s ideology, undivided government, honeymoon effects following an election, 
and election cycles. Block and Vaaler (2004), in contrast, argue for an impact of political 
business cycles and find that credit rating agencies downgrade developing countries 
more often in election years. In a subsequent study, Vaaler et al. (2006) show that 
downgrades (upgrades) become more likely if right-wing (left-wing) incumbents are 
more vulnerable to losing the next election. Beaulieu et al. (2012) try to provide new 
evidence for a democratic advantage. However, according to Biglaiser and Staats 
(2012), this advantage is not due to democratic institutions, but only because of the 
rule of law, strong courts, and property rights protection (see chapter 5 on political 
institutions). Regarding specific policies, Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) show that trade 
liberalization is the only economic reform that positively influences sovereign ratings 
(see chapter 4). 
The empirical literature also identifies several potential international economic 
agreements that could serve as a signal of a government’s commitment to economic 
openness and reform and hence its willingness to repay in hard times. Empirical 
studies test whether sovereign ratings are influenced by the adoption of and 
compliance with international financial standards (Mosley 2003b, Petrie 2003, Hameed 
2005, Arbatli & Escolano 2012), agreements with the IMF (Nelson 2010), and 
commitments as a member of an international organization (Dreher & Voigt 2011). 
However, these studies face many empirical limitations (see chapter 6). 
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3.2 Research Question 
As seen above, the empirical literature thus far mostly neglects political factors in its 
analysis of sovereign rating criteria. Despite many claims on the importance of political 
factors for credit rating agencies, there is only limited conclusive empirical evidence. 
The main research question of this book is therefore: Do credit rating agencies take 
political factors into account for their sovereign risk assessments and if so, which 
political criteria do they use? 
Credit rating agencies can take political factors into account on three different levels. 
CRAs can analyze a country’s domestic policies, its political institutions, and its 
commitments on the international level. As CRAs have to assess a country’s willingness 
to repay, I expect that they will look for signals of this willingness on all of these three 
levels. As I will develop my hypotheses on the importance of political criteria on these 
three levels in more detail in chapter 4-6, I will only give a brief overview here.  
First, regarding domestic policies, rating agencies can take economic liberalization 
policies into account as signals of a government’s willingness to repay because these 
policies are easily interpretable and costly to reverse (see chapter 4). Domestic 
economic reforms, in particular privatization policies, that are especially difficult to 
reverse are most likely to be used by CRAs. 
Second, CRAs can also analyze a country’s domestic political institutions (see chapter 
5). If more domestic actors have to agree on a default decision, it is less likely that a 
country will default. CRAs will therefore give a better rating to countries with more 
veto players that can prevent a government from making a decision to default. 
Finally, CRAs can pay close attention to a country’s commitments on the international 
level (see chapter 6). As any domestic policies, international agreements are only 
credible commitment devices if their implementation or a lack of compliance is costly. 
Rating agencies will therefore only care about international agreements if international 
organizations or other states enforce these agreements by checking compliance and 
punishing non-compliant states. 
How can we find out whether rating agencies take into account political factors on 
these different levels? As a first step, I will summarize what CRAs state in their 
methodologies on the importance of political factors for their sovereign risk 
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assessments (section 3.3). In section 3.4, I will then provide details on the data and 
methods that I will use in the subsequent chapters to find out whether CRAs go beyond 
simple macroeconomic indicators and also analyze political factors to measure a 
government’s willingness to repay. 
3.3 Evidence from Rating Methodologies and Quantitative 
Handbooks 
Rating methodologies published by the CRAs can provide some evidence on whether 
CRAs actually take political factors into account. According to the literature, these 
methodologies are “opaque” (Beaulieu et al. 2012: 731) and characterized by “secrecy 
and vagueness” (Biglaiser & Staats 2012: 518). However, since the financial crisis in 
2009, CRAs have become more transparent and have published more extensive rating 
methodologies (see also section 7.3.1). In these methodologies, CRAs emphasize that 
political factors are one of their major rating determinants and that their political 
analysis mainly depends on the qualitative judgments of their analysts.  
S&P analyzes a country’s creditworthiness based on five scores according to its most 
recent methodology (S&P 2013a). Four of these scores refer to a country’s economic, 
external, fiscal, and monetary performance. However, one score is also about S&P’s 
assessment of a country’s “Institutional and Governance Effectiveness”, for which S&P 
used the term “Political Score” until 2013 (S&P 2011a: 10-15). S&P highlights that the 
assessment of this political score “relies mostly on our qualitative analyses” (S&P 
2013a: 11). This is also reflected in the quantitative indicators, the “Sovereign Risk 
Indicators”, which S&P has published since 1999 (S&P 2012a). In this database, S&P 
does not provide any data on political factors, but only on a country’s economic, fiscal, 
debt, balance-of-payments, and external balance sheet performance. 
As S&P, Moody’s also analyzes a country’s “institutional strength”, which is one of its 
four major rating factors (Moody’s 2008: 8-9). According to Moody’s, the “starting point 
[… are] those indexes developed by the World Bank: Rule of Law, Government 
Effectiveness Index” (Moody’s 2008: 8, emphasis in original). The Government 
Effectiveness Index is also the only quantitative political indicator that Moody’s 
provides in its Statistical Handbook (Moody’s 2012a: 66-70). All other 53 quantitative 
indicators are on a country’s economic structure and performance, government 
finance, external payments and debt, and a country’s monetary, external vulnerability, 
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and liquidity indicators. Due to this lack of quantitative political data, Moody’s relies on 
its “analysts’ judgments” (Moody’s 2008: 9) for its political analysis. Moody’s is very 
explicit about the importance of its qualitative judgments: 
“While there have been continuous efforts to make the analysis 
more quantitative, it is our view that no quantitative model is able 
to fully capture the variety of situations and interference of 
political factors that characterize sovereign risk.” (Moody’s 2008: 
6) 
 
In particular, Moody’s points out that political factors are central because “by the very 
nature of sovereignty, a government may decide not to repay its debt despite having 
the resources to do so” (Moody’s 2008: 1). CRAs not only have to assess a country’s 
ability but also its willingness to repay and that is why they have to take political 
factors into account. 
Fitch also highlights the importance of a country’s “credible policy framework” (Fitch 
2012a: 7) and its “political will and ability to mobilise resources” (ibid.: 9) to repay its 
debt. Fitch mainly refers to the World Bank Governance Indicators (ibid.), which have 
been published by the World Bank on a yearly basis since 2002 (World Bank 2013a). In 
contrast to the other two CRAs, Fitch has also revealed a list of independent variables 
for their econometric sovereign rating model (Fitch 2012a: 18). This list includes one 
composite governance indicator based on the World Bank’s rule of law, government 
effectiveness, control of corruption, and voice and accountability scores (ibid.). In 
addition to these scores, Fitch also provides the World Bank’s stability and ease of 
doing business indicator in its Sovereign Data Comparator database (Fitch 2012b). 
Although Fitch publishes some information on its quantitative model, the agency also 
emphasizes the importance of its qualitative judgments on the first page of its 
methodology: 
“Fitch's approach to sovereign risk analysis is a synthesis of 
quantitative and qualitative judgements that capture the 
willingness as well as the capacity to meet its debt obligations.” 
(Fitch 2012a: 1) 
 
Overall, the three main CRAs state in their methodologies that political factors are one 
of their major rating drivers. As “there is no one-to-one mapping” (Kiff et al. 2012: 4) 
between their quantitative criteria and their ratings, we need to uncover CRAs’ 
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quantitative and qualitative judgments. In the following section, I will describe the data 
and methods that I will use in the following chapters to analyze which policies and 
political institutions CRAs take into account. 
3.4 Overview of Data and Methods 
First, I will estimate a panel econometric model with sovereign ratings as dependent 
variable, which is comparable to previous empirical studies. I have compiled a new 
extensive data set, which I will describe in 3.4.1 alongside with a detailed description of 
the econometric methods used and the macroeconometric control variables used in the 
following chapters. Second, in addition to this econometric model, I will also uncover 
CRA rating criteria by analyzing their sovereign rating announcements (see section 
3.4.2). In these announcements, CRAs explain why they have changed the rating of a 
certain country. This data source of more than 1,200 announcements has never been 
compiled and used systematically for empirical evidence thus far. 
3.4.1 Panel Data 
As we have seen in section 2.3, Standard & Poor’s has issued 1,888 year-end sovereign 
ratings for 129 countries from 1980 to 2010 and Moody’s 1,823 for 109 countries from 
1980 to 2009. Fitch started issuing sovereign ratings in 1994 and published 1,295 year-
end ratings for 111 countries until 2010. My analysis is built on this complete data set 
of all year-end sovereign ratings. In contrast, the first study on political variables by 
Archer et al. (2007) focuses on only 50 developing countries from 1987-2003 with a 
maximum of only 253 observations in their regressions for Standard & Poor’s. The only 
study on liberalization policies by Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) concentrates on only 
16 Latin American countries and a maximum of 121 observations for Standard & 
Poor’s. I can thus analyze a far more comprehensive set of sovereign ratings. Most of 
the following regressions are for a data set of about 100 countries and more than 1,000 
observations. 
The Dependent Variable: Sovereign Ratings 
As the previous econometric literature, I use year-end long-term foreign-currency 
issuer ratings in all of the econometric models. As explained in section 2.1.2, these 
ratings are the basis for all other sovereign rating assessments. Since Cantor and 
Packer (1996: 40), most econometric studies linearly transform the different rating 
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categories. This approach is also taken in studies published by CRA employees (see 
Borio & Packer 2004: 54, Fitch 2011a, 2011b). For my estimations on a linear scale, I 
transform the rating categories for Moody’s from Aaa=21 to C=1, for Standard & Poor’s 
from AAA=21 to SD/ D=1 and for Fitch from AAA=22 to the default categories RD, DDD, 
DD, D=1 (see Table 9). This linear transformation allows a direct comparison of my 
results with previous research on political factors (see Archer et al. 2007: 350, Biglaiser 
& DeRouen 2007: 129). As a robustness check, I estimate sovereign ratings on an 
ordinal scale. This approach does not assume the same differences between rating 
categories, but estimates the cut points for an unobserved latent variable (see below). 
 
Table 9: Linear Rating Transformation3  
Count S&P Moody’s Fitch 
1 D, SD C DDD, DD, D, RD 
2 CC Ca C 
3 CCC- Caa3 CC 
4 CCC Caa2 CCC- 
5 CCC+ Caa1 CCC 
6 B- B3 CCC+ 
7 B B2 B- 
8 B+ B1 B 
9 BB- Ba3 B+ 
10 BB Ba2 BB- 
11 BB+ Ba1 BB 
12 BBB- Baa3 BB+ 
13 BBB Baa2 BBB- 
14 BBB+ Baa1 BBB 
15 A- A3 BBB+ 
16 A A2 A- 
17 A+ A1 A 
18 AA- Aa3 A+ 
19 AA Aa2 AA- 
20 AA+ Aa1 AA 
21 AAA Aaa AA+ 
22   AAA 
 
Econometric Models 
There are a number of different econometric approaches to identify sovereign rating 
criteria. Table 8 in section 3.1.2 gives an overview of the different econometric methods 
                                                          
3 As I do not pool the data for the three different CRAs, the linear transformation is for each CRA 
individually. 
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used in the literature thus far. As Cantor and Packer (1996) in the first econometric 
study, other scholars have analyzed a cross-section of sovereign ratings with an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Afonso 2003, Rowland 2004, Borensztein & 
Panizza 2009). Using panel data, however, allows analyzing more observations and not 
only the cross-sectional variance but also the time variation in sovereign ratings. The 
most important studies on political factors (Archer et al. 2007, Biglaiser & DeRouen 
2007, see also Nelson 2010) employ a Prais-Winsten transformation to correct for first-
order autoregression and use panel-corrected standard errors to control for 
contemporaneously correlated and panel heteroscedastic errors.4 For each model, I 
present this PCSE(ar1) estimator as a first comparison to the only previous study on 
economic reforms by Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) and the first study on other 
political factors by Archer et al. (2007). 
Moreover, I test my claim for other econometric models that have been used thus far in 
the literature on sovereign ratings. First, I estimate an ordered probit. Since there are 
few observations in the last categories, I follow Afonso et al. (2007, 2011a) in analyzing 
16 categories from AAA (Aaa) to B- (B3) and below. I calculate robust standard errors 
clustered on country to deal with panel heteroskedasticity. In the ordered probit 
regression, one cannot simply include country fixed effects (see Gould et al. 2003). In 
contrast to most other cross-country political science studies (see the debate in Green 
et al. 2001, Plümper et al. 2005), the presence of unit-specific effects, however, would 
not indicate any underlying institutional country differences. Sovereign ratings are the 
results of a rating model of qualitative and quantitative indicators. Hence, there cannot 
be unit-specific effects in the sense of inherent non-measurable distinct characteristics 
of countries, but only in the sense of omitted variables and characteristics ascribed to 
countries by CRAs. 
With a fixed effects regression one can circumvent the risk of omitting time-invariant 
explanatory variables by using only the within variation in sovereign ratings over time. 
However, the average time series for sovereign ratings is still quite small as the ratio of 
                                                          
4 Beck and Katz (1995) suggest using a lagged dependent variable (LDV) for adjusting for 
autocorrelation. But for their simulations, the number of observed time periods was higher than 
for my data sets with an average of about 13 years (see also Beck & Katz 2011: 332). Moreover, 
for my estimation, the LDV model does not eliminate autocorrelation and the coefficient 
estimates in this model would therefore be biased (see Butler & Wilson 2007: 107). CRAs’ own 
publications on quantitative models (Fitch 2011a, 2011b) and estimations by CRA employees 
(Cantor & Packer 1996, Borio & Packer 2004) do not include LDV models. Including a lagged 
dependent variable leads to results that are in stark contrast to everything that we know from 
previous research and credit rating agencies’ own publications. 
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between and within variation is at about 4 for the three CRAs. With a fixed effects 
estimator, one can thus only explain a smaller percentage of the variation in sovereign 
ratings, the changes in ratings over time. Most econometric studies on sovereign rating 
criteria hence do not include country-fixed effects because they are too “costly and 
inefficient” (Nelson 2010: 119). This is especially the case for analyzing relatively time-
invariant independent variables such as political institutions as in chapter 5. Including 
country-fixed effects might even cause a severe selection bias because the results 
would be limited to countries that change their political institutions over time which 
are rather unstable countries that are not representative for all rated sovereigns. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, I will show that my main results also hold when 
country-fixed effects are included.5 
Nonstationarity is not likely to be a problem for my panel estimations. Although 
sovereign ratings are very persistent over time (see section 2.3 and the transition 
matrix in Table 6), my data are only for a short-time period of on average 13 years. As 
for many other political economy data sets, “while the series may be very persistent, we 
have no idea if a longer time period would show the series to be stationary” (Beck & 
Katz 2009: 13). Moreover, as the ratings are bound between D as lowest and AAA/Aaa 
as highest ratings, the means and variances of observations cannot grow larger and 
larger over time. Fisher-type unit root tests based on Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron 
tests also indicate no evidence for nonstationarity.6 Most of the variation in sovereign 
ratings and policies and political institutions is across countries and not over time (see 
Table 10 and chapter 4 and 5). Hence, my results will also not show a spurious 
correlation due to jointly trending variables because my results mainly rely on cross-
sectional variance. 
In addition to the PCSE(ar1), the ordered probit and the country fixed-effects model, I 
also report the results of a simple pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) estimator with 
White-robust standard errors. Although this estimator does not control for the most 
common problems in panel data, it is the one that Fitch uses (2011a, 2011b). In its 
                                                          
5 As additional robustness check, I also show that all results hold with random effects as in Ferri 
et al. (1999), Mulder & Perrelli (2001), and Afonso et  al. 2007), a generalised least squares 
estimator that puts different weights on the within- (fixed effects) and between-units estimators 
(see Greene 2003: 293ff.). For the ordered probit framework, I also confirm all results with a 
random effects ordered probit estimator. I use Frechette’s (2001) implementation in Stata to 
compute this estimator. As in the linear framework, this random effects estimator treats the 
error terms and country-specific effects as random variables. 
6 Due to space considerations, the results for the eight test statistics for each of the three credit 
rating agencies are not reported, but are available from the author upon request. 
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methodology, Fitch states that the “application of OLS [...] was the preferred statistical 
method because of the ease of understanding the relationship between the 
independent variables and the rating output” (Fitch 2011b). They explain that the 
“standard errors are White adjusted to correct for heteroscedasticity and thus do not 
violate the constant variance assumption” (ibid.). At least for Fitch’s rating data, this 
simple OLS should thus be the best approach to re-engineer their quantitative model. If 
they use such a model in 2011, they probably have not used more sophisticated 
econometric approaches over the last two decades. 
Finally, it is important to note that I only re-engineer the sovereign rating model for 
countries that are rated by credit rating agencies. Beaulieu et al. (2012) argue that this 
leads to a selection bias because credit rating agencies only evaluate borrowers that are 
willing to enter the sovereign debt market. According to Beaulieu et al.: 
“raters will have observed a biased sample of countries and 
developed rules of thumb to deal with that sample. Perhaps, if 
random samples of autocracies and democracies had sought 
ratings, raters would have developed an explicit preference for 
democracies over autocracies.” (Beaulieu et al. 2012: 714) 
In contrast to their analysis, this book is not about a hypothetical different state of the 
world, in which CRAs could have developed other criteria. Instead, I want to uncover 
the sovereign rating criteria, or “rules of thumb” in Beaulieu et al.’s words, that CRAs 
actually use. 
Macroeconomic Control Variables 
In the following chapters, I will estimate the impact of economic liberalization policies 
and political institutions on sovereign ratings. I will discuss details on these main 
explanatory variables in the relevant sections (section 4.4 and 5.4). In this section, I will 
briefly present the main macroeconomic variables used as controls in the econometric 
estimations. 
Despite their different methods and data sets, econometric studies identify similar 
significant macroeconomic indicators (see Table 8). Higher GDP per capita, GDP growth 
and current account surpluses have a positive influence on sovereign ratings, while 
higher inflation, debt ratios and past default history lead to a lower sovereign rating. To 
make my research comparable, I use the same set of macroeconomic control variables 
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that Archer et al. (2007) and Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) take as basis for their 
analysis of political institutions and neoliberal economic indicators. I use the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook Database (IMF 2010a) to control for GDP per capita 
(NGDPDPC, in current prices, US dollars), GDP growth (NGDP_RPCH), current account 
surplus as % of GDP (BCA_NGDPD) and inflation (PCPIPCH). As the two previous 
studies, I control for history of past defaults with a dummy based on data by Standard 
& Poor’s (2006) which equals one if a sovereign has defaulted on its debt in the past 
five years. Instead of an external debt measure, I use newly available data on public 
debt to GDP ratios provided by the IMF in its Historical Public Debt Database (IMF 
2010b). External debt data are only available for developing countries, are not 
significant in most of my models and were not significant in most specifications of the 
two previous studies. 
Table 10 provides summary statistics for all macroeconomic control variables for 
which the country in the specific year was rated by at least one CRA in my database. 
Except for a few islands and small states, the standard economic control variables are 
available for all rated countries. Most of these entities are only partly independent or 
their sovereignty is disputed. For my basic model, I have therefore 1588 observations 
for 112 countries for Standard & Poor’s, 1648 for 102 countries for Moody’s, and 1106 
observations for 102 countries for Fitch. 
The summary statistics in Table 10 show that the average rating is at “BBB+” (14.42) 
for S&P, “A3” (14.67) for Moody’s, and “BBB+” (14.85) for Fitch. The between variation 
in ratings across countries is more than three times the within variation for countries 
over time. Since Fitch only began to rate sovereigns again in the mid-1990s, the time 
series for Fitch is shorter with an average of less than 12 years compared to an average 
of 15 years for S&P and almost 17 years for Moody’s. The macroeconomic control 
variables are available for almost the same set of about 130 countries for an average of 
15 ½ years. GDP per capita is on average at $13,293 with average growth rates of 
almost 4%. The current account is on average almost in balance across the sample. 
Inflation is the only macroeconomic indicator that has a substantially higher variation 
across time than across countries. Public debt to GDP is on average at about 50% with 
the highest ratios for Japan and Nicaragua. For 5% of the sample, the country is in 
default or has defaulted on its debt in the previous five years. Overall, 23 of the 132 
rated countries defaulted on their debt in at least one of the past five years. 
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Table 10: Summary Statistics for Main Variables 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Dependent Variables 
     
S&P Long-Term 
Foreign Currency 
Ratings 
overall 14.42 5.24 1 21 N =    1806 
between 
 
4.91 4.90 21 n =     119 
within 
 
1.34 5.62 25.81 T-bar = 15.17 
Moody’s Long-
Term Foreign 
Currency Ratings 
overall 14.67 5.16 2 21 N =    1757 
between 
 
4.84 4.46 21 n =     104 
within 
 
1.51 8.77 24.77 T-bar = 16.89 
Fitch Long-Term 
Foreign Currency 
Ratings 
overall 14.85 5.23 1 22 N =    1252 
between 
 
5.13 4.35 22 n =     106 
within 
 
1.25 5.78 21.49 T-bar = 11.81 
Independent Variables 
     
GDP per Capita 
(NGDPDPC) 
overall 13293 14715 183 119521 N =    2036 
between 
 
11319 219 61507 n =     130 
within 
 
7770 -21827 71307 T-bar = 15.66 
GDP Growth in % 
(NGDP_RPCH) 
overall 3.87 4.07 -17.95 34.5 N =    2067 
between 
 
2.14 0.66 13.86 n =     132 
within 
 
3.50 -19.29 24.51 T-bar = 15.65 
Current Account 
Surplus as % of 
GDP  (BCA_NGDPD) 
overall -1.19 8.77 -50.69 44.61 N =    2067 
between 
 
8.61 -34.92 26.82 n =     132 
within 
 
5.41 -41.86 28.95 T-bar = 15.65 
Inflation in % 
(PCPIPCH) 
overall 15.48 132.77 -9.42 3079.46 N =    2070 
between 
 
44.19 1.10 442.28 n =     132 
within 
 
120.83 -423.59 2843.85 T-bar = 15.68 
Default History 
(pastdefault) 
overall 0.05 0.23 0 1 N =    2077 
between 
 
0.15 0 0.8 n =     132 
within 
 
0.17 -0.74 1.00 T-bar = 15.73 
Public Debt to GDP 
in % (IMFdebtGDP) 
overall 52.56 32.69 2.4 236.17 N =    1870 
between 
 
29.94 5.25 167.09 n =     127 
within 
 
16.89 -38.33 157.91 T-bar = 14.72 
Data: Rating data are from S&P (2011b), Moody’s (2011) and Fitch (2012c), the default history 
from S&P (2006a, 2011b), public debt to GDP data from the IMF’s Historical Public Debt 
Database (IMF 2010b) and all other data from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database (IMF 
2010a). 
Summary statistics are provided for the overall mean, the standard deviation (Std. Dev.), the 
minimum (Min), maximum (Max), the number of total observations (N), the number of countries 
(n), and the average time period in years (T-bar). Summary statistics are also given for the 
between variation (across countries) and within variation (over time).  
 
3.4.2 Sovereign Rating Announcements 
In addition to the panel econometric study, I will also analyze CRA sovereign rating 
announcements. CRAs publish a rating announcement for all new sovereign ratings and 
for each sovereign rating change on their website. These announcements are about 
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500-650 words long and contain an explanation why the sovereign rating is changed. In 
this section, I will briefly highlight the advantages of an analysis of these 
announcements, explain the coding process, and give some first summary statistics of 
the database. 
The analysis of these rating announcements offers several advantages compared to 
previous empirical approaches. First, in contrast to surveys (see, e.g., Mosley 2003b and 
Petrie 2003), an analysis of rating announcements can be more systematic based on 
more than one point in time. Second, compared to econometric studies, an analysis of 
rating announcements does not run the risk of omitting important unobservables. As 
discussed in section 3.3, qualitative factors are important rating drivers, which are 
difficult to include in an econometric analysis. In comparison to the panel econometric 
analysis, the text analysis of sovereign rating announcements can best be compared to 
the country-fixed effects models. For these models, only the changes in the dependent 
and independent variables over time are taken into account. In a similar way, 
announcements are not released on an annual basis, but for rating changes only. Third 
and most importantly, the announcements are the relevant explanations given to 
policymakers for rating changes. Rating announcements are the way in which CRAs tell 
policymakers what to do to get a better sovereign rating. 
Computer-aided text analyses have become increasingly common in the political 
science literature (see Krippendorff 2004: ch. 12). There are already some studies 
coding texts in the literature on the political economy of sovereign debt (see Bernhard 
& Leblang 2006: chapter 6; Enderlein et al. 2012). In particular, there have been a 
number of recent text analyses coding the substance of IMF program conditions 
(Caraway et al. 2012), IMF surveillance (Fratzscher & Reynaud 2010), and IMF 
boardroom discussions (Clegg 2012). 
For sovereign ratings, there is only one previous analysis of announcements published 
in the Global Financial Stability Report by the International Monetary Fund in October 
2010 (IMF 2010c: chapter 3). The IMF analyzes announcements from May 2007 to June 
2010 “based on a “count” of main ratings drivers mentioned in the rating action 
reports” (ibid.: 19). However, following previous econometric studies, they focus only 
on broad categories, such as main macroeconomic drivers, for instance growth, public 
finances, and debt. 
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I use the content analysis software MaxQDA to code the frequency with which 
economic liberalization policies, political institutions, and international agreements are 
mentioned. For the liberalization policies, I also code whether CRAs are in favor of or 
against specific economic liberalization policies (see section 4.5.1 for details). In 
addition, I code CRAs’ assessment of political institutions and elections (see section 
5.4.3 for details). For the international agreements, I code the reasons given by CRAs 
why they take these political factors into account (see section 6.3 for details). I will give 
one example of this coding process below for the sovereign rating announcement of 
Mongolia on 23/12/1999 by S&P. 
Box 1: Example of a Sovereign Rating Announcement 
“Mongolia Assigned 'B' Long-Term Rating; Outlook Stable 
23-Dec-1999 
 
SINGAPORE (Standard & Poor's CreditWire) Dec. 24, 1999----Standard & Poor's today 
assigned its single-'B' long-term foreign and local currency issuer credit ratings to 
Mongolia. The outlook on the long-term ratings is stable. 
 
The ratings are constrained by: 
-- Very high budget deficits. General government deficits have averaged 10% of GDP 
over the past five years and are set to continue. While the deficit for 2000 is budgeted 
to decline to 8.5% (excluding privatization proceeds), this would still be the highest of 
all rated sovereigns. The deficit stems from high current expenditure levels, substantial 
capital expenditure needs, and an inefficient tax system that fails to harness the 
growing private sector. 
-- High public debt burden. With the gross general government debt burden and net 
government external debt at about 88% of GDP and 100% of exports, respectively--one 
of the highest among single-'B' rated sovereigns--Mongolia's fiscal position is weak. 
Debt servicing is more moderate at 7% of government revenues, thanks to the 
concessional nature of the bulk of Mongolia's public debt burden. However, reflecting 
poor systemwide payment discipline and fiscal liquidity problems, the central 
government only recently cleared interest arrears on domestic bonds issued during 
past bank restructuring attempts. 
-- The challenge of accelerating structural reforms in the face of political 
uncertainties surrounding the June 2000 general elections. Urgently needed 
reforms include overhauling the moribund banking system and public enterprises, as 
well as stepping up large-scale privatization. The banking system, crippled by past 
inadequacies in the supervisory regime and problem loans from directed lending, will 
require urgent attention. However, expected recapitalization costs (estimated at about 
2% of GDP) are relatively manageable thanks to a generally very low level of bank 
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intermediation. 
-- The vulnerabilities inherent in a small, narrowly based, low-income economy. Per 
capita income of about US$430 is among the lowest of all rated sovereigns. A very 
pronounced export dependence on three commodities (copper, gold, and cashmere) 
underscores commodity price and demand-related risks. 
 
The ratings are supported by: 
-- Strong donor country and multilateral support. Successive governments have 
demonstrated commitment to prescribed reform programs while inducing a smooth 
transition to democracy and a market economy from communism. Continued support 
from multilateral lending institutions by way of aid and technical assistance will, 
however, be dependent on adherence to strict performance criteria. 
-- Progress into an open, stable, and market-led economy. Inflation has been 
gradually reduced to about 10% this year, from 268% in 1993. Economic growth 
continued to be robust in 1999, after having averaged 4% in the past five years, and is 
expected to accelerate in 2000 as key commodity prices recover. Nevertheless, the 
government still needs to implement further price liberalization and regulatory 
reforms. In addition, infrastructure improvements and greater diversification of 
product and export markets are needed to keep the economy on a stable growth 
trajectory. 
 
OUTLOOK: STABLE 
The stable outlook reflects the expectation that government reform policies will remain 
broadly on track, securing continued bilateral and multilateral support, even if the 
government is replaced in mid-2000, when elections are due. The ratings could 
improve if the next administration continues with reforms, fiscal pressures ease, 
and privatization attracts more substantial foreign direct investment inflows. 
Conversely, significant fiscal slippage and stalling reforms could put downward 
pressure on the rating. In light of Mongolia's weak fiscal position and tremendous 
restructuring and developmental needs, the country's creditworthiness also hinges 
on continued IMF and donor support, as well as sustained improvement in payment 
discipline to avoid a recurrence of payment arrears, Standard & Poor's said.” (S&P 
1999, emphasis added) 
 
Box 1 gives an example of a rating announcement and the coding process. On 23 
December 1999, S&P issued its first long-term foreign currency rating for Mongolia. 
The length of 593 words and the clear structure are very typical for all sovereign rating 
announcements. S&P emphasizes four factors that constrain the rating. Budget deficits, 
high public debt burden, and the vulnerabilities of a small low-income economy are 
three economic factors that are already emphasized in the previous literature and 
controlled for in my econometric analysis (see section 3.1.2 and 3.3). In addition, S&P 
states that urgently “needed reforms include […] stepping up large-scale privatization”. 
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I code this sentence as a positive judgment by S&P on privatization as one economic 
liberalization policy. Another liberalization policy is mentioned by S&P as one of the 
two positive rating drivers. According to S&P, “the government still needs to implement 
further price liberalization”, which I code as a positive judgment on deregulation as 
another domestic liberalization policy. 
The second positive rating driver shows the importance that S&P attributes to 
multilateral support for Mongolia. As S&P makes clear in the outlook, “the country's 
creditworthiness also hinges on continued IMF […] support”. I code this as a positive 
assessment of an international agreement, an IMF program. S&P takes the IMF program 
into account because of the financial support and the prescribed reforms that the 
program provides. 
S&P’s assessment of political institutions is less straight-forward for Mongolia. S&P is in 
favor of a “smooth transition to democracy”, but they also highlight the negative 
aspects of elections. S&P argues that the rating is constrained by the “challenge of 
accelerating structural reforms in the face of political uncertainties surrounding the 
June 2000 general elections.” I code this as an analysis of a domestic election. Moreover, 
I add this code as an example for a political business cycle that, according to S&P, 
prevents necessary domestic economic reforms. 
Overall, this rating announcement is one example that shows how liberalization 
policies, international agreements, and political institutions are taken into account as 
political factors by a CRA in its assessment of a country’s creditworthiness. In the 
following paragraph, I will introduce the unique data set on which my text analyses in 
the subsequent chapters are based. Following the example just given for the 
announcement accompanying Mongolia’s rating in 1999, I have coded all sovereign 
rating announcements issued since 1995 that were available online. 
Table 11: Summary Statistics for Database of Announcements 
Agency 
Announce-
ments 
Since 
Up-
grades 
Down-
grades 
New/ 
With-
drawn 
Invest-
ment 
Specu-
lative 
Coun-
tries 
S&P 520 1995 236 209 75 216 304 117 
Moody’s 371 1995 200 109 62 181 190 100 
Fitch 331 1999 171 105 55 143 188 100 
Total 1,222  606 424 192 540 682 137 
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As in the econometric study, I focus on long-term foreign currency issuer ratings, which 
are the most relevant ratings because all other sovereign ratings are based on them 
(see section 2.1.2). Table 11 gives a summary of the comprehensive database of 1,222 
rating announcements for almost all rating changes since 1995. Standard & Poor’s has 
changed 626 sovereign ratings since 1980. On their website, they publish 520 
announcements for 117 countries from 23/10/1995 to 19/05/2011 which are 97% of 
all rating changes in that period. 236 of these rating changes are upgrades, 209 
downgrades, 72 explanations for newly rated countries, and 3 for ratings that were 
withdrawn (WR). 216 of the countries were rated investment grade (BBB- and higher) 
following the rating change and 304 were rated speculative grade. Moody’s has 
changed 478 sovereign ratings since the 1950s. 371 announcements for a total of 100 
countries are published on their website from 01/01/1995 to 31/12/2010 which are 
98% of all rating changes in that period. 200 of these announcements are for upgrades, 
109 for downgrades, 59 new ratings, 3 for withdrawn ratings. Half of these 
announcements are for investment grade-rated countries. 
Fitch has changed 436 ratings since 1994. On Fitch’s website, there are rating 
announcements for all but one of the 332 rating changes for a total of 100 countries 
from 26/01/1999 to 03/02/2011. Fitch does not publish its previous sovereign rating 
announcements online, as many of the first published ratings were still issued by 
companies, IBCA Limited, Duff & Phelps Credit Rating, and Thomson Financial Bank 
Watch, that were acquired by Fitch from 1997 to 2000 (see Fitch 2011a). 171 of these 
announcements are upgrades, 105 downgrades, 48 new ratings, and 7 withdrawn 
ratings. 143 of the announcements are for investment grade-rated countries and 188 
for speculative grade-rated countries. The announcements by Fitch (624 words) and 
Standard & Poor’s (625 words) are on average longer than the announcements by 
Moody’s (474 words). 
Table 12 provides a complete list of all countries covered in the text analysis and in the 
panel econometric study. The text analysis extends the econometric study by 13 
sovereigns, for which no macroeconomic control variables are available. For eleven 
countries, the sovereign rating has not been changed from 1995 to 2010 so that there is 
no announcement available for the text analysis. All of these countries are, except for 
the Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein, and Micronesia, included in the econometric 
analysis. For twelve countries of the overall 137 countries, there is only one rating 
change or the announcement for a new rating. Russia’s ratings are most often changed 
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with 36 announcements followed by Argentina with 33 and Indonesia and Uruguay 
with 32.  
Combined, the econometric study and the text analysis cover 145 rated sovereigns. This 
new comprehensive database of sovereign ratings and rating announcements allows 
me to thoroughly analyze which political factors CRAs take into account in their risk 
assessments. Do rating agencies care about economic liberalization policies (chapter 4), 
political institutions (chapter 5), and countries’ adoption of and compliance with 
international agreements (chapter 6)? 
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Table 12: List of Countries Covered in Panel Econometric and Text Analysis 
Country 
Announce-
ments 
In Panel 
since 
 Country 
Announce-
ments 
In Panel 
since 
Abu Dhabi 2 NA  Fiji Islands  7 1999 
Albania 2 2007  Finland  5 1980 
Andorra 5 NA  France 0 1980 
Angola 3 2010  Gabon 2 2007 
Argentina 33 1986  Gambia 4 2002 
Armenia 4 2006  Georgia 6 2005 
Aruba 2 NA  Germany 0 1983 
Australia 4 1980  Ghana  4 2003 
Austria 0 1980  Greece 25 1988 
Azerbaijan  7 2000  Grenada 7 2002 
Bahamas 2 1997  Guatemala  6 1997 
Bahrain  14 1996  Guernsey 1 NA 
Bangladesh 2 2010  Honduras  3 1998 
Barbados 7 1994  Hong Kong 14 1988 
Belarus  3 2007  Hungary  19 1989 
Belgium  2 1988  Iceland  19 1989 
Belize 17 1999  India  10 1988 
Benin  3 2003  Indonesia  32 1992 
Bermuda 2 NA  Iran 5 2002 
Bolivia 13 1998  Ireland  17 1987 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3 2004  Isle of Man 1 NA 
Botswana  3 2001  Israel 6 1988 
Brazil 26 1986  Italy  6 1986 
Bulgaria  21 1996  Jamaica 18 1998 
Burkina Faso 1 2004  Japan 9 1980 
Cambodia  2 2007  Jordan 4 1995 
Cameroon  7 2003  Kazakhstan  20 1996 
Canada 6 1980  Kenya  4 2006 
Cape Verde  2 2003  Korea  21 1986 
Chile  7 1992  Kuwait 10 1995 
China 12 1988  Latvia  20 1997 
Colombia  10 1993  Lebanon  14 1997 
Cook Islands 6 NA  Lesotho 2 2002 
Costa Rica  3 1997  Libya 4 2009 
Croatia  5 1997  Lithuania  22 1996 
Cuba 1 NA  Luxembourg 0 1989 
Cyprus  10 1994  Macao 4 NA 
Czech Republic 7 1993  Macedonia  5 2004 
Denmark  3 1980  Madagascar  3 2004 
Dominican Republic 24 1997  Malawi 4 2003 
Ecuador  25 1997  Malaysia 18 1986 
Egypt 7 1996  Mali  4 2004 
El Salvador 7 1996  Malta  6 1994 
Estonia  13 1997  Mauritius 1 1996 
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Mexico 15 1990  Saudi Arabia  12 1996 
Moldova 14 1997  Senegal  1 2000 
Mongolia 7 1999  Serbia  4 2004 
Montenegro  5 2004  Seychelles 6 2006 
Montserrat 1 NA  Singapore  3 1989 
Morocco  5 1998  Slovak Republic 19 1994 
Mozambique  3 2003  Slovenia  12 1996 
Namibia 1 2005  South Africa  10 1994 
Netherlands 0 1986  Spain  9 1988 
New Zealand 6 1980  Sri Lanka 6 2005 
Nicaragua 3 1998  Suriname 5 1999 
Nigeria 3 2006  Sweden  8 1980 
Norway  1 1980  Switzerland 0 1982 
Oman 10 1996  Taiwan 3 1989 
Pakistan 22 1994  Thailand  15 1989 
Panama  7 1980  Trinidad and Tobago  9 1993 
Papua New Guinea 7 1998  Tunisia  5 1995 
Paraguay  12 1995  Turkey  19 1992 
Peru  17 1996  Turkmenistan 5 1997 
Philippines  10 1993  Uganda  2 2005 
Poland  8 1995  Ukraine 22 1998 
Portugal  11 1986  United Arab Emirates 5 1996 
Qatar 12 1996  United Kingdom 0 1980 
Ras Al Khaimah 2 NA  United States 0 1980 
Romania  24 1996  Uruguay 32 1993 
Russia 36 1996  Venezuela 24 1980 
Rwanda 2 2006  Vietnam 7 2002 
Saint Vincent 1 2007  Zambia  1 NA 
San Marino 3 NA     
 
Data: Rating data are from S&P (2011b), Moody’s (2011) and Fitch (2012c). NA = “not available” 
if macroeconomic control variables are not available for the specific country. Eight countries are 
included in the econometric analysis, but their sovereign rating has not been changed from 1995 
to 2010 so that there is no announcement available for the text analysis. 
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4 The Promotion of Economic Liberalization Policies 
In this first empirical chapter, I will analyze whether rating agencies demand certain 
economic policies from national governments. Although many scholars argue that CRAs 
promote economic liberalization policies with their rating decisions (Datz 2004, Sassen 
1996, Sinclair 2005), there is only limited empirical support thus far. Most studies rely 
on anecdotal evidence from very few rating announcements. In the only econometric 
study by Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007), most liberalization policies do not have a 
statistically significant impact on sovereign ratings. 
I provide the first comprehensive empirical study based on the new data set of 
sovereign rating announcements and the panel of sovereign ratings. Following a brief 
review of the literature (section 4.1), I will explain why I expect CRAs to take economic 
liberalization policies into account when assessing sovereign default risk (section 4.2). 
As argued in section 1.2, CRAs not only have to evaluate a country’s ability but also its 
willingness to repay. Economic liberalization policies can serve as an important signal 
for this willingness to repay. In section 4.3, I will present the independent variable of 
my analysis, economic liberalization, and different approaches to conceptualize and 
measure this variable. 
In the following two sections, I will test my claim econometrically and in a text analysis. 
In section 4.4, I will present the results for a panel econometric analysis of all sovereign 
ratings from 1980-2010 for all three major CRAs for more than 100 countries. In 
contrast to the only previous study by Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007), which analyzes 
sovereign ratings for 16 countries, I test for CRAs’ support of economic liberalization 
policies in a far more comprehensive data set. Controlling for standard macroeconomic 
rating drivers and except for trade liberalization, all economic liberalization measures – 
deregulation, investment and capital account liberalization – lead to better sovereign 
ratings. My results are robust to alternative specifications of the regression model in an 
ordered probit or a linear framework using panel-corrected standard errors and 
controlling for autocorrelation, country-fixed effects and alternative measures of the 
main explanatory variables. 
In section 4.5, I present additional evidence in a content analysis of all sovereign rating 
announcements published since the mid-1990s by the three major CRAs. In contrast to 
the existing literature that relies on only very few rating announcements for a small 
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number of countries, I test for CRAs’ promotion of liberalization policies in a 
comprehensive data set of 1,222 announcements for 137 countries. In their 
announcements, CRAs strongly support economic liberalization, with 82% positive 
judgments of a total of 647 judgments. 
In contrast to previous empirical tests, I can therefore show that economic 
liberalization leads to better sovereign ratings and that CRAs promote economic 
liberalization policies in their announcements. CRAs interpret economic liberalization 
policies as an important signal of a government’s market-friendly type. 
4.1 Literature on Sovereign Ratings and Economic 
Liberalization 
Several studies focus on CRAs’ promotion of economic liberalization policies. Sinclair, 
for instance, claims that CRAs promote “institutional arrangements of a neoliberal 
form” (2005: 139) and an “American-derived mental framework” (ibid.: 71). Sassen 
supports this perspective by arguing that ratings are tied to “narrow theories of market 
efficiency” (1996: 111), which aim for an “undistorted price signal and little if any 
government involvement” (ibid.). Datz argues that “sovereign ratings are embedded in 
a neoliberal strategy of development” (2004: 311), which is based on the “Washington-
Wall Street ‘consensus’ on neoliberal reforms” (ibid.). 
However, thus far there is only limited rigorous evidence on this “neoliberal agenda”7. 
Sinclair, Sassen, and Datz rely on only very few rating announcements for a small 
number of countries to support their claims. In his book on credit rating agencies, 
Sinclair (2005) cites only two sovereign rating announcements that show CRAs’ 
support of economic liberalization policies. First, he refers to a rating change in 1992, 
in which Moody’s embraces Argentina’s deregulation efforts (Sinclair 2005: 145). 
Second, Sinclair cites Standard & Poor’s first rating of Senegal in 2000, in which S&P 
promotes privatization policies (ibid.: 146). Sassen completely relies on Sinclair’s 
analysis to back her claims. Datz analyzes the case of Argentina and in particular its 
exchange rate system that, according to Datz, signals “the ultimate commitment of the 
                                                          
7 As the term “neoliberal” is highly charged in the debate, I will use the term economic 
liberalization instead. I will define the term in more detail in section 4.3.1. In principle, I focus on 
privatization and deregulation as domestic economic liberalization policies and on the 
liberalization of trade, foreign direct investment, and capital controls as foreign economic 
liberalization policies. 
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Argentine government to neoliberal reforms” (2004: 313). She claims that “rating 
agencies would downgrade Argentine debt” (ibid.: 314) if the country abandoned its 
parity system (ibid.). However, she does not give any evidence for this claim, such as 
citing rating announcements. As there are more than 1,200 sovereign rating changes 
and new ratings for more than 100 countries, the evidence derived from few rating 
announcements easily runs the risk of a selection bias and is not sufficient to support 
the strong claims put forward in the literature. 
Thus far, the econometric analysis by Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) is the only 
systematic attempt to analyze the impact of economic reforms on sovereign ratings. In 
their sample of 16 Latin American countries, trade liberalization has a positive impact 
on sovereign ratings, but all other liberalization measures – domestic financial reform, 
capital account liberalization, privatization, and tax reform – are insignificant. They 
thus conclude that “most economic reforms are apparently not essential for achieving 
higher bond ratings” (2007: 124). However, their sample of 16 Latin American 
countries from 1992-2003 only comprises a small selection of the existing sovereign 
ratings in the last decades, which shows the need to test for economic liberalization in a 
more comprehensive sample. 
4.2 Argument: Economic Liberalization Policies as Signals 
Sovereign creditors cannot credibly enforce sovereign debt repayment. Therefore, as 
argued in the introduction, CRAs not only have to assess a country’s ability but also its 
willingness to repay. However, most studies focus only a limited number of 
macroeconomic factors as indicators for a country’s ability to repay and use past 
default history as the only proxy to assess a sovereign’s current willingness to repay 
(see section 3.1). I argue that CRAs have good reasons to use economic liberalization 
policies as an additional signal of a government’s willingness to repay. As liberalization 
policies are both visible and costly to reverse, countries can use these policies as a 
device to signal their investor-friendly type. 
First, economic liberalization policies, such as privatizations and deregulation, are 
visible policies that a government cannot easily adopt if these policies are not in the 
interest of its major supporters. I assume that groups that support these liberalization 
policies are in general investor-friendly and are hence in favor of sovereign debt 
payment to uphold good relations with investors. By liberalizing its economy, a 
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government can thus build an investor-friendly reputation. Most liberalization policies 
can also be well observed by external rating agencies. Many other domestic policy 
choices and reform processes, such as wage bargaining and labor reforms, are difficult 
to assess for an outside actor. In contrast, liberalization policies, such as privatization 
programs, are very visible. For instance, even without being aware of all the intricacies 
of domestic politics, an outsider can nevertheless observe whether a company is sold or 
not. 
Second, most liberalization policies cannot be easily reversed. For instance, if a 
government wants to reverse its privatization program, it has to expropriate current 
owners, which will lead to visible protests that can be observed by CRAs as external 
observers. Moreover, the ability of a government to implement costly structural 
reforms can also serve as a general signal of its willingness to reform and to reverse an 
unsustainable fiscal trajectory in times of crisis. For these reasons, I expect that credit 
rating agencies take economic liberalization policies into account and that economic 
liberalization policies thus lead to better sovereign ratings. 
4.3 The Independent Variable: Economic Liberalization 
Policies 
4.3.1 Defining Economic Liberalization 
Testing this hypothesis requires a clear definition of economic liberalization policies. In 
the previous literature on sovereign ratings, the term “neoliberal” is not exactly 
defined. Sinclair’s two examples are on deregulation (2005: 145) and privatization 
(ibid.: 146). He also states that the “neoliberal privatization agenda is locked into the 
rating process as a technical assumption” (Sinclair 2000: 497). In addition to these two 
liberalization policies, Bruner and Abdelal analyze CRAs’ stance on capital account 
liberalization (2005: 2000). Datz refers to the Washington Consensus as a central 
neoliberal reform package (2004: 311). These policies were first summarized by 
Williamson in 1989 and include the following: fiscal discipline, tax reform, interest rate 
liberalization, trade liberalization, liberalization of foreign direct investment inflows, a 
competitive exchange rate, secure property rights, a redirection of public expenditures, 
privatization, and deregulation (Williamson 1989). In the previous attempt to measure 
CRAs’ liberalization preferences, Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) use data by Morley et 
al. (1999) on structural reforms, in particular on trade liberalization, financial reform, 
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tax reform, capital opening, and privatization. Their list of neoliberal reforms mainly 
includes economic liberalization policies. Instead of using the term neoliberal, 
promoters of these policies prefer the term “economic freedom” (see section 4.3.2). 
Simmons et al. summarize privatization, deregulation, and the liberalization of foreign 
economic policies as “free-market oriented” reforms (2006: 781). 
Since the term “neoliberal” is contested and not clearly defined in the sovereign rating 
literature and all cited examples are on economic liberalization policies, I will explicitly 
focus on these cited liberalization policies. Based on the examples above, I will analyze 
domestic liberalization measures, in particular governments’ privatization and 
deregulation efforts. In addition, I will take into account the liberalization of foreign 
economic policies, i.e., the reduction of barriers to trade, foreign direct investment, and 
capital flows. All of these five liberalization policies are often contested domestically, 
hence implementation is costly. If they are implemented, they could therefore serve as 
credible signals of a government’s type.  
4.3.2 Measuring Economic Liberalization Policies 
I will use different measures of liberalization policies based on data by the Heritage 
Foundation (2011) and the Fraser Institute (2011). The Heritage Foundation provides 
annual data for these indicators since 1995 and the Fraser Institute from 2000 to 2008. 
Data by these institutions are widely used in the literature. For instance, the World 
Bank uses several sub-indicators of the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic 
Freedom to construct the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank 
2012). Biglaiser and Staats (2012) use several sub-indicators provided by Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index. 
I construct two indices of economic liberalization policies based on the data by the 
Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Institute. Heritage Foundation’s Economic 
Freedom Index (2011) includes ten components in total. Four of these components 
capture economic liberalization. As foreign economic liberalization policies, Heritage 
Foundation’s trade freedom variable measures trade liberalization by the absence of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers. Investment freedom provides joint data on capital account 
liberalization and on the liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. As 
domestic economic liberalization policy, financial freedom measures the liberalization 
of the domestic financial market, in particular the degree of privatization with lower 
government ownership leading to a higher score. Business freedom is defined as a low 
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overall burden of regulation and the efficiency of government in the regulatory process. 
For each component, the Heritage Foundation compiles data on a number of sub-
indicators and then assigns a grade using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents 
the best score from their perspective. For their overall score based on ten components, 
they calculate the average of the sum of all indicators. I will construct an index of 
liberalization policies in the same way, by calculating the average of the sum of the four 
liberalization sub-indicators. 
The Fraser Institute provides data for three areas of liberalization policies. As foreign 
economic liberalization policy, their trade liberalization, and capital account 
liberalization variables measure the absence of tariffs and capital controls respectively. 
Similar to Heritage’s business freedom variable, Fraser’s business deregulation variable 
provides data for bureaucracy costs, administrative requirements, and price controls. 
For each variable, the Fraser Institute assigns values on a scale from 0 to 10. To 
construct a liberalization index based on their data, I take again the average of the sum 
of their three measures.  
In addition to these two liberalization indices, I will test for specific liberalization 
policies. Based on the definition of liberalization policies above, I will analyze the 
impact of trade liberalization, capital account liberalization, the liberalization of FDI 
inflows, privatization, and deregulation. In addition to the two sets of liberalization 
indicators from Heritage and Fraser, I also use Chinn-Ito’s measure of capital account 
liberalization (Chinn & Ito 2007, 2011) as a further robustness check. This indicator 
has been used in previous studies on capital account liberalization (see, e.g., Chwieroth 
2007, Milner & Mukherjee 2009). As this index provides data on capital account 
liberalization policies from 1975 onwards, it gives a more comprehensive set of data 
for one specific liberalization measure. The Chinn-Ito index is a composite index on a 
scale from -2.5 to +2.5 based on binary dummy variables of restrictions on cross-
border financial transactions in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions.  
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Figure 3: Development of Liberalization Policies 
 
Figure 3 shows the spread of liberalization policies since 1996 for the average of more 
than 100 countries that were rated at least once by one of the major CRAs and for 
which data on liberalization policies are available.8 Trade liberalization, as measured by 
Heritage, increased by 29% from 60.7 in 1995 to 78.4 in 2011. On average, domestic 
financial liberalization policies stayed almost at the same level as fifteen years before. 
Fraser Institute’s measure of deregulation policies rose from 6.4 in 2000 to 7.0 in 2009 
and Chinn-Ito’s index of capital account openness increased from .23 in 1996 to .82 in 
2009. In the following two sections, I test for these economic liberalization policies 
econometrically in an extensive panel data set and in a text analysis based on the new 
data set of sovereign rating announcements. 
4.4 Panel Econometric Analysis of Sovereign Ratings 
After an introduction to the data set used for this section, I will present the results for 
the newly constructed liberalization indices based on data by the Heritage Foundation 
and the Fraser Institute (section 4.4.1). In addition, I will analyze the impact of specific 
liberalization policies and compare the results to the main previous study in the 
literature (section 4.4.2). 
                                                          
8 The data are for 131 countries for Heritage data, 119 countries for Fraser data, and 128 
countries for Chinn-Ito’s measure of capital account openness. Fraser Institute’s data on the 0-
10 scale are multiplied by 10 to make them directly comparable to Heritage’s measure. 
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The panel econometric analysis is based on the comprehensive data set of sovereign 
ratings and macroeconomic control variables introduced in section 3.4.1 with 1,588 
observations for 112 countries for Standard & Poor’s, 1,648 for 102 countries for 
Moody’s, and 1,106 observations for 102 countries for Fitch. As Heritage Foundation 
provides annual data for its indicators since 1995, this leads to 1,235 observations for 
110 countries for Standard & Poor’s, 1,261 observations for 102 countries for Moody’s, 
and 1,068 observations for 102 countries for Fitch. For the Fraser Institute data, I can 
analyze a smaller sample from 2000 to 2008 with 751 observations for 103 countries 
for Standard & Poor’s, 728 observations for 94 countries for Moody’s, and 684 
observations for 96 countries for Fitch. With its longer time series, Chinn-Ito’s index of 
capital account openness allows me to analyze 1,550 observations for 110 countries for 
Standard & Poor’s, 1,606 observations for 100 countries for Moody’s, and 1,080 
observations for 100 countries for Fitch. By analyzing economic policies with this set of 
different indicators of overall and specific liberalization measures, I aim to provide 
robust results that are not dependent on one particular measurement of economic 
liberalization. 
I will test the impact of economic liberalization on sovereign ratings for all econometric 
models used in the previous literature and discussed in section 3.4.1. Due to space 
considerations, I present only the PCSE(ar1) estimator, which is a direct comparison to 
previous research on economic liberalization, in the main text and report all other 
results in the appendix. 
4.4.1 Results for Economic Liberalization Indices 
Table 13 reports the results of the impact of the macroeconomic variables and the two 
economic liberalization indices on the sovereign ratings of the three main CRAs. For all 
CRAs, the macroeconomic control variables, which are statistically significant, have the 
expected sign in all model specifications.9 Table 20-Table 22 in the appendix show that 
the macroeconomic variables already explain about two thirds of the variation in 
sovereign ratings. 
For all three CRAs, the liberalization index based on Heritage data has a significant 
positive effect on sovereign ratings. Its influence is substantial. In most estimations, an 
                                                          
9 All of the following results also hold when they are tested for a sample of developing countries 
as in some of the previous literature and when political institutions are introduced as further 
controls (see also chapter 5). 
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increase by 10 points on the 0-100 Heritage scale leads to an increase in sovereign 
ratings of up to almost half a rating notch. This result holds for all model specifications 
for all CRAs (Table 23-Table 25 in the appendix). Controlling for the macroeconomic 
indicators in the PSCE(ar1)-estimation, an increase from the 10%- to the 90%-
percentile on the liberalization scale (from 48.65 to 80.60) leads to a sovereign rating 
that is about 1.5 rating notches higher. 
The liberalization index based on Fraser Institute data is also significantly positively 
correlated with sovereign ratings for all three CRAs. The results are only insignificant 
for Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s in the fixed-effects regression although they have 
the expected sign (see Table 32-Table 34 in the appendix). However, this is no surprise 
given the short time series of less than 8 years. For the other models, the effect is 
substantive and similar to the effect of Heritage’s measure. In the linear framework, a 
one point increase on the 10-point Fraser scale leads to a higher rating of almost one 
rating notch. 
To obtain simulated probabilities for the ordered probit estimations in the appendix, I 
use Clarify, a program developed by Tomz et al. (2003) that uses Monte Carlo 
simulations to interpret statistical results. For the simulation, I hold all other control 
variables at their mean. As for the linear estimations, the simulations show the 
substantive significance of liberalization policies. The predicted probability that a 
country has an “A” rating or higher is almost zero for the lowest actual liberalization 
score on Heritage’s (30) or Fraser’s scales (4.15). For the highest liberalization score on 
Fraser’s (9.2) or Heritage’s scale (92.5), the probability of a rating of “BB” or lower is 
almost zero. 
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Table 13: Regression of Economic Liberalization on Sovereign Ratings 
VARIABLES S&P Moody’s Fitch S&P Moody’s Fitch 
Ln(GDP) 
2.651*** 2.827*** 2.665*** 2.569*** 2.886*** 2.454*** 
(0.135) (0.142) (0.124) (0.140) (0.156) (0.102) 
GDP Growth 
0.021 0.016 0.020 -0.018 -0.014 -0.019 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.004 0.006 0.008 0.028** 0.036*** 0.017 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Inflation 
-0.019*** 0.001 -0.011 -0.068*** -0.048*** -0.072*** 
(0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) 
Default History 
0.201 -0.134 -0.030 -0.442 -0.735 -0.786 
(0.320) (0.275) (0.386) (0.618) (0.467) (0.639) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.009** -0.006 -0.002 -0.000 0.003 0.004 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Heritage 
Liberalization 
0.048*** 0.039*** 0.044***    
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    
Fraser 
Liberalization 
   0.802*** 0.688*** 0.945*** 
   (0.193) (0.183) (0.146) 
Constant 
-12.499*** -13.795*** -11.652*** -13.840*** -16.237*** -12.796*** 
(1.103) (1.334) (0.969) (1.286) (1.496) (1.053) 
Observations 1,235 1,261 1,068 751 728 684 
R-squared 0.757 0.759 0.770 0.815 0.830 0.850 
Countries 110 102 102 103 94 96 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.4.2 Results for Specific Liberalization Policies 
Table 14 presents the results for individual liberalization indicators. As the individual 
liberalization policies are positively correlated, their effects are expected to be less 
significant in the joint regression below due to multicollinearity (see Table 29-Table 31 
in the appendix for individual regressions of each of Heritage’s indicators). However, 
even under these stringent assumptions, most individual liberalization policies have a 
significant positive impact on sovereign ratings. 
For Heritage Foundation’s data, I test for four liberalization policies: business, trade, 
investment, and financial freedom. Except for trade freedom, all indicators have a 
significant positive influence on sovereign ratings for all three CRAs in most 
estimations. An increase by 10 points in the individual indicators leads to a better 
rating of .10 to .18 of a rating notch. Except for the insignificant trade freedom measure, 
the results confirm the expectation that liberalization policies lead to better sovereign 
ratings. 
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I also test for individual liberalization policies with Fraser Institute’s data on business 
deregulation, trade liberalization, and capital account liberalization. The results are 
substantially the same as for the Heritage Foundation. Business deregulation and 
capital account liberalization lead to better sovereign ratings. An increase by one point 
on Fraser’s scale is associated with an increase in sovereign ratings of .1 to .4 of a rating 
notch. As for the overall measure, the fixed-effects results for the deregulation measure 
of Fraser’s short time series are only significant for Fitch. 
The clear results on capital account liberalization can be confirmed for the alternative 
measure of capital account openness by Chinn and Ito (2011, see Table 38-Table 40 in 
the appendix). In all estimations, higher capital account openness has a significant 
positive effect on sovereign ratings for all CRAs. This analysis is a further robustness 
test because the index covers a longer period including the 1980s. The degree of the 
effect is also similar to the results for other liberalization policies if these policies are 
regressed individually. A half point increase on the five point capital account openness 
scale leads to a better rating of up to one rating notch. 
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Table 14: Regression of Specific Liberalization Policies on Sovereign Ratings 
VARIABLES S&P Moody’s Fitch S&P Moody’s Fitch 
Ln(GDP) 
2.689*** 2.901*** 2.692*** 2.586*** 2.925*** 2.524*** 
(0.139) (0.138) (0.126) (0.141) (0.172) (0.105) 
GDP Growth 
0.019 0.015 0.019 -0.008 -0.003 -0.012 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) 
Current Acc. 
Surplus 
0.004 0.007 0.008 0.028** 0.036*** 0.020* 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Default 
History 
-0.020*** 0.001 -0.011 -0.066*** -0.043*** -0.075*** 
(0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) 
Public Debt to 
GDP 
0.220 -0.158 -0.007 -0.396 -0.556 -0.859 
(0.325) (0.281) (0.388) (0.630) (0.459) (0.671) 
Inflation 
-0.010** -0.006 -0.003 -0.000 0.003 0.004 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Business 
Freedom 
0.014** 0.014** 0.014*    
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)    
Trade 
freedom 
0.000 -0.006 -0.000    
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)    
Investment 
Freedom 
0.018*** 0.017*** 0.012*    
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)    
Financial 
Freedom 
0.012** 0.010** 0.014***    
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
Business 
Deregulation 
   0.250** 0.197* 0.403*** 
   (0.108) (0.107) (0.087) 
Low Trade 
Taxation 
   0.129* 0.071 0.053 
   (0.076) (0.092) (0.059) 
Capital Acc. 
Liberaliz. 
   0.173*** 0.107** 0.120*** 
   (0.055) (0.054) (0.045) 
Constant 
-12.394*** -13.999*** -11.468*** -12.288*** -14.521*** -10.718*** 
(1.059) (1.225) (0.932) (1.099) (1.501) (0.873) 
Observations 1,235 1,261 1,068 751 728 684 
R-squared 0.759 0.765 0.771 0.811 0.823 0.843 
countries 110 102 102 103 94 96 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Trade liberalization is the only liberalization policy that is statistically and 
substantively insignificant in all model specifications. Even if I do not control for other 
liberalization policies, trade liberalization is still not significant (see Table 29-Table 31 
in the appendix). This shows the potential limits of economic liberalization measures as 
signals of a government’s investor-friendly type. In contrast to the other liberalization 
policies, trade liberalization can have a direct impact on a government’s fiscal stance. 
Trade taxes are an important government revenue source for most developing 
countries (Agénor & Montiel 2008: 19). These revenues ensure the capacity of 
sovereign debt repayment, in particular since developing countries find it more difficult 
to raise other tax revenues because of insufficient institutions, such as a limited 
administrative capacity, a large informal sector resulting in a low tax base, and low 
 4 The Promotion of Economic Liberalization Policies  
 
83 
 
collection rates (Bird & Zolt 2005). Trade liberalization as a signal cannot trump the 
importance of these government revenues. 
The consistent substantive and statistical significance of my results on the impact of 
liberalization policies stands in sharp contrast to the insignificance of the results 
presented in the only previous study thus far by Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007). The 
difference between the two studies is particularly puzzling because the only significant 
liberalization policy in Biglaiser and DeRouen, their measure of trade liberalization 
based on tariff policy (Biglaiser & DeRouen 2007: 127), delivers insignificant results in 
my analysis. Because of this surprising difference, I have a closer look at their data that 
Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) gratefully provide in the data archive of International 
Studies Quarterly (ISQ Data Archive 2011). 
In general, their sample of 108 observations for 13 countries for Moody’s and 121 
observations for 15 countries for Standard & Poor’s is relatively small and displays only 
small variation for the liberalization policies on the 0 to 1 scale by Morley et al. (1999). 
This is even more the case for their measure of trade liberalization. There is almost no 
variation in trade policies on this scale (see Figure 4). Even if their result on trade 
reform was robust, it would be based on almost no trade policy changes on this scale in 
their sample. This shows the importance of increasing the sample size to test for the 
role of liberalization policies more extensively in a sample with more variation in 
liberalization policies. 
Figure 4: Box Plot of Liberalization Policies in Latin America, 1995-2003 
 
Data: Biglaiser & DeRouen (2007) for 16 Latin American countries (see ISQ Data Archive 2011) 
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4.5 Content Analysis of Sovereign Rating Announcements 
In contrast to the insignificant results on economic reform indicators reported in the 
previous econometric study, I can show a substantive positive effect of economic 
liberalization on sovereign ratings in the panel econometric study above. In this 
section, I present the results of an additional content analysis based on the 
comprehensive sample of 1,222 sovereign rating announcements introduced in section 
3.4.2. After highlighting the advantages of the content analysis, I will explain the coding 
process of economic liberalization policies (section 4.5.1) and present my central 
findings (section 4.5.2). 
A content analysis of sovereign rating announcements can shed more light on the 
specific liberalization policies that CRAs promote and on the stated reasons for their 
support of specific policies. First, the text analysis can help me to identify the impact of 
specific economic liberalization policies on sovereign ratings. It is difficult to include 
qualitative factors in an econometric analysis. But qualitative factors are important 
rating drivers, especially for political factors as rating agencies state in their 
methodologies (see section 3.3). Due to the lack of appropriate cross-country data, I 
was only able to analyze the impact of the privatization of financial companies 
(included in Heritage’s measure of “financial freedom”) and not of privatization in 
general. Moreover, for specific policies, econometric studies run the risk of 
multicollinearity. Although it is possible to determine the overall significant positive 
impact of economic liberalization on sovereign ratings, it is difficult to identify which 
specific liberalization policies account for this positive effect of liberalization on ratings. 
Second, the text analysis allows me to identify the reasons stated by CRAs for specific 
liberalization policies. This could especially help me in understanding the unexpected 
results of the econometric analysis on the insignificance of trade liberalization. Third, 
there could be a difference between CRAs’ revealed preferences in their sovereign 
ratings and their expressed preferences in their announcements. CRAs could demand 
different policy reforms from national governments than those that are relevant for 
their sovereign ratings. For all these reasons, a text analysis can give additional 
evidence on the liberalization policies that CRAs promote. 
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4.5.1 Coding Liberalization Policies 
To make my text analysis comparable to the panel econometric results, I use the 
definitions of trade, FDI, and capital account liberalization by the Heritage Foundation 
and the Fraser Institute for the content analysis (see section 4.3.2). In addition to 
business deregulation, I also take the deregulation of credit and labor markets into 
account. Moreover, I do not only code the privatization of financial companies (as 
Heritage’s “financial freedom” variable), but privatization in general. Privatization is 
defined as “the deliberate sale by a government of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or 
assets to private economic agents” (Megginson & Netter 2001: 321). Privatization is a 
central and precise element of the Washington consensus policies and “suggests a 
commitment to the private over the public sector” according to Biglaiser and DeRouen 
(2007: 126). 
Based on these definitions of the specific liberalization policies above, I go through all 
1,222 announcements and code the frequency of all judgments on economic 
liberalization policies with the content analysis software MAXQDA. In addition to this 
frequency analysis, I also conduct a valence analysis, coding whether CRAs are in favor 
of or against specific economic liberalization policies. I identify CRAs’ position in three 
ways. 
First, there is often a direct statement that links the rating decision to the judgment so 
that it is clear what position a CRA takes. For instance, Fitch argues in a rating 
announcement for Nigeria on 30/01/2006 that “Nigeria's ratings are underpinned by 
the current government's strong commitment to economic reform, including measures 
to [...] accelerate privatisation”. For this statement, I thus code a positive judgment on 
privatization policy. There are also clear judgments when CRAs relate policies to future 
rating changes, such as in the case of Qatar, for which Standard & Poor’s states on 
03/09/2001, “The ratings could be raised again if the government […] restarts the 
stalled privatization program”. 
Second, CRAs often directly demand policy changes from governments, which also 
shows their preferences for certain economic liberalization policies. For instance, Fitch 
demands the following from the Greek government on 20/06/2001, “Further 
privatisation, deregulation and public sector reform (particularly in the pensions 
sector) are all urgently required”. 
 4 The Promotion of Economic Liberalization Policies  
 
86 
 
Third, CRAs make judgments when they explain the impact of economic liberalization 
on other rating drivers in their announcements. We know from CRA methodologies and 
previous studies (see section 3.1.2) that CRAs are in favor of a higher GDP per capita, 
higher economic growth, lower public debt, lower deficits, and lower inflation. In the 
first announcement for Kenya on 12/12/2007, Fitch, for instance, highlights that the 
“economy also benefits from a large and resilient private sector with ongoing 
privatisation further reducing the role of the state”. In this announcement, there is a 
direct link between privatization, which increases the role of the private sector to the 
benefit of the economy as a whole. Hence I code this statement as a positive judgment 
on privatization policies. 
In Table 15, I give examples for positive and negative judgments for all economic 
liberalization policies. If a CRA endorses the removal of policy barriers on trade, FDI, 
and capital account flows, this is always coded as a positive judgment. If a CRA supports 
controls or any barriers to entry, I code this as a negative judgment on the 
liberalization policy. Due to space considerations, I do not include all coded text 
segments here, but the MAXQDA file and all coded segments are available upon request. 
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Table 15: Code System with Examples 
1 privatization 
 1 positive 
“Reform of the energy sector, accelerated privatization efforts, and continuation of tax 
reform are important tasks for the future.” (Moody’s 2003_11_10_Ukraine) 
 1 negative 
“As non-tax revenues fall following […] the privatization of public enterprises, the 
consolidated public sector deficit could approach 2% of GDP in 1997 after a small 
surplus in 1996.” (S&P: 1997_01_22_Panama) 
 
2 deregulation of credit, labor and business 
 2 positive 
“Further privatisation, deregulation and public sector reform (particularly in the 
pensions sector) are all urgently required.” (Fitch 2001_06_20_ Greece) 
 2 negative 
“The financial sector is experiencing the negative symptoms of recent liberalization.” 
(Moody’s 1997_04_08_Thailand) 
 
3 trade liberalization 
 3 positive 
“Egypt's investment-grade ratings reflect: […] Accelerating structural reforms, 
including privatization, trade liberalization, and deregulation, which should further 
strengthen government finances, raise national savings and investment, and secure 
more rapid economic growth longer term.” (S&P 1997_01_15_Egypt) 
 3 negative 
“The newly appointed government has taken decisive steps, including an increase in 
the VAT rate and in customs duties, which should lead to a significant improvement in 
the fiscal balance in 2005.” (Fitch 2005_02_15_Cameroon) 
 
4 FDI liberalization 
 4 positive 
“Korea's sovereign ratings are supported by: -- Decisive government responses to the 
crisis on several fronts. The NCNP-ULD coalition has been effective in passing key 
legislation to open the Korean market to foreign investment” (S&P 
1999_01_25_Korea) 
 4 negative 
There is no example in one of the sovereign rating announcements. As for the other 
policies, there could have been a judgment, such as: The recent liberalization of FDI 
inflows led to lower economic growth undermining X’s sovereign rating. 
 
5 capital account liberalization 
 5 positive 
“capital and price controls have caused significant damage to the private sector” (S&P 
2003_07_30_Venezuela) 
 5 negative 
“The ratings could come under renewed pressure if […] capital controls are 
dismantled” (Fitch 2005_08_12_Venezuela) 
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4.5.2 Findings 
Although the announcements are relatively short, about 600 words each, economic 
liberalization policies are often mentioned. In total, there are 647 judgments on specific 
liberalization policies in 450 of the 1,222 announcements. For 114 of the 137 countries, 
CRAs have made at least one judgment on a liberalization policy. The explanations 
given by the CRAs for their rating actions strongly confirm the econometric results. 
82% of the judgments on liberalization policies are positive. Table 16 shows the 
percentage of announcements with positive and negative judgments on economic 
liberalization policies of the total number of 1,222 announcements. In almost a third of 
all announcements, there is a positive judgment on at least one of the five liberalization 
policies. CRAs mention negative aspects of liberalization policies in only 9% of all 
announcements. 
This overall positive judgment on economic liberalization holds for all CRAs. Only 
Moody’s has fewer judgments and is also more critical than Standard & Poor’s and 
Fitch, though of Moody’s 128 judgments, 75% are also positive. In contrast to previous 
results on the scope of financial market pressures on developed and developing 
countries (Mosley 2000, 2003a), there is no difference between investment- and 
speculative-grade rated countries in my sample. 
 
Table 16: Announcements with Liberalization Judgments10 
% of total 
announcements 
Total S&P Moody’s Fitch 
Invest-
ment 
Specu-
lative 
with judgments 37% (450) 39% 30% 40% 35% 32% 
with pos. judgments 31% (385) 35% 23% 34% 30% 28% 
with neg. judgments 9% (107) 7% 10% 9% 9% 8% 
 
 
Privatization is the policy that is most often evaluated by CRAs in more than 20% of 
their announcements (see Table 17). In a similar analysis of IMF programs from 1992-
2002, Stone (2008) finds that the IMF includes privatization policies in 9% of its 
programs. Given that these programs are more detailed than any of the short CRA 
announcements, the high number of privatization policies included in CRA assessments 
shows the importance CRAs attach to these policies. 96% of the privatization 
                                                          
10 Percentage of total announcements in which there is at least one positive or negative 
judgment. As there can be positive and negative judgments on different policies in the same 
announcement, the figures do not have to add up. 
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judgments are positive and CRAs list a wide range of reasons for their support of 
privatization policies. First, according to the CRAs, privatizations directly lower the 
fiscal deficit11 and hence reduce government debt12. Privatizations also increase foreign 
direct investment13, lower the current account deficit14, and external debt15. But the 
reasons that CRAs give for their support of privatizations are even broader. CRAs 
expect that privatization will lead to a reduced role of the state16 and associated 
efficiency gains once state companies are privatized17, which will ultimately lead to 
higher economic growth18. Moreover, according to CRAs, privatizations also reduce the 
state sector wage bill19 and the role of loss-making state-owned firms20. In a few cases, 
CRAs recommend privatization because of IMF demands21. 
Although the benefits of privatization programs are strongly debated in the literature 
(Brune et al. 2004: 198ff.), CRAs mention negative aspects of privatization policies in 
only nine announcements. Those are instances in which privatization obviously went 
wrong. Moody’s observes for Russia that the “decentralized privatization program left 
considerable power in the hands of insiders and local authorities”22 and Fitch notes the 
lack of transparency in Romania’s privatization program23. The ensuing job losses of a 
privatization program are only mentioned in two of the 254 announcements.24 
 
Table 17: Judgments on Specific Liberalization Policies 
Judgments Total 
Privati-
zation 
Deregu-
lation 
Trade 
Lib 
FDI 
Lib 
Cap. Ac. 
Lib 
Positive 533 245 122 96 39 31 
Negative 114 9 55 25 0 25 
Total 647 254 177 121 39 56 
 
                                                          
11 See for instance: Fitch: 2001_09_21_Lebanon; S&P: 2004_06_16_TrinidadandTobago; 
Moody’s: 1995_06_01_Poland 
12 Fitch: Iceland 2000_02_03, 2001_07_12_Kazakhstan; S&P: 1997_01_22_Panama; Moody’s: 
2001_07_30_Lebanon 
13 Fitch: 1999_12_15_Slovenia; S&P: 2004_05_13_Slovenia; Moody’s: 1998_03_02_Morocco 
14 S&P: 1997_04_02_Brazil 
15 Fitch: 2005_11_01_Macedonia; S&P: 1996_03_15_Iceland; Moody’s: 1998_05_08_Hungary 
16 Fitch: 2007_12_12_Kenya; Moody’s: 1997_11_14_Egypt 
17 Fitch: 1999_12_15_ Slovenia; S&P: 2003_05_23_Bulgaria; Moody’s: 1998_03_25_Malta 
18 Fitch: 2001_06_07 Moldova; S&P: 1997_01_16_Latvia; Moody’s: 1995_04_06_Tunisia 
19 Fitch: 2011_02_02_Lebanon 
20 S&P: 2010_12_21_Croatia 
21 Fitch: 2002_08_01_Indonesia, 1999_11_25_Moldova; Moody’s: 2000_04_19_Moldova 
22 Moody’s: 1996_10_07_Russia 
23 Fitch: 2002_06_14_Romania 
24 S&P: 1997_01_16_Latvia, 2001_08_06_PapuaNewGuinea 
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The results for deregulation policies seem to be more mixed at first glance, with the 
highest number of negative judgments for all liberalization policies analyzed. But a 
more refined text analysis again confirms the econometric results. In the econometric 
analysis, I only test for Heritage’s and Fraser’s measure of the deregulation of business, 
but not of labor and credit markets. In the text analysis, all 55 negative deregulation 
judgments are on the deregulation of the financial sector. Moody’s is most critical of 
deregulation with few positive comments (see Table 18). Similarly to Standard and 
Poor’s, Moody’s demands adequate financial sector regulation, however, it also openly 
criticizes financial liberalization. For example for Honduras, they criticize that a “lack of 
adequate regulation in the banking sector has contributed to a deterioration in the 
overall financial health of the banking system”25. For Jamaica, Moody’s emphasizes that 
“the liberalization of the financial sector ahead of the strengthening of the supervisory 
authority combined with high interest rates contributed to a financial sector crisis 
which sent the fiscal position into a hefty deficit”26. The deregulation of business is 
always positively evaluated by all three CRAs, which confirms the econometric results 
on “business freedom” and “business deregulation”. 
Table 18: Judgments by Credit Rating Agency 
Policy Area Judgment S&P Moody‘s Fitch 
Privatization 
positive 120 54 71 
negative 4 3 2 
Deregulation 
positive 63 16 43 
negative 24 23 8 
Trade 
Liberalization 
positive 38 36 22 
negative 5 6 14 
FDI 
Liberalization 
positive 12 16 11 
negative 0 0 0 
Capital Acc. 
Liberalization 
positive 18 6 7 
negative 7 7 8 
 
The liberalization of foreign economic policies is mentioned less often in sovereign 
rating announcements. In their announcements, CRAs are generally in favor of trade 
liberalization, but there are also negative comments. In the econometric analysis, trade 
liberalization measures were the only liberalization policy that was not significant. The 
importance of trade tax revenues suggested in section 4.4 is indeed emphasized by 
CRAs in their negative judgments. In a rating action for Lebanon, Fitch states, “While 
                                                          
25 Moody’s: 1998_09_29_Honduras 
26 Moody’s: 1998_03_30_Jamaica 
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Fitch is generally supportive of lower trade barriers, the agency notes that in the short 
term this will make the task of fiscal consolidation harder; customs revenues accounted 
for 38.5% of total fiscal receipts in 2000”27. This result is especially evident for Fitch 
because Fitch rates a higher number of developing countries in comparison to the other 
two CRAs. 
FDI flows are an important rating driver and are mentioned in a fourth of all 
announcements. CRAs argue for a number of policies to increase FDI inflows, such as 
better infrastructure, lower corruption, lower crime rates, and better education. 
However, the liberalization of FDI flows is only mentioned in 3% of all announcements. 
FDI liberalization policies, such as national treatment of foreign investment or a 
transparent investment code, are not important for CRAs in their announcements. 
When they mention these policies, CRAs are always in favor of them. 
Capital account liberalization is also only mentioned in 4% of all announcements. CRAs 
take capital controls into account for other types of sovereign rating assessments, such 
as Transfer & Convertibility assessments by Standard & Poor’s28 or sovereign ceilings 
for companies by Moody’s.29 As Bruner and Abdelal (2005: 2000) already noted, CRAs 
were against capital controls in the prominent case of Malaysia in 199830, but have 
since become less critical. The negative statements on capital account liberalization are 
driven by few countries. Venezuela accounts for four of Standard & Poor’s seven 
negative judgments on capital account liberalization and for three of Fitch’s eight 
negative judgments. As for deregulation policies, Moody’s is again more cautious and 
more often highlights the negative aspects that could follow because of capital account 
liberalization. 
But aside from Moody’s stance on financial deregulation and capital account 
liberalization, there are in fact few differences between the CRAs. All three main CRAs 
strongly promote economic liberalization policies in their announcements. 
Privatization and the deregulation of business are often mentioned and in almost all 
cases supported by CRAs. Foreign economic liberalization is, however, less often 
mentioned. One explanation for the higher importance of domestic liberalization 
policies could be that these liberalization measures are a more credible device for 
                                                          
27 Fitch 2001_02_02_Lebanon; see also, for example, Fitch on Tunisia 2001_05_24 
28 S&P: 2008_11_24_Iceland, 2010_04_06_Bangladesh 
29 Moody’s: Panama 1997_01_22 
30 S&P: 1998_09_15_Malaysia; Moody’s: 1998_09_14_Malaysia; Fitch: 1999_03_22_Malaysia 
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governments to signal that they are investor-friendly. Privatizations and domestic 
deregulation measures cannot be as easily reversed as FDI or capital account 
liberalization policies. If the reversal of these measures is more costly, the signal is 
more credible. Indeed, CRAs directly highlight the importance of domestic economic 
liberalization policies as signals of a government’s type. For instance, Fitch argues for 
Lebanon that “progress in privatisation next year will be an important benchmark, 
since it would confirm the authorities’ resolve in undertaking contentious reforms”31. 
Moreover, as privatization measures can be observed directly, they are referred to as 
evidence for a general progress on structural reforms. Standard & Poor’s suggests for 
Cameroon that the “upgrade is supported by the authorities' continued commitment to 
(…) structural reforms” which is shown “by the process of privatization [which] is 
pushed toward completion”32. Moody’s highlights for Romania that the “government's 
economic reform program remains on-track, as evidenced by the privatization of a 
number of large state-owned enterprises over the past year”33. Governments could 
therefore use these policies to signal their market-friendly type and their commitment 
to repay. 
4.6 Summary 
In the literature thus far, theoretical claims and empirical evidence on CRA criteria have 
been inconsistent. Many scholars claim that CRAs promote economic liberalization, but 
econometric evidence suggested that these policies do not matter for CRAs. In contrast 
to previous econometric evidence, I show that economic liberalization has a 
substantive positive impact on sovereign ratings for all three major CRAs. My results 
are based on the first comprehensive data set of more than 1,000 observations for 
more than 100 countries. The results are robust to alternative measures of the main 
explanatory variables and alternative specifications of the regression model in an 
ordered probit or a linear framework using panel-corrected standard errors and 
controlling for autocorrelation and country-fixed effects. Among the specific 
liberalization policies tested, only trade liberalization does not consistently lead to 
better sovereign ratings, presumably due to the importance of trade taxes as a source 
of government revenue in many developing countries. Business deregulation, lower 
                                                          
31 Fitch: 2001_09_21_Lebanon 
32 S&P: 2007_02_26_Cameroon 
33 Moody’s 2006_10_06_Romania 
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barriers to FDI, and capital account liberalization are all positively correlated with 
sovereign ratings. 
Credit rating agencies also promote economic liberalization policies in their rating 
announcements. In the new comprehensive data set of 1,222 announcements for 137 
countries, I show that CRAs make judgments on economic liberalization policies for 
more than a third of all rating actions. In more than 80% of the judgments, CRAs take a 
positive stance on economic liberalization policies. Domestic economic liberalization 
policies, i.e., privatization and business deregulation, are especially important in CRAs’ 
announcements. Trade, FDI, and capital account liberalization policies are less often 
mentioned and are not referred to as credible signals of a government’s willingness to 
repay. Taken together, the econometric and the text analysis provide the first 
comprehensive set of evidence on the importance of economic liberalization, as one 
political factor, for CRAs’ assessments of sovereign states. 
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4.7 Appendix 
 
1. Further Summary Statistics 
 
Table 19: Summary Statistics for Main Variables 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Heritage Index of 
Economic 
Liberalization 
overall 64.20 12.10 30 92.5 N =    1602 
between 
 
11.67 35.07 91.77 n =     131 
within 
 
4.36 45.14 82.10 T-bar =  12.22 
Fraser Index of 
Economic 
Liberalization 
overall 6.51 0.85 3.30 9.15 N =     859 
between 
 
0.78 4.38 8.67 n =     117 
within 
 
0.30 5.42 8.42 T-bar = 7.34 
Chinn-Ito Index of 
Capital Account 
Openness 
overall 0.88 1.53 -1.84 2.47 N =    1883 
between 
 
1.40 -1.84 2.47 n =     126 
within 
 
0.75 -1.78 3.35 T-bar = 14.94 
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2. Regression Results 
2.1 Basic Model 
 
Table 20: S&P Basic Model34 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P 
Ln(GDP) 
3.198*** 0.973*** 1.287*** 2.753*** 1.050*** 1.342*** 
(0.062) (0.076) (0.074) (0.149) (0.094) (0.044) 
GDP Growth 
0.049* 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.020 0.016 0.040*** 
(0.027) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.019) (0.008) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.050*** -0.035*** -0.028*** -0.005 0.019* -0.020*** 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.010) (0.004) 
Inflation 
-0.005** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001* -0.002** -0.002*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Default History 
-3.627*** -1.058*** -1.125*** 0.476 -1.411*** -1.214*** 
(0.315) (0.173) (0.180) (0.320) (0.211) (0.154) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.013*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.015*** -0.006** -0.028*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Constant 
-13.185*** 7.434*** 2.981*** -9.641***   
(0.621) (0.706) (0.706) (1.293)   
Observations 1,588 1,588 1,588 1,588 1,588 1,588 
R-squared 0.693 0.333 0.544 0.670   
Countries 112 112 112 112 112 112 
 
 
Table 21: Moody’s Basic Model 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSEar1 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s 
Ln(GDP) 
3.156*** 0.997*** 1.385*** 2.663*** 0.982*** 1.264*** 
(0.070) (0.091) (0.087) (0.174) (0.119) (0.046) 
GDP Growth 
0.001 0.023** 0.024** 0.008 -0.003 0.007 
(0.024) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.035*** -0.020*** -0.013* 0.000 0.011 -0.011*** 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Inflation 
-0.003*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Default History 
-2.759*** -0.642*** -0.730*** 0.101 -1.035*** -0.371*** 
(0.440) (0.203) (0.210) (0.266) (0.254) (0.138) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.003 -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.008** -0.002 -0.015*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Constant 
-13.151*** 6.826*** 2.042** -9.023***   
(0.706) (0.854) (0.838) (1.596)   
Observations 1,648 1,648 1,648 1,648 1,648 1,648 
R-squared 0.638 0.165 0.575 0.685   
Countries 102 102 102 102 102 102 
 
                                                          
34 In the following models, standard errors are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Due to space consideration, I do not report cut points for the ordered probit estimators in this 
and the following models. 
 4 The Promotion of Economic Liberalization Policies  
 
96 
 
Table 22: Fitch Basic Model 
VARIABLES POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSEar1 
Ordered 
Probit 
RE Ordered 
Probit 
 Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch 
Ln(GDP) 
3.143*** 1.508*** 1.974*** 2.914*** 1.251*** 2.245*** 
(0.060) (0.100) (0.090) (0.127) (0.115) (0.073) 
GDP Growth 
0.039 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.015 0.018 0.030*** 
(0.026) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.015) (0.009) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.032*** -0.034*** -0.028*** 0.001 0.016 -0.039*** 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) 
Inflation 
-0.004** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Default History 
-3.443*** -0.749*** -0.849*** 0.017 -1.388*** -1.007*** 
(0.443) (0.201) (0.207) (0.357) (0.264) (0.171) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.005 -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.015*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Constant -12.651*** 2.429** -2.611*** -11.048***   
 (0.612) (0.949) (0.855) (1.047)   
Observations 1,106 1,106 1,106 1,106 1,106 1,106 
R-squared 0.745 0.350 0.712 0.753   
Countries 102 102 102 102 102 102 
 
 
2.2 Heritage Foundation 
 
Table 23: S&P Heritage Liberalization 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P 
Ln(GDP) 
2.489*** 1.134*** 1.651*** 2.651*** 0.978*** 1.685*** 
(0.073) (0.099) (0.091) (0.135) (0.107) (0.057) 
GDP Growth 
0.081*** 0.056*** 0.065*** 0.021 0.035** 0.056*** 
(0.023) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.016) (0.009) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.063*** -0.031*** -0.018** 0.004 0.029*** -0.002 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) 
Inflation 
-0.069*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.032*** -0.029*** 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) 
Default History 
-2.370*** -0.404** -0.485*** 0.201 -1.111*** -0.399** 
(0.348) (0.167) (0.175) (0.320) (0.246) (0.158) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.008*** -0.031*** -0.024*** -0.009** -0.005 -0.026*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Heritage 
Liberalization 
0.081*** 0.032*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.034*** 0.049*** 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) 
Constant 
-12.882*** 3.043*** -3.405*** -12.499***   
(0.656) (0.966) (0.856) (1.103)   
Observations 1,235 1,235 1,235 1,235 1,235 1,235 
R-squared 0.771 0.419  0.757   
Countries 110 110 110 110 110 110 
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Table 24: Moody’s Heritage Liberalization 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s 
Ln(GDP) 
2.685*** 1.633*** 1.994*** 2.827*** 1.024*** 2.005*** 
(0.077) (0.102) (0.094) (0.142) (0.129) (0.066) 
GDP Growth 
0.061*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.016 0.021* 0.056*** 
(0.019) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.013) (0.009) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.051*** -0.015** -0.004 0.006 0.019** 0.010** 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) 
Inflation 
-0.007 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Default History 
-2.858*** -0.940*** -1.019*** -0.134 -1.341*** -0.952*** 
(0.339) (0.181) (0.186) (0.275) (0.246) (0.164) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.002 -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Heritage 
Liberalization 
0.086*** 0.030*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.079*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) 
Constant 
-15.628*** -2.152** -6.840*** -13.795***   
(0.745) (1.038) (0.934) (1.334)   
Observations 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261 
R-squared 0.741 0.341  0.759   
Countries 102 102 102 102 102 102 
 
 
Table 25: Fitch Heritage Liberalization 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch 
Ln(GDP) 
2.505*** 1.310*** 1.741*** 2.665*** 1.079*** 2.029*** 
(0.087) (0.106) (0.097) (0.124) (0.119) (0.077) 
GDP Growth 
0.041* 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.020 0.020 0.053*** 
(0.024) (0.009) (0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.010) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.055*** -0.028*** -0.019*** 0.008 0.025*** -0.007 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) 
Inflation 
-0.068*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.011 -0.029*** -0.007 
(0.015) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
Default History 
-2.918*** -0.697*** -0.785*** -0.030 -1.224*** -0.816*** 
(0.442) (0.203) (0.209) (0.386) (0.246) (0.189) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.005 -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.010*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Heritage 
Liberalization 
0.071*** 0.036*** 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.026*** 0.052*** 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.005) 
Constant 
-11.289*** 1.897* -3.589*** -11.652***   
(0.706) (1.033) (0.905) (0.969)   
Observations 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 
R-squared 0.766 0.374  0.770   
Countries 102 102 102 102 102 102 
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Table 26: S&P Heritage Individual Liberalization 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P 
Ln(GDP) 
2.527*** 1.259*** 1.852*** 2.689*** 1.011*** 2.505*** 
(0.079) (0.115) (0.101) (0.139) (0.107) (0.079) 
GDP Growth 
0.081*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.019 0.036** 0.042*** 
(0.022) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.015) (0.009) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.063*** -0.031*** -0.016** 0.004 0.029*** -0.001 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005) 
Inflation 
-0.070*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.033*** -0.020*** 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) 
Default History 
-2.328*** -0.328* -0.386** 0.220 -1.118*** -0.401*** 
(0.350) (0.168) (0.175) (0.325) (0.243) (0.153) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.010*** -0.030*** -0.023*** -0.010** -0.006* -0.021*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Business 
Freedom 
0.041*** 0.002 0.008* 0.014** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
Trade Freedom 
-0.005 -0.003 -0.010* 0.000 -0.005 -0.027*** 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) 
Investment 
Freedom 
0.030*** 0.008** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.013** 0.014*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) 
Financial 
Freedom 
0.010* 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.012** 0.003 0.010*** 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) 
Constant 
-12.705*** 2.755*** -3.778*** -12.394***   
(0.670) (1.006) (0.865) (1.059)   
Observations 1,235 1,235 1,235 1,235 1,235 1,235 
R-squared 0.776 0.425  0.759   
Countries 110 110 110 110 110 110 
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Table 27: Moody’s Heritage Individual Liberalization 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s 
Ln(GDP) 
2.788*** 1.875*** 2.292*** 2.901*** 1.094*** 2.512*** 
(0.082) (0.119) (0.106) (0.138) (0.119) (0.075) 
GDP Growth 
0.060*** 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.015 0.020* 0.051*** 
(0.019) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.008) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.051*** -0.016** -0.004 0.007 0.020** 0.016*** 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) 
Inflation 
-0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Default History 
-2.758*** -0.835*** -0.913*** -0.158 -1.351*** -1.178*** 
(0.336) (0.180) (0.184) (0.281) (0.239) (0.159) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.005* -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.006 -0.004 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Business 
Freedom 
0.036*** -0.007 -0.000 0.014** 0.016** 0.022*** 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
Trade Freedom 
-0.009 -0.011** -0.016*** -0.006 -0.007 -0.025*** 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.003) 
Investment 
Freedom 
0.039*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.007*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) 
Financial 
Freedom 
0.008 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.010** 0.003 0.011*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Constant 
-15.505*** -2.859*** -7.605*** -13.999***   
(0.734) (1.085) (0.950) (1.225)   
Observations 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261 
R-squared 0.749 0.361  0.765   
Countries 102 102 102 102 102 102 
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Table 28: Fitch Heritage Individual Liberalization 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch 
Ln(GDP) 
2.520*** 1.476*** 1.948*** 2.692*** 1.124*** 2.004*** 
(0.091) (0.123) (0.108) (0.126) (0.123) (0.074) 
GDP Growth 
0.039 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.019 0.020 0.056*** 
(0.024) (0.009) (0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.009) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.053*** -0.027*** -0.020*** 0.008 0.025** -0.005 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) 
Inflation 
-0.068*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.011 -0.029*** -0.025*** 
(0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) 
Default History 
-2.918*** -0.667*** -0.766*** -0.007 -1.257*** -0.345* 
(0.449) (0.204) (0.208) (0.388) (0.256) (0.182) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.006** -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.003 -0.005 -0.011*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
Business 
Freedom 
0.033*** 0.011** 0.015*** 0.014* 0.014* 0.007 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) 
Trade Freedom 
0.001 -0.009 -0.015** -0.000 -0.008 -0.002 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) 
Investment 
Freedom 
0.024*** 0.008* 0.014*** 0.012* 0.012** 0.018*** 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
Financial 
Freedom 
0.009 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.002 0.016*** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) 
Constant 
-11.057*** 1.393 -3.857*** -11.468***   
(0.797) (1.068) (0.913) (0.932)   
Observations 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 
R-squared 0.768 0.382  0.771   
Countries 102 102 102 102 102 102 
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Table 29: S&P Heritage Individual Indicators 
 PCSE(ar1) PCSE(ar1) PCSE(ar1) PCSE(ar1) 
VARIABLES S&P S&P S&P S&P 
Ln(GDP) 
2.808*** 2.833*** 2.799*** 2.797*** 
(0.129) (0.150) (0.126) (0.130) 
GDP Growth 
0.015 0.011 0.016 0.014 
(0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.001 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Inflation 
-0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Default History 
0.148 0.301 0.243 0.280 
(0.325) (0.311) (0.323) (0.315) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.009** -0.009* -0.009** -0.008* 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Business 
Freedom 
0.019**    
(0.007)    
Trade Freedom 
 0.001   
 (0.006)   
Investment 
Freedom 
  0.021***  
  (0.007)  
Financial 
Freedom 
   0.016*** 
   (0.005) 
Constant 
-12.011*** -11.031*** -11.872*** -11.595*** 
(1.121) (1.180) (1.139) (1.143) 
Observations 1,235 1,235 1,235 1,235 
R-squared 0.753 0.735 0.750 0.747 
Countries 110 110 110 110 
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Table 30: Moody’s Heritage Individual Indicators 
 PCSE(ar1) PCSE(ar1) PCSE(ar1) PCSE(ar1) 
VARIABLES Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s 
Ln(GDP) 
2.884*** 2.932*** 2.950*** 2.898*** 
(0.155) (0.178) (0.138) (0.153) 
GDP Growth 
0.011 0.008 0.013 0.011 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.002 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Inflation 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Default History 
-0.083 -0.008 -0.124 -0.038 
(0.266) (0.259) (0.274) (0.267) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Business 
Freedom 
0.016**    
(0.007)    
Trade Freedom 
 -0.005   
 (0.006)   
Investment 
Freedom 
  0.019***  
  (0.006)  
Financial 
Freedom 
   0.013** 
   (0.005) 
Constant 
-12.888*** -11.783*** -13.454*** -12.641*** 
(1.434) (1.509) (1.338) (1.423) 
Observations 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261 
R-squared 0.749 0.737 0.758 0.749 
Countries 102 102 102 102 
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Table 31: Fitch Heritage Individual Indicators 
 PCSE(ar1) PCSE(ar1) PCSE(ar1) PCSE(ar1) 
VARIABLES Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch 
Ln(GDP) 
2.810*** 2.871*** 2.818*** 2.809*** 
(0.119) (0.133) (0.115) (0.116) 
GDP Growth 
0.015 0.013 0.017 0.016 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.005 0.002 0.005 0.006 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Inflation 
-0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Default History 
-0.092 0.042 -0.029 0.015 
(0.391) (0.374) (0.385) (0.388) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Business 
Freedom 
0.019**    
(0.009)    
Trade Freedom 
 -0.000   
 (0.007)   
Investment 
Freedom 
  0.017**  
  (0.007)  
Financial 
Freedom 
   0.017*** 
   (0.005) 
Constant 
-11.357*** -10.611*** -11.099*** -11.095*** 
(0.990) (1.009) (0.969) (0.955) 
Observations 1,068 1,068 1,068 1,068 
R-squared 0.767 0.757 0.766 0.767 
Countries 102 102 102 102 
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2.3 Fraser Institute 
 
Table 32: S&P Fraser Liberalization 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P 
Ln(GDP) 
2.448*** 1.142*** 1.977*** 2.569*** 1.144*** 2.762*** 
(0.081) (0.127) (0.102) (0.140) (0.116) (0.103) 
GDP Growth 
0.011 0.040*** 0.020 -0.018 0.020 0.031* 
(0.036) (0.015) (0.016) (0.026) (0.023) (0.018) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.045*** -0.006 0.018* 0.028** 0.024** 0.003 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) 
Inflation 
-0.118*** -0.024*** -0.033*** -0.068*** -0.083*** -0.116*** 
(0.030) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.013) (0.011) 
Default History 
-2.761*** 0.218 -0.076 -0.442 -1.505*** -1.345*** 
(0.429) (0.225) (0.239) (0.618) (0.338) (0.223) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.006* -0.024*** -0.011*** -0.000 -0.003 0.002 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Fraser 
Liberalization 
1.276*** 0.031 0.469*** 0.802*** 0.501*** 0.482*** 
(0.141) (0.114) (0.113) (0.193) (0.115) (0.085) 
Constant 
-15.229*** 4.499*** -6.554*** -13.840***   
(1.111) (1.481) (1.152) (1.286)   
Observations 751 751 751 751 751 751 
R-squared 0.818 0.333  0.815   
Countries 103 103 103 103 103 103 
 
 
Table 33: Moody’s Fraser Liberalization 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s 
Ln(GDP) 
2.673*** 1.462*** 2.064*** 2.886*** 1.213*** 2.284*** 
(0.088) (0.115) (0.102) (0.156) (0.151) (0.093) 
GDP Growth 
-0.012 0.014 0.002 -0.014 -0.010 -0.036** 
(0.030) (0.013) (0.014) (0.025) (0.020) (0.015) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.039*** -0.002 0.018* 0.036*** 0.021** 0.048*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) 
Inflation 
-0.112*** -0.020*** -0.026*** -0.048*** -0.072*** -0.090*** 
(0.027) (0.006) (0.007) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) 
Default History 
-3.116*** -0.530*** -0.747*** -0.735 -1.778*** -2.326*** 
(0.393) (0.201) (0.214) (0.467) (0.374) (0.261) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.001 -0.006 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.006*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Fraser 
Liberalization 
1.223*** 0.094 0.405*** 0.688*** 0.492*** 0.559*** 
(0.145) (0.100) (0.102) (0.183) (0.127) (0.082) 
Constant 
-16.961*** 0.794 -7.205*** -16.237***   
(1.257) (1.347) (1.175) (1.496)   
Observations 728 728 728 728 728 728 
R-squared 0.816 0.325  0.830   
Countries 94 94 94 94 94 94 
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Table 34: Fitch Fraser Liberalization 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch 
Ln(GDP) 
2.296*** 1.384*** 1.919*** 2.454*** 1.168*** 3.064*** 
(0.091) (0.112) (0.093) (0.102) (0.147) (0.116) 
GDP Growth 
-0.018 -0.004 -0.019 -0.019 0.000 -0.009 
(0.034) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.018) (0.015) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.030*** -0.001 0.010 0.017 0.020** 0.017*** 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) 
Inflation 
-0.143*** -0.049*** -0.058*** -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.086*** 
(0.017) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.013) (0.009) 
Default History 
-3.354*** -0.135 -0.374 -0.786 -1.558*** -1.361*** 
(0.563) (0.229) (0.237) (0.639) (0.378) (0.253) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.001 -0.013*** -0.005* 0.004 -0.001 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Fraser 
Liberalization 
1.274*** 0.404*** 0.702*** 0.945*** 0.552*** 0.799*** 
(0.165) (0.106) (0.104) (0.146) (0.116) (0.102) 
Constant 
-12.670*** 0.964 -6.328*** -12.796***   
(1.098) (1.327) (1.082) (1.053)   
Observations 684 684 684 684 684 684 
R-squared 0.820 0.384  0.850   
Countries 96 96 96 96 96 96 
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Table 35: S&P Fraser Individual Liberalization 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P 
Ln(GDP) 
2.543*** 1.273*** 2.044*** 2.586*** 1.164*** 2.370*** 
(0.086) (0.130) (0.101) (0.141) (0.116) (0.099) 
GDP Growth 
0.039 0.040*** 0.029* -0.008 0.030 0.030* 
(0.039) (0.014) (0.015) (0.025) (0.022) (0.017) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.050*** -0.001 0.019* 0.028** 0.024** 0.052*** 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) 
Inflation 
-0.127*** -0.023*** -0.031*** -0.066*** -0.087*** -0.123*** 
(0.032) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.014) (0.010) 
Default History 
-3.106*** 0.260 -0.013 -0.396 -1.620*** -1.410*** 
(0.444) (0.221) (0.233) (0.630) (0.336) (0.230) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.007** -0.024*** -0.012*** -0.000 -0.004 -0.013*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
Business 
Deregulation 
0.418*** -0.071 0.029 0.250** 0.151 0.093* 
(0.136) (0.069) (0.071) (0.108) (0.100) (0.054) 
Low Trade 
Taxation 
0.184** -0.022 0.107 0.129* 0.023 -0.040 
(0.073) (0.065) (0.066) (0.076) (0.081) (0.057) 
Capital Acc. 
Liberaliz. 
0.159** 0.208*** 0.281*** 0.173*** 0.068 0.123*** 
(0.066) (0.042) (0.042) (0.055) (0.058) (0.037) 
Constant 
-12.532*** 2.893* -6.643*** -12.288***   
(1.049) (1.490) (1.115) (1.099)   
Observations 751 751 751 751 751 751 
R-squared 0.806 0.359  0.811   
Countries 103 103 103 103 103 103 
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Table 36: Moody’s Fraser Individual Liberalization 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s 
Ln(GDP) 
2.789*** 1.576*** 2.132*** 2.925*** 1.228*** 2.771*** 
(0.094) (0.118) (0.102) (0.172) (0.144) (0.109) 
GDP Growth 
0.001 0.017 0.010 -0.003 -0.004 -0.023 
(0.033) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.019) (0.015) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.043*** 0.001 0.019** 0.036*** 0.021** 0.035*** 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) 
Inflation 
-0.124*** -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.043*** -0.077*** -0.081*** 
(0.029) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.019) (0.009) 
Default History 
-3.341*** -0.493** -0.673*** -0.556 -1.874*** -2.107*** 
(0.416) (0.197) (0.208) (0.459) (0.387) (0.261) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.003 -0.006 0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.009*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Business 
Deregulation 
0.399*** -0.052 0.016 0.197* 0.170 -0.116** 
(0.146) (0.062) (0.065) (0.107) (0.110) (0.056) 
Low Trade 
Taxation 
0.114 -0.021 0.057 0.071 -0.005 -0.015 
(0.073) (0.056) (0.058) (0.092) (0.074) (0.047) 
Capital Acc. 
Liberaliz. 
0.136** 0.199*** 0.255*** 0.107** 0.057 0.166*** 
(0.065) (0.039) (0.039) (0.054) (0.058) (0.030) 
Constant 
-13.898*** -0.375 -7.177*** -14.521***   
(1.145) (1.345) (1.150) (1.501)   
Observations 728 728 728 728 728 728 
R-squared 0.803 0.352  0.823   
Countries 94 94 94 94 94 94 
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Table 37: Fitch Fraser Individual Liberalization 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch 
Ln(GDP) 
2.378*** 1.429*** 1.928*** 2.524*** 1.192*** 2.641*** 
(0.098) (0.115) (0.094) (0.105) (0.147) (0.104) 
GDP Growth 
-0.008 -0.001 -0.010 -0.012 0.004 -0.027* 
(0.035) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.018) (0.015) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.033*** 0.001 0.010 0.020* 0.020* -0.007 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) 
Inflation 
-0.157*** -0.047*** -0.055*** -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.109*** 
(0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.015) (0.009) 
Default History 
-3.556*** -0.088 -0.307 -0.859 -1.615*** -0.929*** 
(0.586) (0.227) (0.234) (0.671) (0.392) (0.260) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.001 -0.012*** -0.005* 0.004 -0.001 0.007*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Business 
Deregulation 
0.600*** 0.152** 0.227*** 0.403*** 0.221** 0.214*** 
(0.128) (0.065) (0.067) (0.087) (0.094) (0.059) 
Low Trade 
Taxation 
0.181** 0.024 0.111* 0.053 0.006 0.108** 
(0.083) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.087) (0.049) 
Capital Acc. 
Liberaliz. 
0.031 0.178*** 0.217*** 0.120*** 0.033 0.391*** 
(0.060) (0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.055) (0.034) 
Constant 
-10.114*** 1.022 -5.307*** -10.718***   
(1.031) (1.336) (1.069) (0.873)   
Observations 684 684 684 684 684 684 
R-squared 0.808 0.399  0.843   
Countries 96 96 96 96 96 96 
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2.4 Capital Account Openness (kaopen) 
 
Table 38: S&P Capital Account Openness 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P S&P 
Ln(GDP) 
2.945*** 0.731*** 1.072*** 2.543*** 0.969*** 1.283*** 
(0.075) (0.086) (0.084) (0.147) (0.098) (0.046) 
GDP Growth 
0.047* 0.048*** 0.051*** 0.019 0.015 0.036*** 
(0.027) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.019) (0.008) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.048*** -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.004 0.019* -0.018*** 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.010) (0.004) 
Inflation 
-0.004** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.002*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Default History 
-3.526*** -1.023*** -1.095*** 0.474 -1.390*** -1.091*** 
(0.316) (0.172) (0.179) (0.308) (0.212) (0.141) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.015*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.015*** -0.006** -0.028*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
0.425*** 0.250*** 0.230*** 0.384*** 0.132** 0.157*** 
(0.064) (0.043) (0.044) (0.080) (0.058) (0.028) 
Constant 
-11.272*** 9.307*** 4.596*** -8.119***   
(0.689) (0.772) (0.768) (1.298)   
Observations 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 1,550 
R-squared 0.697 0.350 0.538 0.674   
Countries 110 110 110 110 110 110 
 
 
Table 39: Moody’s Capital Account Openness 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s Moody’s 
Ln(GDP) 
2.896*** 0.750*** 1.168*** 2.512*** 0.902*** 1.387*** 
(0.084) (0.105) (0.100) (0.181) (0.121) (0.046) 
GDP Growth 
0.003 0.020* 0.022** 0.007 -0.002 0.011 
(0.023) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.033*** -0.017** -0.011 -0.000 0.010 -0.007* 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Inflation 
-0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Default History 
-2.661*** -0.610*** -0.699*** 0.108 -1.013*** -0.623*** 
(0.443) (0.204) (0.211) (0.262) (0.261) (0.133) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.006* -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.008** -0.003 -0.013*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
0.421*** 0.279*** 0.253*** 0.291*** 0.127** 0.176*** 
(0.067) (0.053) (0.053) (0.064) (0.055) (0.024) 
Constant 
-11.176*** 8.724*** 3.675*** -7.966***   
(0.788) (0.951) (0.926) (1.643)   
Observations 1,606 1,606 1,606 1,606 1,606 1,606 
R-squared 0.640 0.181 0.578 0.686   
Countries 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 40: Fitch Capital Account Openness 
 POLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
PCSE(ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
RE Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch Fitch 
Ln(GDP) 
2.810*** 1.211*** 1.650*** 2.620*** 1.139*** 2.260*** 
(0.084) (0.106) (0.097) (0.134) (0.123) (0.075) 
GDP Growth 
0.042* 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.013 0.019 0.033*** 
(0.025) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.015) (0.009) 
Current Account 
Surplus 
0.039*** -0.027*** -0.022*** 0.001 0.018* -0.026*** 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) 
Inflation 
-0.003** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Default History 
-3.411*** -0.708*** -0.800*** 0.051 -1.394*** -0.622*** 
(0.436) (0.196) (0.202) (0.345) (0.255) (0.189) 
Public Debt to 
GDP Ratio 
-0.008** -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.003 -0.005 -0.013*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Capital Account 
Openness 
0.479*** 0.465*** 0.460*** 0.430*** 0.163** 0.252*** 
(0.084) (0.055) (0.056) (0.095) (0.073) (0.039) 
Constant 
-10.052*** 4.592*** -0.204 -8.817***   
(0.762) (0.977) (0.897) (1.090)   
Observations 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 
R-squared 0.749 0.396 0.714 0.754   
Countries 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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5 Rating Political Institutions: Where is the Democratic 
Advantage? 
 
“Democracies as well as autocracies or other political regimes 
default alike.” 
Moody’s sovereign rating methodology (Moody’s 2008: 8) 
 
 
In addition to liberalization policies as signals of a government’s willingness to repay, 
CRAs also have good reason for taking institutional constraints on the executive into 
account as a political factor. In the literature, starting with Schultz and Weingast 
(2003), several authors suggest that democratic states enjoyed a “democratic 
advantage” in the past as these countries had to pay lower sovereign risk premia. 
However, for more recent data, econometric studies cannot confirm that CRAs also 
regard democracy as a positive rating driver (Archer et al. 2007). For Beaulieu et al. 
(2012), this difference between studies on historical debt data and more recent 
sovereign rating data raises the question: “where is the democratic advantage?” (2012: 
710). 
I argue that there is actually no contradiction between the studies based on historical 
debt data and on more recent sovereign rating criteria if we distinguish between two 
political institutions: electoral competitiveness and veto players as constraints on the 
executive. All studies on historical data analyze the impact of constraints on the 
executive on borrowing costs and do not refer to these constraints as democratic. In the 
literature on recent debt and rating data, democracy is defined by electoral 
competitiveness. Using the same definition of electoral competitiveness for the studies 
on historical data, we cannot find any evidence for a democratic advantage. But if we 
take the same mechanism, constraints on the executive, that led to the alleged 
democratic advantage for historical data and apply them to sovereign rating data, we 
do indeed find an advantage: countries with many veto players or institutional 
constraints on the executive get better sovereign ratings. 
Following a review of the democratic advantage literature (section 5.1), I explain in 
more detail my argument why CRAs have good reason for being in favor of constraints 
on the executive, but not of electoral competitiveness (section 5.2). In section 5.3, I 
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review the historical evidence and highlight that sovereigns in the past only got lower 
risk premia because of increased institutional constraints on the executive, but not 
because of the introduction of competitive elections. In section 5.4, I show that this 
mechanism still holds for recent sovereign rating data. In the panel econometric 
analysis of sovereign ratings for more than 100 countries since 1980, more veto players 
or constraints on the executive lead to better sovereign ratings. In contrast, regimes 
with electoral competitiveness do not get better ratings and for many cases even worse 
ratings. The additional text analysis of all rating announcements since the mid-1990s 
demonstrates that CRAs are in particular wary of the political uncertainty and 
instability and the political business cycles associated with electoral competitiveness. 
My results can therefore help to explain the alleged puzzle in the political economy 
literature on the democratic advantage in sovereign bond markets. Moreover, I 
contribute to the recent economic literature that focuses on domestic political 
explanations for why countries generally try to repay their debt (see Panizza et al. 
2009: 29-32 for an overview). In particular, I emphasize the importance of institutional 
explanations for repaying debt and for graduation from default that is also stressed by 
Kohlscheen (2010) and Rijckeghem and Weder (2009). Finally, I point to an alternative 
explanation in the general literature on democratic advantages in international 
relations. International Relations scholars not only argue that democracies have better 
access in sovereign bond markets but also that democracies have a greater propensity 
to trade internationally (Mansfield et al. 2002, Milner and Kubota 2005), have an 
advantage in war (Fearon 1994, Schultz 1999) and are more peaceful (Maoz and 
Russett 1993, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). For the democratic peace, Tsebelis and 
Choi (2009) argue that there is a conceptual distinction between democracy and veto 
players and that veto players outweigh democracy in explaining the absence of 
interstate conflict. In a similar vein, I show that constraints on the executive are also a 
more convincing explanation for lower borrowing costs than a democratic advantage in 
the sovereign debt market. 
5.1 Literature on the Democratic Advantage 
As argued in chapter 1, CRAs not only have to assess a country’s ability but also its 
willingness to repay. The economic literature suggests several mechanisms why 
countries could be willing to repay their debt. Theoretical explanations include the 
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threat of permanent capital market exclusion (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981) and higher 
borrowing costs following a default (see Cruces & Trebesch 2013 for recent empirical 
evidence), trade sanctions (Bulow & Rogoff 1989, Rose 2005), and military pressure 
(Mitchener & Weidenmier 2005, see Tomz 2007 for a critique). In recent years, the 
focus has shifted to domestic explanations for the willingness of national governments 
repay their debt (see Broner et al. 2010, Borensztein & Panizza 2008). 
For the historical example of England, North and Weingast (1989) propose such a 
domestic explanation for sovereign debt repayment. They argue that changes following 
the Glorious Revolution in England put constraints on the Crown’s ability to unilaterally 
change the terms of its sovereign debt agreements. By constraining itself, the executive 
was able to credibly commit to repay its debt. Schultz and Weingast (2003) extend this 
argument to democracies and first propose a “democratic advantage” for the sovereign 
debt market. As North and Weingast (1989), they argue that representative legislatures 
with power over budgeting create “a new “veto player” who can prevent actions” 
(Schultz & Weingast 2003: 13). In addition to this veto player argument, Schultz and 
Weingast also propose a second commitment mechanism, “mechanisms for removing 
representatives from office” (ibid.: 15), “such as electoral accountability” (ibid.: 14). 
Despite the title of their article “The Democratic Advantage”, the authors acknowledge 
that these mechanisms on their own “are not sufficient to qualify a polity as democratic 
by current standards” (ibid.: 15). Although they “use the term “democracy” as a 
shorthand” (ibid.), they clarify that their “interest is not in democracy per se, but in a 
more basic set of institutions” (ibid.). 
The subsequent literature does not take this clarification into account and tests the 
democratic advantage for recent data with a definition of democracy as a regime with 
electoral competitiveness. In his paper “Do Countries Have a “Democratic Advantage”?”, 
Saiegh (2005) shows for 80 countries from 1971 to 1997 that the “’democratic 
advantage’ argument (Schultz & Weingast 2003) [...] must be revised” (2005: 367). 
However, Saiegh (2005) tests the argument for a modern definition of democracies as 
regimes with contested elections. “Following Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and 
Limongi (2000), regimes are classified as democracies if during a particular year they 
simultaneously satisfy four criteria: (a) the chief executive is elected, (b) the legislature 
is elected, (c) more than one party competes in elections, and (d) incumbent parties 
have in the past or will have in the future lost an election and yielded office. All regimes 
that fail to satisfy at least one of these four criteria are classified as dictatorships (pp. 
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18-29)” (Saiegh 2005: 375). For his empirical estimations, Saiegh uses the democracy 
measure developed by Cheibub et al. (2010) based on these four rules above by 
Przeworski et al. (2000). As Cheibub et al. clarify, it makes sense to use this measure if 
one expects that “the mechanism that links political regimes to outcomes is the 
presence or absence of contested elections” (2010: 73). But electoral accountability 
was not the mechanism that North and Weingast (1989) originally proposed and it was 
only one of the two mechanisms that Schultz and Weingast (2003) suggested (see Table 
41). 
Table 41: Causal Mechanisms on Democracy and Default in the Literature 
Study Causal Mechanism 
North & Weingast 1989 Veto Players 
Schultz & Weingast 2003 Veto Players + Electoral Competitiveness 
Saiegh 2005 & Archer et al. 2007 Electoral Competitiveness 
 
This shift from a veto player to an electoral accountability argument becomes very 
clear in the paper on “Sovereign Bonds and the “Democratic Advantage”” by Archer et 
al. (2007). Archer et al. expect that “democratization [...] would have a positive effect on 
bond ratings [...] because […] electoral accountability under democratic rule support[s] 
credible commitments to repay debts” (2007: 358). According to them, “electoral 
accountability under democracy gives the populace a means to punish sovereigns that 
harm the citizenry, such as via debt expansion, which force governments to comply 
with their debt obligations” (ibid.: 348). From their theoretical perspective, 
democracies can credibly commit to repay not because of an additional veto player but 
because of electoral accountability. Archer et al. use the combined polity2 score (see 
Marshall et al. 2010) to estimate the impact of democracy on sovereign ratings. In 
addition to electoral competition as a minimal definition of democracy, this indicator 
also includes constraints on the executive (see section 5.3 for details). They show for 50 
developing countries from 1987-2003 that democracies do not get better sovereign 
ratings. But given their democracy measure, they confound the two mechanisms that 
link political institutions and sovereign debt repayment: veto players as constraints on 
the executive and electoral competitiveness. As the polity2 indicator combines both 
mechanisms, more veto players and electoral competitiveness, it is not surprising that 
Archer et al. (2007) find that countries with a better polity2 score do not get better 
sovereign ratings. 
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5.2 Argument: Constraints on the Executive, Not Electoral 
Competitiveness 
As shown above, the previous literature either defines democratic institutions only by 
the presence of electoral competitiveness (indicator by Cheibub et al. 2010) or by a 
combination of electoral competitiveness and veto players (Polity indicator by Marshall 
et al. 2010). However, as I will argue CRAs have good reasons to distinguish between 
the impact of these two political institutions – veto players as constraints on the 
executive and electoral competitiveness – on a country’s likelihood to repay. To avoid 
any confusion, I will only use the terms electoral competitiveness and veto players as 
constraints on the executive as two distinct institutional set-ups. I expect that political 
constraints on the executive have a positive impact (section 5.2.1) and that electoral 
competitiveness has a negative impact on the likelihood to repay (section 5.2.2). The 
two mechanisms can be tested separately because there is a high variance of the 
number of veto players among regimes with electoral competitiveness and because 
many regimes without electoral competitiveness also have a number of veto players. 
5.2.1 Constraints on the Executive 
Following North and Weingast (1989), I argue that more political constraints on the 
executive lead to a lower likelihood of default. As explained above, North and Weingast 
argue that changes during the Glorious Revolution in England “limited the Crown’s 
ability to alter rules after the fact without parliamentary consent” (1989: 829), which 
led to an “increasing number of veto players” (829). If the monarch wanted to default, it 
had to find an agreement with parliament about the financing of the budget. Tsebelis 
(1995, 2002) highlights that a higher number of veto players increase policy inertia. 
Veto players are “individual or collective decisionmakers whose agreement is required 
for the change of the status quo” (Tsebelis 2000: 442). A number of studies confirm that 
more veto players lead to less changes in economic policy, such as on taxes (Hallerberg 
& Basinger 1998), on labor legislation (Tsebelis 1999), on inflation (Treisman 2000), 
and on budget deficits (Franzese 2002). According to this approach, the impact of veto 
players on policy outcomes fundamentally depends on the status quo. For the 
democratic peace, Tsebelis and Choi (2009) claim that the status quo is no war and 
therefore a higher number of veto players decrease the likelihood of war. In a similar 
vein, I argue below that the status quo for sovereign debt is repayment and not a debt 
restructuring. It is important to note that my argument is not about budget deficits and 
debt developments, but only about debt repayment. For fiscal policy, more veto players 
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can lead to high budget deficits if high deficits are the status quo that cannot be 
changed due to policy inertia with a high number of veto players. But debt 
developments do not necessarily determine the willingness of a national government to 
default. Governments default with high and low debt levels and in economic bad and 
good times. Tomz and Wright (2007), for instance, show that governments have 
maintained debt service when faced with adverse shocks and have also defaulted in 
times of increasing economic output. Theoretically, I am therefore only interested in 
the impact of political institutions on the final decision to repay or not. In my empirical 
estimations in section 5.4.2, I will control for the impact of debt increases on sovereign 
ratings. In the remainder of this section, I will first show that debt restructurings are 
indeed a political decision and not due to policy inertia. Second, I will explain which 
political actors can prevent defaults. Finally, I will present first stylized facts about the 
relationship between defaults and the number of veto players. 
Defaults as Political Decisions 
According to Standard & Poor’s, a sovereign default is the “failure to meet a principal or 
interest payment on the due date contained in the original terms of a debt issue” (S&P 
2011a). It occurs when the “government either fails to pay scheduled debt service on 
the due date or tenders an exchange offer of new debt with less-favorable terms than 
the original issue” (ibid.). It is important to note that defaults are the outcome of a 
political decision and that countries therefore do not miss payments due to a lack of 
decisions caused by a high number of veto players. The Greek default in 2012 is only 
the latest example of a debt restructuring that took place before any payments were 
missed. It was an explicit policy decision by the executive and by the Greek parliament. 
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) review eight recent sovereign defaults in the last 
fifteen years. Pakistan in 1999, Moldova in 2002, Uruguay in 2003, and the Dominican 
Republic in 2005 all restructured their debt before any payments were missed (ibid.). 
In the other countries that they analyze, the default was also a political decision and not 
the result of policy inflexibility. The Russian default in 1998 followed an intense 
struggle between the president, the prime minister, and the Duma about the 
willingness to repay Soviet-era debt (ibid.: chapter 4). The Ukraine already made 
several debt exchange offers before any payments were missed (ibid.: chapter 5). In 
Ecuador in 1999, the default was also a political decision announced by the president 
and the finance minister (ibid.: 155, 164). When Ecuador defaulted again in 2008, 
Moody’s highlighted that the “government's decision to default is based on ideological 
and political grounds and is not related to liquidity and solvency issues" (Moody’s on 
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16/12/2008, see Moody’s 2008). Before Argentina defaulted, debt repayment played a 
central role in the presidential campaign of 1999 (Saiegh 2009b: 232). When the 
government announced the suspension of debt payments, the default was celebrated in 
Congress (Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer 2006: 201). As in Argentina and for instance 
also in Peru 1989, the announcement of a default often coincided with the inauguration 
speech of a president (Kohlscheen 2010: 65). All these different examples show that a 
sovereign default is not a consequence of policy inertia, but an explicit political decision 
that is often already made before any payments are missed. 
Who Can Constrain the Executive? 
If defaults are the outcome of a political decision, it is important to examine who can 
prevent the executive from this decision. In his cross-country analysis of constitutions, 
Kohlscheen finds that the “decision of whether to service debt typically falls into a legal 
void” (2010: 62). In contrast to other policy areas, there are thus no clearly defined 
constitutional veto players. But a number of actors can act as veto players by making 
the decision of the executive to default extremely costly. 
Parliaments are the classic example of an actor that can constrain the executive (see 
North & Weingast 1989). Due to the confidence requirement in parliamentary systems 
(see Persson & Tabellini 2003: 24-25), the executive would put its own survival at risk 
when defaulting in opposition to the parliament (see Kohlscheen 2007). Stasavage 
(2002, 2007a) criticizes this veto player approach because the parliament would only 
constrain the executive if a default was not also in the interest of parliament. England 
could thus only achieve credibility because holders of government debt were more 
represented in parliament (Stasavage 2002: 184). Tsebelis (2002) also highlights that 
the impact of veto players not only depends on their number but also on the ideological 
distance between them. It will thus depend on the interests of the majority in 
parliament whether they will veto a default decision by the executive. At least in some 
cases, parliamentarians and their supporters will have an interest in preventing a 
default. For instance, they might be directly affected by a default as creditors or by the 
ensuing economic turmoil and its impact on the economy and unemployment. Although 
a parliament hence does not have to veto the default decision of the executive, it can do 
so and thus increase the probability of debt repayment. Indeed, Kohlscheen (2010) 
finds in a sample of 59 developing countries from 1976 to 2003 that parliamentary 
regimes have a lower propensity to default. 
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An independent central bank can pose additional constraints on the executive not to 
default. In the 2012 Greek debt restructuring, the cooperation of the European Central 
Bank was, for instance, essential in quickly accepting Greek debt again as collateral. If 
the central bank does not support the restructuring, it can make the default very costly 
by not providing enough liquidity to the banking system. As in the European sovereign 
debt crisis, the central bank has often been a strong veto player in opposition to 
defaults. Uruguay, for instance, only defaulted following the resignation of several 
members of the Board of its central bank (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 2006: 225). 
Central banks are directly affected by a default because they hold government bonds as 
collateral. Moreover, a default in the domestic currency will undermine the inflation 
target of an independent central bank. 
An independent judiciary is another veto player that can constrain the executive. North 
and Weingast (1989: 816) highlight the central role of the judiciary for the English case. 
If debt is held under domestic law, the judiciary has to decide whether the default was 
legal. As in the 2012 Greek debt restructuring, the parliament can pass new laws to 
legitimize the default. However, the judiciary has to accept that these laws are passed in 
retrospect. Moreover, the executive – also in presidential regimes – then needs the 
support of parliament to change the law. 
Finally, a number of studies emphasize the status quo bias of coalition governments 
(Roubini & Sachs 1989, Alesina & Drazen 1991). If the government constitutes a 
coalition of parties, then there has to be agreement among these parties before a 
country can decide to default. Saiegh (2009b) and Kohlscheen (2010) both find that 
there are fewer defaults in countries under coalition governments. 
Stylized Facts about Default and Veto Players 
Table 42 presents initial evidence on the relationship between defaults and the number 
of veto players for 173 countries from 1975 to 2008 (unbalanced panel with an average 
of 26 years). The data on veto players are from the Database of Political Institutions 
(DPI) that measures the number of veto players on an ordinal scale from 1 to 18 (see 
Beck et al. 2001 and Keefer & Stasavage 2003). Data on defaults are from Standard & 
Poor’s (2006, 2011b). Following Rijckeghem and Weder (2009), I exclude default years 
after the entry into default. The data show a clear relationship between defaults and the 
number of veto players. As the number of veto players increases, the probability of 
default decreases. A simple Pearson chi-squared test indicates that there is a statistical 
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significant relationship between defaults and the number of veto players (chi-square 
with 13 degrees of freedom is 24.61, p = 0.026). Another measure of political 
constraints, Henisz’s indicator of political constraints on a scale from 0 to 1 for a 
sample of 172 countries from 1960 to 2007 (Henisz 2000, 2002) is also almost double 
as high for countries that do not default compared to countries that default (.32 
compared to .19). Although, empirically, regimes with electoral competitiveness are 
correlated with a higher number of veto players, there are also several regimes without 
electoral competitiveness with a high number of veto players. For the data in Table 42, 
23 of the 107 countries that have more than three veto players in some year are 
regimes without contested elections as defined by Cheibub et al. (2010). Moreover, 
there is also a clear variation in the number of veto players between regimes with 
contested elections. For the data in Table 42 below, the standard deviation in veto 
players for these regimes for 2008 is 1.90. 
Table 42: Default and Veto Players 
Number of Veto 
Players 
Number of 
Defaults 
Total 
Observations 
Probability of Default 
in % 
1 76 1,809 4.20 
2 13 380 3.42 
3 15 849 1.77 
4 14 804 1.74 
5 5 342 1.46 
6 or more 2 185 1.08 
Data: 173 countries from 1975 to 2008; veto player data are from the World Bank’s Database of 
Political Institutions (World Bank 2013b, Beck et al. 2001), default data are from S&P (2006a, 
2011b) 
 
Kohlscheen (2010) and Rijckeghem and Weder (2009) test the relationship between 
defaults and veto players more systematically in a multivariate probit and non-
parametric model. Both studies find a significant negative relationship between 
defaults and the extent of political constraints on the executive. This empirical evidence 
suggests that credit rating agencies should consider constraints on the executive when 
evaluating the likelihood of sovereign debt repayment. In section 5.4, I will test 
whether rating agencies actually take these political constraints into account. 
5.2.2 Regimes with Electoral Competitiveness 
The central argument of this chapter is that there is a conceptual difference between 
political constraints on the executive and electoral competitiveness. Regimes with 
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electoral competitiveness will always have at least one veto player, voters. But there is 
a high variance of the number of veto players among regimes with electoral 
competitiveness and many regimes without electoral competitiveness also have a 
number of veto players. For instance, a parliament does not have to be competitively 
elected to act as a veto player and prevent a default, but could also be composed of a 
tribal council, for instance. Parliaments that represent a minority of people, such as 
wealth-holders in 17th century England, might even be more likely to veto a default 
decision than modern parliaments elected with universal suffrage. Foley-Fisher (2012) 
shows that elected leaders who default are actually more likely to be re-elected. Some 
veto players, such as central banks, are explicitly granted independence to follow clear 
rules and shield them from electoral pressures and democratically elected decision-
makers (see Kydland & Prescott 1977). 
Contested elections and electoral pressures could lead to a higher likelihood of default 
for two reasons. First, opportunist political business cycle theories suggest that 
contested elections lead to incentives for a “potlatch right before elections” (Nordhaus 
1975: 187). If governments want to be re-elected, they have an incentive to please their 
voters right before an election. As debt repayment involves a short-term pain, but only 
a long-term gain in credibility, governments might have an incentive to default before 
an election. As illustrated above, debt repayment plays a central role in electoral 
campaigns. Governments might thus not be willing to bear the burden of debt 
repayment in an election year. For instance, the Mexican government in 1994 was not 
willing to increase interest rates to defend its currency peg and hence its solvency 
because of an upcoming presidential election (Mishkin 2006: 80). 
Second, electoral uncertainty can increase the borrowing costs for a government in an 
election year and therefore increase the incentive to default. For developing countries, 
there are many examples how uncertainty about electoral outcomes affects a country’s 
sovereign risk premium, such as for the case of Brazil 2002 (Brooks & Mosley 2007). 
Canes-Wrone and Park (2012) also show for developed countries that electoral 
uncertainty can have a negative impact on the decision of financial market participants 
to invest in the country. 
When analyzing how financial market participants evaluate political institutions it is 
therefore important to distinguish between the impact of veto players and electoral 
competitiveness. 
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5.3 A Review of Historical Cases 
The literature on recent data not only shifts from an explanation based on veto players 
to electoral competitiveness (see section 5.1) but also misrepresents studies based on 
historical data. I will first clarify which studies according to the literature on recent 
data allegedly show that democracies face a lower sovereign risk premium. I will then 
review these studies on historical data focusing on the mechanism that they suggest. 
Finally, I will show that it was not the introduction of electoral competitiveness, but 
rather more constraints on the executive that led to a lower sovereign risk premium for 
the historical cases. 
Archer et al. argue that their results are “contrary to the broad theoretical literature 
that suggests democracy helps to bolster government credibility and therefore access 
to capital markets” (2007: 343). They not only cite Weingast and Schultz (2003) at this 
point but also North and Weingast (1989). They also claim that “North and Weingast 
argue that seventeenth-century England’s adoption of more democratic institutions led 
to better access to capital through borrowing” (342). In a recent study on portfolio 
investment flows, Biglaiser et al. also suggest that some “studies indicate the benefits of 
democratic institutions (North & Weingast, 1989)” (2008: 1095).  
Beaulieu et al. (2012) claim that the “literature exploiting historical data, which 
includes case studies of seventeenth- to eighteenth-century England, nineteenth-
century Argentina, and nineteenth-century Brazil, along with panel data on both city 
states and large states, is generally supportive of the democratic advantage thesis” 
(Beaulieu et al. 2012: 710). They cite the studies by North and Weingast (1989), Saiegh 
(2009a), Summerhill (2006), Stasavage (2007b and 2011), and Dincecco (2009). 
According to Beaulieu et al., beginning “with North and Weingast’s seminal treatment, 
various scholars have argued that democracies should be perceived as more 
creditworthy than otherwise similar autocracies, leading to a “democratic advantage” 
in borrowing” (2012: 730). 
However, none of the cited studies on historical data suggest that democracies enjoy an 
advantage in sovereign debt markets and they do not refer to electoral competitiveness 
as a causal mechanism. North and Weingast highlight many different mechanisms 
leading to lower borrowing costs in their study on England from 1604 to 1750, but they 
do not mention democratic institutions and electoral competitiveness once. North and 
Weingast’s main claim is that the “new constitutional settlement endowed several 
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actors with veto power” (1989: 818). “Increasing the number of veto players implied 
that a larger set of constituencies could protect themselves against political assault, 
thus markedly reducing the circumstances under which opportunistic behaviour by the 
government could take place” (ibid.: 829). They focus on the new veto powers of the 
parliament, but they also mention that the “political independence of the courts limited 
potential abuses by Parliament” (ibid.: 819). In addition to the independent judiciary, 
they also highlight the importance of the central bank (ibid.: 821). 
In his study on Brazil in the 19th century, Summerhill (2008) presents evidence that 
constitutional changes in 1824 led to higher amounts of borrowing and lower 
sovereign borrowing costs. He focuses on the new role of parliament as an additional 
veto player. The “constitution of 1824 both established a parliament, and specified that 
parliamentary consent was required to make any changes to taxes, expenditures, or 
borrowing” (Summerhill 2008: 2). This “increased the number of entities with veto 
authority over the question of default” (ibid.). By “constitutionally establishing 
parliament as a veto entity on financial policies, the crown lost its ability to unilaterally 
default” (ibid.: 19). This is the same argument as North and Weingast’s and the 
argument is again not about democracies as regimes with electoral competitiveness, 
but about veto players. 
Dincecco (2009) demonstrates how changes in political institutions decreased 
government bond yields for 11 European countries from 1750 to 1913. He argues that 
by “establishing parliament’s power of the purse, limited government reduced the 
likelihood of poor spending choices by executives” (Dincecco 2009: 34). According to 
his definition, “limited government emerged the year in which parliament gained the 
constitutional right to control the national budget on an annual basis” (ibid.: 33). Saiegh 
(2009a) follows Dincecco’s definition of limited government in his study on 19th 
century Argentina. “According to these criteria – a regular veto right by parliament over 
budgets, and constitutional continuity, – limited government in Argentina dates back to 
the adoption of the 1853 constitution” (Saiegh 2009a: 12). Saiegh shows that there is a 
structural break in the government’s borrowing costs following the introduction of 
limited government. Both studies focus on the role of parliament as an additional veto 
player and do not mention democratic institutions or electoral competitiveness. 
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Table 43: Overview of Historical Cases 
Countries Time Veto Player Boix 
Data 
Polity 
Change 
Polity xrcomp xconst 
England 1604- 
1750 
Parliament, 
Judiciary, 
Central 
Bank 
1885 first in 
1800 
-2 1 7 
Brazil 1824 Parliament 1946 1824 (first) -6 1 1 
Belgium 1831 Parliament 1894 1830 (first) -4 1 5 
Netherlands 1848 Parliament 1897 1847-1848 -7 → -4 1 3 → 6 
Prussia 1848 Parliament 1919 1847-1848 -9 → -8 1 2 
Portugal 1851 Parliament 1911 1851 -4 1 3 
Argentina 1853 Parliament 1912 1851-1853 -5 → -3 1 1→ 3 
Italy 1861 Parliament 1919 1861 (first) -4 1 3 
Sweden 1866 Parliament 1911 1866-1870 -5 → -4 1 4 → 5 
Austria-
Hungary 
1867 Parliament 1920 
1990 
1860-1867 -6 → -4 1 1 → 3 
France 1870 Parliament 1870 1869-1877 -3 →  7 1→ 3 1 → 7 
Spain 1876 Parliament 1931 1873-1876 -5 → -1 1 1 → 7 
Data: For the first three columns (countries, time and veto player), data are from North & 
Weingast (1989) for England, from Summerhill (2008) for Brazil, from Saiegh (2009a) for 
Argentina and from Dincecco (2009) for all other countries. “Boix data” is an update of the 
database of regimes with contested elections developed by Cheibub et al. (2010) (Boix et al. 
2012). The last four columns are based on data from the Polity IV project (Marshall et al. 2010). 
 
The literature on recent data claims that there is a puzzle between studies on historical 
and studies on more recent data. One simple check of this claim is to test the 
hypotheses on the democratic advantage in the same way for historical and more 
recent data. Table 43 gives an overview of the historical cases that are cited by the 
literature on recent data and that I have summarized above. A first test should be based 
on the definition of democratic institutions as regimes with contested elections by 
Cheibub et al. (2010) that is used by Saiegh (2005) and Beaulieu et al. (2012) in their 
empirical studies on more recent data. Boix et al. (2012) provide an update of this 
measure with data until 1800. Except for France, none of the countries fulfills the four 
criteria of contested elections at the time when they have to pay lower sovereign risk 
premia. These countries establish democratic institutions defined as electoral 
competitiveness only several decades after the introduction of parliament as a veto 
player. We would thus not find a democratic advantage when we replicate the studies 
by Saiegh (2005) or Beaulieu et al. (2012) for historical data.  
Archer et al. (2007) do not use such a democracy threshold in their study, but the 
combined polity2 indicator by Marshall et al. (2010) on the 21-point-scale from -10 to 
+10. This indicator shows an increase for all countries for which a polity2 indicator is 
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available in the years in which political institutions were changed and borrowing 
conditions improved (except for Portugal). But this increase was not caused by the 
introduction of contested elections, but by higher constraints on the executive. The 
combined polity2 indicator is based on scores on the competitiveness of political 
participation (parcomp), the openness of executive recruitment (xropen), regulation of 
participation (parreg), the competitiveness of executive recruitment (xrcomp on a scale 
from 1 to 3), and constraints on the executive (xconst on a scale from 1 to 7) (see 
Marshall et al. 2010 for details). Except for France, electoral competitiveness never 
changed in the periods in which borrowing conditions improved. The changes in the 
polity2 indicator are entirely driven by higher constraints on the executive. As argued 
in the literature on the historical cases, it was the introduction of new veto players that 
led to better borrowing conditions for these countries and not the introduction of 
electoral competitiveness. 
5.4 Empirical Evidence for Sovereign Ratings 
In the past, financial market participants required lower sovereign risk premia from 
countries with more veto players. As argued above, if more actors can prevent the 
executive from defaulting, it is less likely that a country will default. CRAs have 
therefore good reason for taking this political factor into account in their sovereign risk 
assessments. In contrast to the previous literature, I will test for the impact of electoral 
competitiveness and veto players as two distinct institutional mechanisms. In addition 
to econometric evidence (section 5.4.2), I will also provide evidence based on sovereign 
rating methodologies (section 5.4.1) and the new database of sovereign rating 
announcements (section 5.4.3). 
5.4.1 Evidence from Rating Methodologies 
Although the rating process has been characterized as “opaque” for a long time 
(Beaulieu et al. 2012: 731), CRAs have become more transparent and have published 
more extensive sovereign rating methodologies in recent years. As shown in section 
3.3, these methodologies indicate that political factors play an important role in the 
sovereign rating process. The methodologies can also give us a first indication of CRAs’ 
assessments of political institutions. 
 5 Rating Political Institutions: Where is the Democratic Advantage?  
 
125 
 
In its most recent methodology, Standard & Poor’s highlights five main sovereign rating 
factors (S&P 2011a). The first sovereign rating factor is a political score on a scale from 
1 (the strongest) to 6 (the weakest). Institutional checks and balances are one key 
driver for this political score. For the best political score of 1, the credit rating agency 
expects “extensive checks and balances between institutions” (ibid.: 11). For a score of 
2, there have to be “generally effective checks and balances” (ibid.), for a score of 3, 
“evolving checks and balances” (ibid.), and for a score of 4 “more uncertain checks and 
balances between institutions” (ibid: 12). Standard & Poor’s does not distinguish 
between democracies and autocracies. 
Moody’s is even more explicit on the question of a “democratic advantage”. Moody’s 
understands the political nature of defaults that can be “deliberate decisions to hurt 
creditors” (Moody’s 2008: 16). One of Moody’s four main sovereign rating criteria is the 
institutional strength of a country (ibid.). They state that “monitoring “institutional 
strength” does not entail a value judgment about the type of government in any given 
country – democracies as well as autocracies or other political regimes default alike.” 
(ibid.: 8). Fitch also takes political risks into account and does not distinguish between 
democracies and autocracies when evaluating sovereign issuers (Fitch 2011a). 
5.4.2 Panel Econometric Evidence 
The most recent sovereign rating methodologies already suggest that checks and 
balances play a more important role in the sovereign rating process than electoral 
competitiveness. Panel econometric evidence can substantiate this finding. I test for the 
impact of political institutions on sovereign ratings in the same econometric models as 
in chapter 4 and as discussed in section 3.4.1. 
In the tables below, I present the PCSE(ar1) estimator, which is a direct comparison to 
previous research on political institutions by Archer et al. (2007). Moreover, I estimate 
pooled ordinary least squares regressions for Fitch’s sovereign ratings because Fitch 
has used this model in its own research (see section 3.4.1). Finally, I will show that all 
results also hold in an ordered probit without assuming the same differences between 
rating categories. Although political institutions do not vary often over time, I can show 
that the main results also hold when controlling for country-fixed effects. For all CRAs, 
the macroeconomic control variables that are statistically significant have the expected 
sign in all estimations. 
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To measure political institutions, I will use the same indicators as in the previous 
literature, the polity indicator by Marshall et al. (2010) and the measure of democracy 
as a regime with contested elections by Cheibub et al. (2010). However, as for the 
historical data, I will not only use a combined measure of political institutions but also 
test for the impact of electoral competitiveness and veto players as two distinct 
institutional mechanisms. 
 
Polity Indicator 
Table 44 presents the results for the combined polity2 indicator, which is used by 
Archer et al. (2007) and combines measures of electoral competitiveness and political 
constraints. At a .05 confidence level, the results are never statistically significant. Table 
48 in the appendix also provides marginal effects for the polity2 score for the ordered 
probit model when all other control variables are held at their mean. The marginal 
effects of the polity2 indicator are neither statistically (at a .05 confidence level) nor 
substantively significant for any rating outcome in this model. As previous empirical 
studies, I therefore do not find a democratic advantage for recent sovereign rating data 
when using this combined measure of electoral competitiveness and political 
constraints. 
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Table 44: Polity2 and Sovereign Ratings 
 Standard & Poor’s Moody’s Fitch 
 PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit 
PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
PCSE (ar1) POLS 
Ordered 
Probit  
VARIABLES Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating 
Ln(GDP per 
capita) 
2.849*** 1.067*** 2.762*** 0.967*** 2.941*** 3.197*** 1.275*** 
(0.147) (0.103) (0.177) (0.123) (0.141) (0.070) (0.121) 
GDP Growth 
0.012 0.028* 0.008 0.006 0.016 0.044* 0.021 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.026) (0.013) 
Current Acc. 
Surplus 
-0.018* 0.013 -0.006 0.011 -0.006 0.018 0.011 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Inflation 
-0.001 -0.002** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.004** -0.001** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Default History 
0.418 -1.391*** 0.056 -1.142*** 0.043 -3.380*** -1.38*** 
(0.330) (0.218) (0.281) (0.303) (0.353) (0.469) (0.277) 
Public Debt to 
GDP 
-0.009* -0.005* -0.005 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Combined 
Polity Ind. 
0.023 0.031* 0.036* 0.033* -0.002 -0.002 0.002 
(0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) 
Constant 
-10.661***  -10.067***  -11.323*** -13.173***  
(1.278)  (1.605)  (1.143) (0.636)  
Observations 1,459 1,459 1,519 1,519 1,044 1,044 1,044 
Fit Statistics 0.693 30.43,8.88 0.699 30.94,9.49 0.745 0.747 30.84,15.85 
countries 100 100 91 91 96 96 96 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Due to space considerations, I do 
not report cut points for the ordered probit estimators. R-Squared fit statistics are reported for 
linear models. For the ordered probit model, the first value shows the percentage of correctly 
predicted observations (in %) and the second the percentage reduction in error (in %). 
 
As expected, countries with a better combined polity score do not get better sovereign 
ratings. As for the historical cases, we need to analyze the different components of the 
polity indicator separately (see Table 45; in Table 49 in the appendix I include all 
components of the polity indicator, which leads to the same results). Except for one 
model for Fitch, constraints on the executive (xconst) always have a significant positive 
impact and competitiveness of executive recruitment (xrcomp) always has a significant 
negative impact on sovereign ratings. The effects are substantial. A country with 
electoral competitiveness of executive recruitment is rated by a third to more than 
three rating notches lower than a country with no electoral competitiveness. On the 
seven-point executive constraint scale (xconst), a one point increase in constraints on 
the executive leads to a higher rating of one fourth to almost an entire rating notch. 
While political constraints consistently lead to higher sovereign ratings, higher 
electoral competitiveness seems to be viewed negatively by credit rating agencies. 
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These results also hold over time. Table 50 in the appendix provides the results for the 
estimation including country fixed effects. For all credit rating agencies, countries that 
introduce elections get a lower sovereign rating of one third to 1.2 fewer rating 
notches. Except for Fitch, for which only a short time horizon is available, the 
introduction of more constraints on the executive also leads to a better sovereign rating 
over time. 
 
Table 45: Polity2 Sub-Indicators and Sovereign Ratings 
 Standard & Poor’s Moody’s Fitch 
 PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit 
PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit 
PCSE (ar1) POLS 
Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating 
Ln(GDP per 
capita) 
2.861*** 1.081*** 2.785*** 0.986*** 2.929*** 3.174*** 1.291*** 
(0.149) (0.102) (0.173) (0.121) (0.145) (0.071) (0.122) 
GDP Growth 
0.013 0.027* 0.008 0.006 0.016 0.041 0.020 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.026) (0.014) 
Current Acc. 
Surplus 
-0.017* 0.014 -0.005 0.013 -0.004 0.031*** 0.015 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
Inflation 
-0.001 -0.002** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.003** -0.001** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Default History 
0.402 -1.345*** 0.058 -1.069*** 0.020 -3.268*** -1.350*** 
(0.330) (0.226) (0.279) (0.302) (0.351) (0.438) (0.263) 
Public Debt to 
GDP 
-0.009** -0.005* -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
xconst 
 
0.247** 0.233** 0.279*** 0.267*** 0.242 0.778*** 0.245** 
(0.120) (0.098) (0.103) (0.097) (0.149) (0.120) (0.102) 
xrcomp 
 
-0.371** -0.306* -0.325* -0.376* -0.429 -1.688*** -0.521** 
(0.185) (0.179) (0.193) (0.201) (0.274) (0.258) (0.204) 
Constant 
-11.114***  -10.843***  -11.516*** -13.131***  
(1.242)  (1.554)  (1.066) (0.590)  
Observations 1,457 1,457 1,514 1,514 1,042 1,042 1,042 
Fit Statistics 0.698 29.85,8.09 0.705 30.31,8.57 0.749 0.761 30.42,15.30 
countries 100 100 91 91 96 96 96 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Due to space considerations, I do 
not report cut points for the ordered probit estimators. R-Squared fit statistics are reported for 
linear models. For the ordered probit model, the first value shows the percentage of correctly 
predicted observations (in %) and the second the percentage reduction in error (in %). 
 
Veto Players and Electoral Competitiveness 
These results suggest that CRAs think that higher political constraints on the executive 
lead to a lower default risk. As robustness check, I will test this hypothesis also for the 
measure of regimes with contested elections by Cheibub et al. (2010), which is used in 
the previous literature by Saiegh (2005) and Beaulieu et al. (2012) and for another 
constraint index developed by Henisz (2002). The constraint index by Henisz (2002) is 
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closely related to the argument in section 5.2 and has been previously used in the 
literature on debt and default (see Kohlscheen 2010, Rijckeghem and Weder 2009). 
Henisz (2000, 2002) builds this indicator of political constraints (polcon V) on a zero to 
one linear scale based on the number veto players in the political system from the 
executive, the lower and the upper house of the legislature, sub-federal units, and the 
judiciary. He also takes into account how political preferences are distributed across 
and within these different veto players. In his spatial model, each additional veto player 
has a positive, but diminishing impact on the total level of political constraints (Henisz 
2002: 363). According to Tsebelis, this indicator is “conceptually very closely 
correlated” (2002: 204) to his own concept of veto players and it is also used by 
Tsebelis and Choi (2009) in their re-analysis of the democratic peace. 
Table 46 shows that Henisz’ political constraints index always leads to better sovereign 
ratings in every model and for all rating agencies. Controlling for the standard 
macroeconomic indicators, a country with more veto players gets a better sovereign 
rating. Table 51 in the appendix shows the marginal effects of the constraint indicator 
for the different rating categories. More veto players lead to a significant higher 
likelihood of being in a rating category of A and higher. In contrast, electoral 
competitiveness does not have an impact on sovereign ratings. In Fitch’s simple pooled 
OLS model, electoral competitiveness even leads to worse sovereign ratings. 
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Table 46: Political Constraints, Electoral Competitiveness and Sovereign Ratings 
 Standard & Poor’s Moody’s Fitch 
 PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit 
PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit 
PCSE (ar1) POLS 
Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating 
Ln(GDP per 
capita) 
2.815*** 1.065*** 2.863*** 0.957*** 2.962*** 3.023*** 1.277*** 
(0.139) (0.111) (0.155) (0.132) (0.135) (0.073) (0.137) 
GDP Growth 
0.006 0.013 0.010 -0.000 0.010 0.015 0.009 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.033) (0.016) 
Current Acc. 
Surplus 
-0.012 0.010 0.001 0.007 -0.003 0.016 0.011 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
Inflation 
-0.001 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.004** -0.002** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Default History 
0.440 -1.298*** -0.021 -1.005*** -0.210 -3.190*** -1.268*** 
(0.354) (0.221) (0.325) (0.310) (0.409) (0.474) (0.299) 
Public Debt to 
GDP 
-0.010** -0.008*** -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.008** -0.006* 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Political 
Constraints 
1.408*** 1.540*** 1.203*** 1.313*** 0.974* 2.892*** 1.120** 
(0.481) (0.391) (0.398) (0.410) (0.542) (0.438) (0.473) 
Electoral 
Competiti. 
-0.169 -0.273 0.009 -0.137 -0.404 -0.902*** -0.387 
(0.300) (0.198) (0.271) (0.176) (0.288) (0.248) (0.255) 
Constant 
-10.67***  -11.37***  -11.55*** -12.14***  
(1.084)  (1.390)  (0.938) (0.677)  
Observations 1,300 1,300 1,379 1,379 883 883 883 
Fit Statistics 0.725 33.77,11.42 0.725 33.43,11.21 0.782 0.778 33.52,17.67 
countries 98 98 94 94 97  97  97 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Due to space considerations, I do 
not report cut points for the ordered probit estimators. R-Squared fit statistics are reported for 
linear models. For the ordered probit model, the first value shows the percentage of correctly 
predicted observations (in %) and the second the percentage reduction in error (in %). 
 
Table 52 and Table 55 in the appendix show that these results also hold when testing 
for veto players and electoral competitiveness in separate regressions. Veto players 
have a positive impact on sovereign ratings and electoral competitiveness has either no 
impact or even a negative impact on sovereign ratings. 
As a final robustness check, I also test my argument for the veto player index of the 
Database of Political Institutions (see section 5.2.1). Table 54 in the appendix 
demonstrates that countries with more veto players also get a higher rating for this 
indicator. No matter which constraint indicator is used, constraints on the executive 
lead to better sovereign ratings. 
5.4.3 Evidence from Sovereign Rating Announcements 
Rating methodologies and econometric evidence show that CRAs assign better ratings 
to regimes with many veto players and do not regard electoral accountability as a 
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positive rating driver. CRAs’ explanations for their rating decisions can provide 
additional evidence for this finding. First, a text analysis of rating announcements 
demonstrates that political stability is an important rating driver and that veto players 
serve as one central indicator of politically stable institutions. Second, CRAs mention in 
particular two types of veto players, independent central banks and an independent 
judiciary. Third, elections are regarded as a negative rating driver for exactly the two 
reasons outlined in section 5.2.2, political uncertainty and political business cycles. 
Domestic political stability is a key rating factor, which is mentioned for 20%, i.e., 250 
of the 1,222 rating actions for all three main CRAs since 1995. Most often, CRAs do not 
specify how countries can achieve domestic political stability, but for many cases, CRAs 
highlight the important role of institutional checks on the executive. For instance, Fitch 
explains that Abu Dhabi’s AA rating is constrained because the “government and 
executive authority is not subject to the public and institutionalised checks and 
balances typical in most other sovereigns in the 'AA' category”35. Other sovereigns on 
the Arabian Peninsula face similar criticism.36 This has led to public complaints about 
sovereign rating decisions. The Finance Minister of Saudi Arabia, Ibrahim al-Assaf, 
complained in the Financial Times that we “see advanced economies with double A and 
some of them are reduced even further, while emerging markets like my own 
country…we’re really deserving of a higher credit rating” (Financial Times 2013). In 
response, Dima Jaradaneh, a Director at S&P, argues that it is “not only about money 
[…]. The political issues […] are constraints on the ratings” (ibid.). 
If countries introduce additional constraints on the executive, they can improve their 
sovereign rating. Kenya, for instance, was upgraded in 2010 by S&P because its “new 
constitution curtails the president's powers, provides new checks and balances, creates 
an apex court, and devolves some power to newly established counties“37. In contrast, 
countries that remove constraints on the executive are downgraded. For instance, 
Venezuela was downgraded several times by all three CRAs due to lower institutional 
checks on the executive. In 1999, S&P argues that Venezuela deserves a lower rating 
                                                          
35 Fitch: 2007_07_02_AbuDhabi 
36 See, for instance, Fitch: 2008_01_23_RasAlKhaimah 
37 S&P: 2010_11_19_Kenya 
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because “the new constitution concentrates power in the executive, with few checks 
and balances”38. In 2005, S&P summarizes that Venezuela’s ratings are constrained by: 
“Weak institutions and a continued deterioration of the system of 
checks and balances. The recent changes in the Central Bank Law 
have reinforced government control over resource allocation and 
greatly damaged confidence. Supporters of President Chavez now 
control most of the major institutions in the country, including the 
National Assembly, the judiciary, armed forces, and electoral 
council.”39 
 
As in this explanation for Venezuela’s rating, CRAs mention in particular independent 
central banks and an independent judiciary as important veto players. Independent 
central banks are a positive rating driver for 35 rating actions, mostly for emerging 
market economies and developing countries. For developed countries, CRAs take 
independent central banks for granted, but also take an increase in central bank 
independence into account, such as Moody’s for the case of Sweden in 1999.40 In some 
cases, CRAs explicitly emphasize how central banks can constrain the executive. For 
instance, S&P argues that Mexico’s “independent central bank […] should insulate the 
government’s liquidity from possible negative shocks during the 2006 election 
campaign”41. 
An independent judiciary is mentioned as a positive rating driver for 22 rating 
announcements. For some countries, CRAs see a direct link between the rule of law and 
a country’s willingness to repay. Fitch, for instance, argues that the Russian 
government should “promote the rule of a law and contract, not least by establishing a 
track record of honouring its payments to domestic and foreign creditors”42. Other veto 
players, such as subnational governments or parliaments are seldom mentioned by 
CRAs. 
In contrast to the positive role of checks and balances, CRAs emphasize the negative 
impact of domestic elections on a sovereign’s ratings. Domestic elections are mentioned 
for 24%, i.e., 297 of the 1,222 rating actions since the mid-1990s. In some cases, CRAs 
explicitly argue that domestic elections increase a government’s willingness to default. 
                                                          
38 S&P: 1999_12_21_Venezuela 
39 S&P: 2005_08_12_Venezuela, see also S&P: 2006_02_03_Venezuela 
40 Moody’s: 1999_08_23_Sweden 
41 S&P: 2005_01_31_Mexico 
42 Fitch: 2000_05_08_Russia 
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Fitch, for instance, suggests for Argentina in 2001 that “against a backdrop of political 
uncertainty due to the elections on October 14, the government's capacity to honor its 
debt obligations has weakened and raised the incentives to pursue debt 
restructuring”43. As argued in section 5.2.2, CRAs highlight in particular that elections 
can lead to policy and political uncertainty and to political business cycles. 
For 68 rating actions, CRAs claim that elections lead to policy uncertainty or political 
instability. S&P expects, for instance, “Korea's economic recovery to falter next year, as 
a result of […] political uncertainties relating to the presidential election”44. For 
Paraguay, S&P argues that the upcoming elections in 2003 will increase political 
instability which “will continue to weaken political institutions in Paraguay and place 
debt repayment at risk”45. Fitch assumes, for example, that “the upcoming elections in 
Mexico inevitably bring uncertainties”46. For Moldova, Moody’s suggests that “political 
uncertainty surrounding upcoming general elections may jeopardize continuity in the 
economic, institutional and fiscal reform process”47 and for Russia that elections lead to 
“uncertainty in continuity in economic policy management”48. 
For 120 rating actions, CRAs refer to electoral or political business cycles as a negative 
rating driver. Most of these elections are on a national level, but CRAs also take the 
negative impact of local, regional, and state level elections into account for larger 
sovereigns, such as for Brazil in 2000, India in 2002, Turkey in 2004, and Mexico in 
2010.49 According to the CRAs, most countries are unable to contain pre-electoral 
spending.50 Spending pressures are especially the result of wage increases51, increases 
in social spending52 and the inability to cut welfare payments and pension and health 
                                                          
43 Fitch: 2001_10_12_Argentina 
44 S&P: 1997_10_24_Korea 
45 S&P: 2002_11_27_Paraguay 
46 Fitch: 2000_05_03_Mexico 
47 Moody’s: 2010_08_12_Moldova 
48 Moody’s: 1998_03_11_Russia 
49 Fitch: 2000_02_22_Brazil, Fitch: 2001_11_21_India, S&P: 2003_07_28_Turkey, Fitch: 
2003_09_25_Turkey, S&P: 2009_12_14_Mexico 
50 S&P: 1997_04_02_Argentina, Moody's: 1997_10_02_Argentina, S&P: 2001_01_03_Brazil, S&P: 
2003_05_09_Guatemala, Fitch: 2003_06_23_Venezuela, Fitch: 2003_07_10_PapuaNewGuinea, 
Fitch: 2003_07_21_Latvia, S&P: 2004_02_05_Lithuania, Fitch: 2004_09_21_Slovakia, S&P: 
2004_12_03_Cameroon, Fitch: 2005_01_21_Ukraine, Fitch: 2005_01_26_Gambia, Fitch: 
2005_08_03_Russia, Fitch: 2005_08_26_CzechRepublic, S&P: 2005_12_15_Russia, Fitch: 
2006_08_29_Jamaica, S&P: 2007_04_02_Grenada, S&P: 2007_08_01_Grenada, S&P: 
2008_02_26_Panama, S&P: 2009_02_25_Ukraine, Moody's: 2010_01_08_Turkey, S&P: 
2010_08_27_Ghana 
51 S&P: 1997_06_05_Venezuela, S&P: 2003_06_02_Uruguay, Fitch: 2003_06_25_Ukraine 
52 S&P: 2002_12_30_Belize, S&P: 2005_03_03_Venezuela 
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entitlements before an election53. At the same time, according to the CRAs, 
governments are unable to raise revenues before an election due to limited tax 
reforms54, such as a failure to pass a VAT law55 before a looming election, pre-electoral 
tax cuts56, and poor tax collection57. Overall, CRAs emphasize that governments lack 
fiscal discipline and increase budget deficits before domestic elections.58 In addition, to 
pre-electoral fiscal indiscipline, CRAs also highlight that elections can undermine 
implementation of IMF programs59 and necessary financial sector reforms60, such as 
bank restructurings61. Moreover, CRAs often question a government’s ability to 
maintain liberalization policies in the run-up to an election62, in particular privatization 
policies63. 
                                                          
53 S&P: 2001_02_22_Japan, S&P: 2003_06_02_Uruguay, Fitch: 2003_06_20_CzechRepublic 
54 S&P: 1997_01_22_Panama, S&P: 1999_11_23_Suriname, S&P: 2011_01_14_ElSalvador 
55 S&P: 2000_09_18_Lebanon 
56 Fitch: 1999_10_25_Greece, S&P: 1999_11_24_Greece, S&P: 2001_03_26_Argentina, Fitch: 
2003_06_25_Ukraine 
57 Moody's: 2008_05_21_Pakistan 
58 S&P: 1995_12_04_Israel, S&P: 1996_08_26_ElSalvador, S&P: 1997_06_05_Venezuela, S&P: 
1997_07_16_CostaRica, Moody’s: 1997_07_24_Ecuador, S&P: 1997_12_18_Peru, S&P: 
1997_12_31_Indonesia, S&P: 1998_01_09_Indonesia, Moody’s: 1998_03_25_Malta, S&P: 
1999_11_24_Greece, S&P: 2000_11_01_Peru, Fitch: 2000_11_30_Hungary, Fitch: 
2001_06_13_Ukraine, S&P: 2001_10_03_Ireland, S&P: 2002_11_21_Uruguay, S&P: 
2002_12_17_Taiwan, S&P: 2003_07_28_Turkey, Fitch: 2003_09_25_Turkey, Fitch: 
2003_12_18_Romania, Fitch: 2005_02_15_Cameroon, S&P: 2005_05_11_Ukraine, S&P: 
2005_12_15_Russia, S&P: 2006_06_28_Brazil, S&P: 2006_09_04_Russia, S&P: 
2006_12_22_Iceland, Fitch: 2007_03_15_Iceland, S&P: 2007_10_02_CzechRepublic, Fitch: 
2007_10_29_Gabon, S&P: 2007_11_08_Gabon, Moody's: 2008_05_21_Pakistan, S&P: 
2008_08_11_Argentina, S&P: 2008_10_27_Romania, S&P: 2008_10_31_Argentina, S&P: 
2009_12_16_Greece 
59 S&P: 2001_08_06_PapuaNewGuinea, Fitch: 2004_01_30_DominicanRepublic, Fitch: 
2005_01_26_Gambia, Fitch: 2005_02_15_Cameroon, Fitch: 2010_07_06_Ukraine 
60 S&P: 2002_12_17_Taiwan 
61 Fitch: 1999_06_24_Korea, S&P: 2004_08_26_Thailand 
62 S&P: 1995_10_23_Paraguay, S&P: 1996_08_26_ElSalvador, S&P: 1997_06_05_Venezuela, S&P: 
1997_06_13_Uruguay, Moody’s: 1998_03_30_Slovakia, S&P: 1998_08_17_Russia, Moody’s: 
1998_09_09_Ukraine, S&P: 1999_12_23_Mongolia, S&P: 2001_02_22_Japan, Fitch: 
2001_06_13_Ukraine, Fitch 2001_11_21_India, Fitch: 2003_11_20_Indonesia, Fitch: 
2003_12_18_Romania, Fitch: 2004_09_28_Brazil, S&P: 2004_11_01_Serbia, S&P: 
2005_07_18_Serbia, S&P: 2005_12_15_Russia, S&P: 2011_03_24_Portugal 
63 S&P: 2001_11_13_Korea, Fitch: 2003_07_24_Bulgaria, S&P: 2004_05_13_Slovenia, Fitch: 
2005_11_01_Macedonia, S&P: 2010_12_21_Croatia 
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Figure 5: Rating Actions on Political Stability or Elections by CRA 
 
 
The text analysis shows that political stability and elections are key rating drivers. In 
many cases, political stability is associated with institutional constraints on the 
executive and independent central banks and judiciaries as veto players. Political 
stability and elections are mentioned for 39%, i.e., 475 of the 1,222 rating actions. As 
Figure 5 shows, S&P takes these criteria most often into account, for almost half of its 
rating actions, while Moody’s refers to these political factors for one fourth of its 
announcements. For 121 of the 137 rated countries, political stability or elections are 
taken into account for at least one rating action. The few countries for which these 
criteria are not mentioned are mainly small sovereigns and overseas territories, such as 
Guernsey, Montserrat, Mauritius, and Bermuda or politically very stable countries, such 
as Singapore, Finland, Denmark, and Norway. 
Moreover, the text analysis demonstrates that CRAs only recently started to refer to the 
quantitative judgment of political institutions compiled by other organizations. As 
discussed in the review of methodologies in section 3.3, Moody’s and Fitch began to use 
quantitative political indicators compiled by another organization. The text analysis 
shows that Moody’s and Fitch started to use these indicators only recently. Fitch 
referred to the World Bank Governance Indicators for the first time in 2008 in a rating 
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action for Israel and only regularly since 2010.64 Moody’s also only started to use the 
World Bank Governance Indicators in 2010.65 
Overall, evidence from rating methodologies, the econometric study, and the text 
analysis point to the central importance of political factors for sovereign ratings. 
Political constraints on the executive and elections are key rating drivers. Countries 
with a higher number of veto players and thus a system of checks and balances get 
better sovereign ratings. In contrast, CRAs associate elections with political instability 
and pre-electoral fiscal indiscipline. 
5.5 Summary 
There are many unsuccessful attempts in the literature to find a democratic advantage 
for recent sovereign rating data because such an advantage allegedly exists for 
historical sovereign debt data. I offer a simple explanation for this puzzle. Countries 
with competitive elections never got better borrowing conditions. Instead, financial 
market participants value constraints on the executive that limit the likelihood of a debt 
restructuring. If more actors can prevent the executive from defaulting, it is less likely 
that a country will default. CRAs have therefore good reason for taking this political 
factor into account in their sovereign risk assessments. Constraints on the executive are 
already the central mechanism suggested in the literature on historical data. For these 
historical cases, an increase in veto players led to a lower sovereign risk premium. I 
show that this mechanism still holds for CRAs in the panel data set of more than 100 
rated countries since the 1980s. Controlling for standard macroeconomic factors, 
different veto player indicators always have a significant positive impact on sovereign 
ratings. The text analysis of 1,222 rating announcements since the mid-1990s shows 
that political stability is a key rating driver, which CRAs often associate with 
institutional constraints on the executive and veto players, such as independent central 
banks and an independent judiciary. In contrast, CRAs expect that domestic elections 
lead to political uncertainty and instability and to fiscal indiscipline and limited 
economic liberalization policies that signal a government’s unwillingness to repay in 
hard times. Credit rating agencies are in favor of constraints on the executive, but not of 
                                                          
64 Fitch: 2008_02_11 for Israel, 2010_02_16_Jamaica, 2010_08_24_Rwanda, 
2010_11_26_HongKong, 2011_02_03_Seychelles 
65 Moody’s: 2010_05_26_Nicaragua, 2010_09_22_SriLanka 
In section 7.3.1 of the conclusion, I will provide an explanation why these CRAs might have 
started to rely more on external quantitative criteria in recent years. 
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electoral competitiveness and in particular the electoral uncertainty and political 
business cycles associated with contested elections. 
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5.6 Appendix 
Table 47: Summary Statistics 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Polity2 Indicator  
overall 6.11 5.83 -10 10 N =    1871 
between 
 
5.96 -10 10 n =     118 
within 
 
1.67 -6.30 13.35 T-bar = 15.85 
Political 
Constraints on the 
Executive (xconst) 
overall 5.78 1.77 1 7 N =    1866 
between 
 
1.84 1 7 n =     118 
within 
 
0.54 2.40 8.90 T-bar = 15.81 
Competitiveness of 
Executive 
Recruitm.(xrcomp) 
overall 2.52 0.82 0 3 N =    1866 
between 
 
0.92 0 3 n =     118 
within 
 
0.29 -0.01 4.29 T-bar = 15.81 
Henisz Political 
Constraint V Index 
overall 0.60 0.26 0 0.9 N =    1580 
between 
 
0.27 0 0.89 n =     117 
within 
 
0.09 -0.02 1.10 T-bar = 13.50 
DPI Checks Veto 
Player Index 
overall 3.50 1.82 1 18 N =    1896 
between  1.41 1 9.54 n =     125 
within  1.13 -3.03 13.47 T-bar =  15.16 
 
 
 
 
Table 48: Marginal Effects of Polity2 on Sovereign Ratings 
 
Standard & Poor's Moody's Fitch 
Category Polity2 SE Polity2 SE Polity2 SE 
B- or below -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
B -0.001 (0.000) -0.001* (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) 
B+ -0.001 (0.001) -0.001* (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
BB- -0.002* (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
BB -0.003 (0.002) -0.002 (0.001) -0.000 (0.002) 
BB+ -0.002 (0.002) -0.003* (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) 
BBB- -0.002 (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) 
BBB -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) 
BBB+ -0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
A- 0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.002) 
A 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) 
A+ 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
AA- 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
AA 0.002 (0.001) 0.003 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
AA+ 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
AAA 0.004 (0.003) 0.005* (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 
For all calculations of marginal effects, all other explanatory variables are held at their mean. 
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Table 49: Individual Polity Indicators66 
 Standard & Poor’s Moody’s Fitch 
 PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
PCSE (ar1) POLS 
Ordered 
Probit  
VARIABLES Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating 
Ln(GDP per 
capita) 
2.455*** 0.921*** 2.348*** 0.823*** 2.650*** 2.614*** 1.175*** 
(0.134) (0.121) (0.163) (0.127) (0.131) (0.100) (0.141) 
GDP Growth 
0.017 0.030** 0.011 0.000 0.016 0.011 0.009 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.025) (0.016) 
Current Acc. 
Surplus 
-0.013 0.024** -0.005 0.018** -0.003 0.046*** 0.024** 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Inflation 
-0.001* -0.002** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.003* -0.001* 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Default 
History 
0.200 -1.500*** -0.074 -1.118*** 0.017 -3.043*** -1.332*** 
(0.330) (0.246) (0.279) (0.330) (0.350) (0.414) (0.273) 
Public Debt 
to GDP 
-0.013*** -0.008*** -0.008** -0.004 -0.004 -0.011*** -0.006** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
xconst 
 
0.273** 0.156 0.253** 0.161 0.268* 0.717*** 0.237** 
(0.130) (0.111) (0.123) (0.111) (0.152) (0.116) (0.112) 
xrcomp 
 
-0.252 -0.480*** -0.340 -0.567*** -0.316 -1.617*** -0.630*** 
(0.265) (0.172) (0.251) (0.170) (0.303) (0.257) (0.192) 
parcomp 
 
-0.015 0.122 0.119 0.141 -0.150 -0.084 0.015 
(0.134) (0.138) (0.167) (0.141) (0.160) (0.153) (0.177) 
xropen 
 
0.053 0.349*** 0.215 0.389*** 0.176 0.652*** 0.391*** 
(0.208) (0.116) (0.176) (0.137) (0.210) (0.126) (0.135) 
parreg 
 
0.859*** 0.443*** 0.827*** 0.432*** 0.587*** 0.870*** 0.299*** 
(0.107) (0.094) (0.113) (0.115) (0.126) (0.105) (0.114) 
Constant 
-11.005***  -10.905***  -11.487*** -12.848***  
(1.118)  (1.446)  (0.923) (0.705)  
Observations 1,457 1,457 1,514 1,514 1,042 1,042 1,042 
Fit Statistics 0.733 33.01,12.23 0.735 33.35,12.56 0.760 0.790 31.57,16.70 
countries 100 100 91 91 96 96 96 
 
                                                          
66 For all of the following models, standard errors are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Due to space considerations, I do not report cut points for the ordered probit estimators 
in this and the following models. For all tables, R-Squared fit statistics are reported for linear 
models. For the ordered probit model, the first value shows the percentage of correctly 
predicted observations (in %) and the second the percentage reduction in error (in %). 
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Table 50: Individual Polity Indicators with Country-Fixed Effects 
 Standard & Poor’s Moody’s Fitch 
 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
VARIABLES Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating 
Ln(GDP per 
capita) 
1.036*** 1.062*** 1.077*** 1.060*** 1.645*** 1.650*** 
(0.075) (0.078) (0.093) (0.093) (0.103) (0.102) 
GDP Growth 
0.049*** 0.044*** 0.020* 0.018* 0.038*** 0.038*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
Current Acc. 
Surplus 
-0.040*** -0.040*** -0.010 -0.011 -0.037*** -0.037*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Inflation 
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Default 
History 
-1.073*** -1.065*** -0.670*** -0.736*** -0.863*** -0.854*** 
(0.176) (0.180) (0.206) (0.207) (0.205) (0.204) 
Public Debt 
to GDP 
-0.031*** -0.032*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
xconst 
 
0.259*** 0.303*** 0.325*** 0.380*** 0.151 0.164 
(0.093) (0.081) (0.112) (0.098) (0.120) (0.105) 
xrcomp 
 
-0.531*** -0.765*** -1.317*** -1.179*** -0.351* -0.341* 
(0.172) (0.149) (0.209) (0.183) (0.202) (0.186) 
parcomp 
 
0.206  0.038  0.073  
(0.153)  (0.167)  (0.180)  
xropen 
 
-0.037  0.504***  0.058  
(0.153)  (0.165)  (0.308)  
parreg 
 
0.576***  0.302***  0.060  
(0.085)  (0.101)  (0.104)  
Constant 
3.863*** 6.915*** 4.531*** 7.229*** 0.318 0.898 
(0.904) (0.778) (1.087) (0.920) (1.588) (1.058) 
Observations 1,457 1,457 1,514 1,514 1,042 1,042 
Fit Statistics 0.400 0.355 0.201 0.188 0.369 0.368 
countries 100 100 91 91 96 96 
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Table 51: Marginal Effects of Political Constraints on Sovereign Ratings (1) 
 
Standard & Poor's Moody's Fitch 
Category Henisz SE Henisz SE Henisz SE 
B- or below -0.002 (0.002) -0.009 (0.006) -0.003 (0.003) 
B -0.013* (0.008) -0.030** (0.014) -0.009 (0.007) 
B+ -0.047** (0.020) -0.056** (0.024) -0.023* (0.014) 
BB- -0.072*** (0.026) -0.053** (0.022) -0.064** (0.032) 
BB -0.118*** (0.040) -0.067** (0.029) -0.079** (0.039) 
BB+ -0.121** (0.048) -0.103** (0.041) -0.121* (0.065) 
BBB- -0.129*** (0.050) -0.110** (0.053) -0.096* (0.055) 
BBB -0.080*** (0.029) -0.053* (0.029) -0.047 (0.031) 
BBB+ -0.028 (0.017) -0.034* (0.018) -0.000 (0.017) 
A- 0.009 (0.024) -0.008 (0.011) 0.078 (0.056) 
A 0.077** (0.039) 0.030 (0.033) 0.087* (0.046) 
A+ 0.054** (0.027) 0.040 (0.029) 0.034* (0.020) 
AA- 0.055** (0.023) 0.039 (0.025) 0.080** (0.040) 
AA 0.092** (0.039) 0.119** (0.049) 0.075* (0.039) 
AA+ 0.119** (0.047) 0.079** (0.036) 0.044** (0.021) 
AAA 0.205*** (0.064) 0.216*** (0.061) 0.044* (0.024) 
For all calculations of marginal effects, all other explanatory variables are held at their mean. 
 
 
Table 52: Henisz’s Political Constraints on Sovereign Ratings 
 Standard & Poor’s Moody’s Fitch 
 PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit 
PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit 
PCSE (ar1) POLS 
Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating 
Ln(GDP per 
capita) 
2.809*** 1.048*** 2.866*** 0.951*** 2.942*** 2.965*** 1.240*** 
(0.133) (0.104) (0.151) (0.132) (0.130) (0.068) (0.128) 
GDP Growth 
0.007 0.016 0.010 0.002 0.009 0.023 0.012 
(0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.033) (0.016) 
Current Acc. 
Surplus 
-0.012 0.014 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.028*** 0.016 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Inflation 
-0.001 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.004** -0.002** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Default 
History 
0.431 -1.341*** -0.024 -1.023*** -0.305 -3.417*** -1.342*** 
(0.355) (0.220) (0.324) (0.312) (0.421) (0.486) (0.295) 
Public Debt 
to GDP 
-0.010** -0.007*** -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.008** -0.006* 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Political 
Constraints 
1.389*** 1.342*** 1.210*** 1.206*** 0.901* 2.256*** 0.842* 
(0.485) (0.418) (0.388) (0.448) (0.505) (0.445) (0.508) 
Constant 
-10.733***  -11.390***  -11.610*** -11.992***  
(1.088)  (1.390)  (0.905) (0.675)  
Observations 1,300 1,300 1,379 1,379 883 883 883 
Fit Statistics 0.726 33.46,11.00 0.725 33.13,10.83 0.784 0.775 33.29,17.39 
countries 98 98 94 94 97 97 97 
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Table 53: Marginal Effects of Political Constraints on Sovereign Ratings (2) 
 
Standard & Poor's Moody's Fitch 
Category Henisz SE Henisz SE Henisz SE 
B- or below -0.002 (0.002) -0.009* (0.005) -0.003 (0.003) 
B -0.012* (0.007) -0.028** (0.013) -0.008 (0.006) 
B+ -0.041** (0.018) -0.051** (0.022) -0.018 (0.012) 
BB- -0.063*** (0.023) -0.048** (0.021) -0.048 (0.029) 
BB -0.101** (0.040) -0.061** (0.030) -0.060 (0.039) 
BB+ -0.105** (0.048) -0.094** (0.043) -0.090 (0.065) 
BBB- -0.112** (0.049) -0.101* (0.055) -0.070 (0.052) 
BBB -0.070** (0.028) -0.049 (0.030) -0.036 (0.029) 
BBB+ -0.026 (0.016) -0.032* (0.018) -0.001 (0.013) 
A- 0.006 (0.021) -0.008 (0.010) 0.056 (0.049) 
A 0.066* (0.036) 0.027 (0.031) 0.065 (0.046) 
A+ 0.047* (0.026) 0.037 (0.028) 0.026 (0.018) 
AA- 0.048** (0.023) 0.036 (0.025) 0.061 (0.041) 
AA 0.080** (0.037) 0.109** (0.050) 0.057 (0.037) 
AA+ 0.104** (0.045) 0.073** (0.036) 0.034* (0.021) 
AAA 0.180*** (0.063) 0.198*** (0.064) 0.035 (0.022) 
For all calculations of marginal effects, all other explanatory variables are held at their mean. 
 
 
 
Table 54: DPI Veto Player on Sovereign Ratings 
 Standard & Poor’s Moody’s Fitch 
 PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit 
PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit 
PCSE (ar1) POLS 
Ordered 
Probit 
VARIABLES Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating 
Ln(GDP per 
capita) 
2.848*** 1.070*** 2.743*** 0.999*** 2.942*** 3.107*** 1.245*** 
(0.138) (0.084) (0.167) (0.120) (0.123) (0.061) (0.115) 
GDP Growth 
0.018 0.024 0.007 0.003 0.016 0.046* 0.021 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.026) (0.014) 
Current Acc. 
Surplus 
-0.014 0.020** -0.001 0.014 0.001 0.037*** 0.018* 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Inflation 
-0.001 -0.002** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.004** -0.001** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Default History 
0.421 -1.365*** 0.091 -0.924*** 0.008 -3.174*** -1.291*** 
(0.335) (0.228) (0.276) (0.283) (0.372) (0.455) (0.259) 
Public Debt to 
GDP 
-0.013*** -0.006** -0.008* -0.002 -0.002 -0.005* -0.004 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
DPI Checks 
0.051** 0.117*** 0.005 0.114*** 0.059 0.201*** 0.092* 
(0.026) (0.032) (0.024) (0.037) (0.046) (0.043) (0.048) 
Constant 
-10.707***  -9.728***  -11.477*** -13.059***  
(1.242)  (1.542)  (0.996) (0.626)  
Observations 1,560 1,560 1,628 1,628 1,089 1,089 1,089 
Fit Statistics 0.689 29.74,8.89 0.695 30.03,8.88 0.758 0.746 29.93,14.26 
countries 109 109 100 100 101 101 101 
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Table 55: Democracy (Cheibub) and Sovereign Ratings 
 Standard & Poor’s Moody’s Fitch 
 PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
PCSE (ar1) 
Ordered 
Probit  
PCSE (ar1) POLS 
Ordered 
Probit  
VARIABLES Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating 
Ln(GDP per 
capita) 
2.740*** 1.033*** 2.711*** 0.957*** 2.919*** 3.145*** 1.270*** 
(0.153) (0.099) (0.176) (0.120) (0.133) (0.072) (0.126) 
GDP Growth 
0.027* -0.001 0.013 -0.014 0.019 -0.014 -0.003 
(0.015) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.019) (0.032) (0.016) 
Current Acc. 
Surplus 
-0.000 0.023** 0.008 0.014 0.005 0.027** 0.014 
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Inflation 
-0.001* -0.002** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.004** -0.001** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Default History 
0.411 -1.451*** 0.089 -1.065*** -0.137 -3.350*** -1.351*** 
(0.345) (0.216) (0.296) (0.278) (0.382) (0.445) (0.253) 
Public Debt to 
GDP 
-0.014*** -0.007*** -0.006 -0.003 -0.000 -0.006* -0.005 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Democracy 
(Cheibub) 
-0.031 0.231 0.004 0.251 -0.205 -0.165 -0.089 
(0.322) (0.230) (0.256) (0.242) (0.222) (0.262) (0.295) 
Constant 
-9.604***  -9.574***  -11.041*** -12.161***  
(1.169)  (1.561)  (1.035) (0.680)  
Observations 1,470 1,470 1,541 1,541 1,008 1,008 1,008 
Fit Statistics 0.669 30.88,9.68 0.693 30.43,8.92 0.756 0.752 31.94,16.54 
countries 111 111 101 101 101 101 101 
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6 Rating Agencies and the Enforcement of 
International Agreements 
In recent decades, each international financial crisis has led to a number of new global 
financial codes, standards, and rules that all countries were supposed to adopt and 
comply with (see Drezner 2007: 137ff., Walter 2008, Verdier 2012). However, in 
contrast to domestic law, the international system lacks a central enforcement agency 
with a monopoly of force. One of the central questions in international relations is 
therefore why states adopt and comply with international agreements if this entails 
short-term costs (Morgenthau 1978: 560, Keohane 1997: 487). In this debate, 
compliance with international agreements is defined as conformity between an actor’s 
behavior and a specified rule (Raustiala & Slaughter 2002: 539, see also Young 1979: 
104). International agreements are agreements signed by a sovereign state with other 
sovereign states or with an international institution and can range from informal 
standards to formal international treaties and commitments as a member of an 
international organization. 
Given the lack of a central enforcement power, several authors argue that financial 
market participants can help enforce international agreements by taking them into 
account in their risk assessments (Porter 2001: 433, Ho 2002, Singer 2007: 10). In 
particular, scholars and international institutions expect that credit rating agencies, as 
one central actor in sovereign debt markets, enforce international agreements 
(Kapstein 1994: 13, IMF 2003: 18, Arner & Taylor 2009: 2, IMF 2013a). If CRAs take 
international agreements into account in their sovereign rating assessments, this may 
provide countries with an incentive to adopt and comply with these agreements in 
order to gain a better rating. The decisive empirical question for this chapter is 
therefore whether, in addition to economic liberalization policies and political 
institutions, CRAs also take international agreements into account in their sovereign 
risk assessments. 
Based on the new comprehensive database of sovereign rating announcements, I show 
that CRAs take only the few international agreements into account that are already 
enforced by other states or international institutions. With their sovereign ratings, 
CRAs assess the default risk of sovereign states. As argued in section 1.2, countries 
default either because they are unable or because they are unwilling to repay. If the 
adoption of or compliance with an international agreement leads to financial support 
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by another state or an international institution, it can increase a country’s ability to 
repay. As economic liberalization policies, international agreements can also serve as a 
signal of a government’s willingness to repay. However, as I will argue, CRAs will only 
take an international agreement into account as a credible signal of a government’s 
willingness if the agreement is enforced by other states or international institutions. If 
these actors do not ensure that the agreement is implemented, countries can easily 
adopt the agreement and superficially comply with it without incurring any costs. 
Without enforcement, an international agreement would then only amount to cheap 
talk which cannot serve for CRAs as a credible signal of the willingness to repay. 
The literature identifies several potential international economic agreements that 
could serve as a signal of a government’s commitment to economic openness and 
reform and hence its willingness to repay in hard times. Empirical studies test whether 
sovereign ratings are influenced by international financial standards (Mosley 2003b, 
Petrie 2003, Hameed 2005, Arbatli & Escolano 2012), agreements with the IMF (Nelson 
2010), and commitments as a member of an international organization (Dreher & Voigt 
2011). However, these studies face many empirical limitations (see section 6.1.2 for an 
empirical review of the literature). I test for CRAs’ promotion of these international 
agreements – international financial standards, agreements with the IMF, and accession 
to and membership of international and regional organizations – based on the new 
comprehensive data set of 1,222 rating announcements for 137 countries. 
I find that CRAs do not take international financial standards into account and mention 
agreements with the IMF and membership of international organizations (IOs) only to 
the extent that they lead to financial support or are enforced by the institution. First, 
CRAs have good reasons not to consider most international financial standards in their 
sovereign risk assessments because these standards are thus far not enforced by other 
states or international institutions. Although many countries adopt these standards, 
this lack of enforcement often does not lead to substantive compliance (Walter 2008). 
Therefore, these standards cannot serve as a credible signal of a government’s 
willingness to repay and CRAs have no reason for taking them into account in their 
assessments of sovereign creditworthiness (see section 6.3.1). 
Second, CRAs embrace agreements with the IMF to the extent that these 
recommendations are part of an IMF program that is enforced by the IMF and leads to 
financial support for liquidity-constrained sovereigns. The IMF is mentioned in 258 
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announcements and in more than half of these announcements IMF financial support is 
a key rating driver (see section 6.3.2). 
Third, membership of other IOs does not lead to financial support in a debt crisis. For 
most IOs, agreements are also not enforced and can therefore not serve as a credible 
signal of a government’s willingness to repay (see section 6.3.3). However, the 
European Union accession process includes policy conditionality. Accordingly, CRAs 
take the European Union into account in two thirds of their rating changes in Europe. In 
many cases, the EU accession process is highlighted as the key rating driver, often 
directly in the headline of the announcement (see section 6.3.4). Although this central 
role of the EU accession process has recently been emphasized in the literature on 
sovereign bond spreads (Gray 2009), it has been mainly overlooked in the literature on 
sovereign rating determinants. 
Overall, the empirical findings show that CRAs only care about international 
agreements, as one political factor, to the extent that other states and international 
organizations do. This limited promotion of international agreements by CRAs puts into 
doubt international reform efforts based only on soft standards, codes, and rules. 
Governments should thus be wary of relying on market enforcement alone in the 
current new wave of international standard-setting. 
6.1 Literature on Sovereign Ratings and International 
Agreements 
Many international institutions and scholars expect that financial markets, and in 
particular rating agencies, help to enforce international agreements by taking these 
agreements into account in their sovereign risk assessments (section 6.1.1). However, 
most studies on the determinants of sovereign ratings focus on a narrow set of 
macroeconomic indicators and the few studies on international agreements face 
empirical limitations (section 6.1.2). 
6.1.1 Claims on Market Enforcement and Rating Agencies 
Over the last few decades, states have developed a multitude of international 
standards, codes, and rules. For instance, following the Asian financial crisis at the end 
of the 1990s, regulators established a compendium of international standards to 
prevent future global financial crises (FSB 2013b). One key characteristic of this 
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international standard-setting process was its reliance on market enforcement 
(Helleiner & Pagliari 2010: 4). States expected international investors to provide “clear 
material incentives (such as lower risk-premiums and greater capital inflows) for 
developing country governments to adopt the new standards” (Mosley 2009: 10). If 
firms used international standards to assess risk, they could put “market pressure on 
governments […] to comply” (Porter 2001: 433). In particular, compliance should be 
achieved through “the positive impact on sovereign credit ratings of adherence to these 
international standards” (Arner & Taylor 2009:2). CRAs are often mentioned in official 
statements on market enforcement as one key actor. For instance, the International 
Monetary Fund expects that its Reports on the Observance of Codes and Standards will 
be taken into account by credit rating agencies in their sovereign rating assessments 
(IMF 2003: 18, IMF 2013a). 
Also, many scholars claim that markets help to enforce international agreements. 
Simmons argues that market pressures lead to high incentives to emulate the standards 
adopted by the dominant financial center which can explain the spread of certain 
international financial agreements (2001: 601-605). According to Ho, most countries 
implemented the Basel Accord because of market pressure (2002: 547). In this way, 
compliance with Basel standards became a signal of bank stability for investors (Singer 
2004: 563). According to Singer, non-compliance with a global financial standard could 
lead to capital flight, loss of competitiveness, and a crisis of confidence (Singer 2007: 
10). Kapstein argues for “enforcement […] through the marketplace, without further 
government intervention” (1994: 13) and already highlighted the important role of 
“market watchers such as debt-rating agencies” (ibid.). 
6.1.2 Limited Empirical Evidence 
Despite the expectation that markets, and in particular rating agencies, enforce 
international financial agreements, few studies have tested whether CRAs actually take 
the adoption of and compliance with international agreements into account. Most 
studies on the determinants of sovereign ratings focus on a narrow set of 
macroeconomic indicators for the three main CRAs that dominate the credit rating 
market. Despite different methods and data sets used, econometric studies identify 
similar significant macroeconomic variables which determine a sovereign’s rating by 
these agencies (see section 3.1.2). Few studies go beyond these macroeconomic 
indicators and study the impact of international agreements. 
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Mosley (2003b) analyzes whether CRAs take into account the adoption of the IMF’s 
Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS), one of the 12 key financial standards 
established following the Asian financial crisis. In her survey of CRA staff during March 
2001, only 20% of CRA staff report that the SDDS plays no role in their assessments 
(Mosley 2003b: 347). However, Mosley directly puts into doubt her own finding 
because it contradicts the limited importance of the SDDS for other market participants 
and is based on a survey conducted for only ten CRA staff. 
Petrie (2003) studies the impact on sovereign ratings for the compliance with another 
one of the 12 key financial standards, the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal 
Transparency. Since its inception, the IMF has conducted a compliance report for this 
standard, the fiscal transparency Reports on the Observance of Codes and Standards 
(ROSCs) (IMF 2002). Until March 2013, these so-called fiscal ROSCs have been 
published for 93 countries (IMF 2013c). In a survey, Petrie finds that 15 of the 21 
sovereign rating analysts at the three major CRAs who responded to his survey read the 
fiscal transparency ROSCs (Petrie 2003: 11). Seven of the 21 CRA staff claim that they 
have used information from the fiscal ROSC as a direct input for their rating assessment 
(ibid.). 
Hameed (2005) develops a quantitative index based on the fiscal ROSCs. For a cross-
section of 32 countries with averages from 1998-2002, he finds that compliance with 
the fiscal ROSCs leads to better credit ratings. Arbatli and Escolano (2012) update 
Hameed’s results for 21 advanced and 35 developing countries using the average 2010 
sovereign rating by the three major CRAs as dependent variable. They find that 
compliance with the fiscal ROSCs has only a direct impact for developing countries. For 
developed countries, compliance with fiscal ROSCs has only an indirect impact through 
lower debt to GDP ratios and higher primary balances. For developing countries, 
however, a one standard deviation increase in their fiscal ROSC index leads to a 
sovereign rating increase of about one rating notch in their estimation. 
Two studies, Nelson (2010) and Dreher and Voigt (2011), test for the impact of 
compliance with and adoption of international agreements on sovereign ratings beyond 
the key financial standards. Instead of ratings by the three major CRAs, these studies 
use two other measures of sovereign risk, Euromoney and Institutional Investor 
ratings, which are to some extent based on, but not produced by the officially 
recognized CRAs. Nelson (2010) analyzes the impact on sovereign ratings for the 
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compliance with Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. Simmons first argued 
that states can use compliance with this agreement on an open current account to 
“enhance their credibility to markets” (2000: 819). For a panel of 112 non-OECD 
countries from 1979-1997, Nelson finds that non-compliance with this agreement leads 
to worse Euromoney and Institutional Investor ratings. Nelson also tests for the impact 
of IMF-supported programs on sovereign risk assessments and shows that a country is 
downgraded by about one point if it takes an IMF loan in the previous year (Nelson 
2010: 121). However, this negative impact of IMF-supported programs on sovereign 
ratings should be interpreted with caution. IMF programs are always started during 
financial crises. Unobservables, such as uncertainty in such a financial crisis, could thus 
rather cause the downgrade than the IMF-supported program.  
Dreher and Voigt (2011) test whether an indicator that aggregates different 
international agreements is a significant determinant of sovereign ratings. Their 
indicator is based on the ratification of four United Nations (UN) conventions67, 
acceptance of International Court of Justice jurisdiction, membership of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and membership of two World Bank sub-organizations68. In 
a panel of 136 countries from 1984-2004, Dreher and Voigt (2011) show that the 
adoption of international agreements leads to significantly better Euromoney and 
Institutional Investor ratings. 
In addition to this study on membership of IOs, I am not aware of any study that 
focuses on membership of regional organizations as a rating determinant. However, 
two studies analyze the impact of compliance with accession criteria used by the 
European Union and the European Monetary Union (EMU) on the sovereign debt 
market in general. Gray (2009) studies the impact of the EU accession process on 
sovereign bond spreads for a sample of 17 post-communist European countries from 
1990-2006. Controlling for selection processes and substantive reforms prior to EU 
accession, Gray finds that closing the negotiation chapter with the EU on domestic 
economic policies leads to lower sovereign bond spreads. Based on many interviews, 
Mosley (2003a: 66-69, 2003b: 333-334) finds that the accession criteria for European 
                                                          
67 The four UN conventions are the International Convention for Civil and Political Rights and its 
Optional Protocol to abolish capital punishment, the International Convention for Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards and the Convention Against Torture. 
68 The World Bank sub-organizations are the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
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Monetary Union membership are also taken into account by sovereign debt market 
participants. 
Overall, this literature review shows the lack of comprehensive empirical evidence 
compared to the expectations by international institutions and academics that CRAs 
help to enforce international agreements by taking them into account in their sovereign 
rating assessments. Although all of the studies emphasize the importance of the 
adoption of and compliance with international agreements, they face several 
shortcomings. First, surveys of CRA staff have low response rates and directly ask about 
a standard at only one point in time when the standard is high on the agenda. Second, 
econometric studies on fiscal ROSCs are only based on a small cross-section of 
countries. These studies face the risk that unobservables, such as good fiscal 
institutions, drive the results because they are correlated with ROSCs and sovereign 
ratings. For IMF programs, it is particularly difficult in an econometric study to 
distinguish between the impact of the crisis and the ensuing program. Third, some of 
the interesting hypotheses, such as the impact of compliance with accession criteria on 
sovereign ratings, have not been tested for sovereign ratings thus far. Finally, none of 
the studies tests for all existing international agreements based on a theory of which 
agreements matter and which do not. 
6.2 Argument and Hypotheses 
I expect that CRAs take international agreements only into account if the agreements 
either lead to financial support or if the agreements are already enforced by another 
institution. As argued in section 1.2, CRAs not only have to assess a country’s ability but 
also its willingness to repay. First, international agreements can increase a country’s 
ability to repay if the adoption of or compliance with these agreements is a condition 
for financial support. Faced with a liquidity crisis, a country can be dependent on this 
short-term international financial support to prevent a default. CRAs would then not 
support an international agreement as such, but only to the extent that it leads to 
liquidity support in a debt crisis. Second, beyond this indirect impact, international 
agreements can also directly serve as a signal of a government’s willingness to repay, 
but only if the agreements are already enforced by other states or international 
institutions (section 6.2.1). Based on these two potential reasons, I present hypotheses 
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on which international agreements matter for the sovereign risk assessment by rating 
agencies (section 6.2.2). 
6.2.1 Argument: International Agreements as Signals 
To assess a government’s willingness to repay, CRAs have to go beyond standard 
economic criteria when evaluating the likelihood of sovereign default. I argue that the 
adoption of and compliance with some relevant international agreements can serve as 
another important signal of a government’s willingness to repay, but only if the 
agreements are visible and costly. 
Some international agreements can be a relevant signal of a government’s willingness 
to repay. States can maintain multiple reputations (Downs & Jones 2002). For instance, 
a state’s violation of human rights treaties does not necessarily indicate a low 
willingness to repay sovereign debt. But there are several issue areas relevant for 
building a reputation of sovereign debt repayment. First, Dreher and Voigt (2011) focus 
on international treaties that are related to property rights. The adoption of these 
treaties could signal a sovereign’s general willingness to honor property rights as in 
sovereign bond contracts. Second, Nelson analyzes the IMF’s Article VIII because it 
shows the “commitment to an open economic system” (2010: 107). In the same vein, 
Büthe and Milner suggest that WTO membership and participation in preferential trade 
agreements can serve as a signal of liberal economic policies with limited government 
intervention (2008: 742). If a country commits not to intervene in its domestic 
economy, this could show its market-friendliness in general. Third, beyond the 
commitment to uphold contracts and to support market interactions, international 
agreements could also demonstrate a state’s willingness to reform in difficult economic 
times. Faced with an adverse shock, a country has to be willing to enact reforms to 
prevent a default. If a country commits to such reforms as part of an international 
agreement, it can build a visible track record. 
Relevant international agreements can only serve as a credible signal if the agreements 
are visible and credibly enforced. First, CRAs’ use of an international agreement for 
their risk assessments depends on the visibility of the agreement. Most international 
agreements are more visible than domestic policy announcements. Indeed, Andritzky et 
al. (2005) find that domestic policy announcements do not have a systematic effect on 
sovereign bond spreads. According to Büthe & Milner (2008: 745), visibility is one of 
the reasons why international agreements can serve as a signal to foreign investors. As 
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it is costly for investors to collect information, they have incentives to use information 
shortcuts (Mosley 2000: 742-744.). Domestic policy announcements are most often in 
the local language for a domestic audience. It is costly for CRAs to translate these 
announcements and to interpret them in the domestic political context. In contrast, 
international agreements can be a “piece of reliable, public information” (Gray 2009: 
932) that can be “easily and uniformly interpreted” (ibid.: 933). IOs can also increase 
the visibility of compliance with international agreements if they publish regular track 
records.  
Second, international agreements have to be costly to serve as a credible signal. If an 
international agreement is not enforced by other states or IOs, a country can easily 
adopt the agreement and superficially comply with it without actually implementing 
the agreement. Such an agreement does not impose any costs on the country. A 
country’s claim to formally comply with such an international agreement amounts only 
to cheap talk, which cannot serve as a credible signal of a country’s type. Without 
enforcement by international institutions or other states, CRAs cannot distinguish 
between countries that only pretend to comply and those that substantively comply 
with the agreement. Monitoring substantive compliance is too costly for CRAs. Due to 
these monitoring costs, I expect that CRAs will not use international agreements if they 
have to assess the details of a country’s implementation process. Some other actor has 
to ensure the implementation of the international agreement. Then CRAs know that the 
agreement is not only cheap talk. Other states or international institutions can ensure 
the implementation of an international agreement with coercive measures such as 
funding conditionality or unilateral sanctions (see Verdier 2012: 29, Drezner 2007). If 
international institutions and other states do not care about the implementation of an 
international agreement, CRAs will regard the agreement as cheap talk and neglect a 
country’s adoption and formal compliance with the agreement.  
6.2.2 Hypotheses: Which International Agreements Matter? 
Based on the criteria above, I expect that CRAs take only those international 
agreements into account that either lead to liquidity support or are visible and credibly 
enforced and can hence serve as a credible signal of a government’s willingness to 
repay (see Table 56). To what extent do the agreements studied thus far in the 
literature fulfill these criteria? 
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Table 56: Hypotheses for Different International Agreements and IOs 
 
Do CRAs take into account? 
Why? 
 
due to financial 
support 
as signal 
if visible and costly 
International 
Financial Stan. 
no no no 
Agreements 
with IMF 
yes, for program countries 
only program 
countries 
yes, for program 
countries 
IO 
Membership 
no for most no for most no for most 
EU and EMU 
Membership 
yes, for accession countries 
limited, esp. since 
crisis 
yes, for accession 
countries 
 
 
First, I do not expect that CRAs take the key international financial standards into 
account because the adoption of or compliance with these agreements does not lead to 
financial support and is also not enforced. Financial regulation is relevant and very 
visible due to the IMF’s and World Bank’s efforts to produce more than 1,200 ROSCs, 
compliance reports, thus far (IMF 2013b). However, the request for these compliance 
reports and the publication is voluntary. Even for the countries monitored, mock 
compliance is prevalent (Walter 2008, Chey 2007). Many countries adopt these 
standards and superficially comply with them, but regulatory forbearance by the 
government, blockage by the bureaucratic administration, and noncompliance by the 
private sector prevent substantive compliance (Walter 2008: 29-49). Therefore, 
adoption of and formal compliance with key international financial standards do not 
necessarily impose costs on countries. As potential cheap talk, these agreements cannot 
serve as a credible signal. 
Second, I expect that agreements with the International Monetary Fund will only be 
taken into account by CRAs if these agreements lead to financial support or if the IMF 
ensures that the agreements are implemented and therefore costly for the country. 
Nelson explicitly focuses on an agreement within the IMF that is not enforced via IMF 
conditionality (2010: 109). Although adoption of Article VIII is visible (ibid.: 112) and 
potentially relevant, it cannot serve as a credible signal without IMF enforcement. In 
contrast, IMF program conditionality is highly relevant for sovereign risk assessments. 
In a liquidity crisis, a default often depends only on the willingness of the IMF to grant a 
loan. I expect that CRAs will monitor the reform progress of program countries closely 
to the extent that disbursements by the IMF or other countries and international 
organizations depend on these reforms. Moreover, agreements with the IMF can also 
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show a government’s willingness to reform if the IMF enforces these reforms with 
policy conditionality attached to its loans.  
Third, the membership of many IOs is not relevant for sovereign debt repayment. 
However, the IOs that Dreher and Voigt focus on are all relevant for a positive 
investment climate (2011: 330). As Dreher and Voigt emphasize, the IOs in their sample 
do not lead to additional financing in a crisis situation (ibid.: 329). IO membership 
could still matter for CRAs as a credible signal if membership ensures the 
implementation of reforms. I do not expect that CRAs regard the IOs in Dreher and 
Voigt’s sample, UN conventions, the International Court of Justice, the WTO, and the 
World Bank sub-organizations, as credible enforcers of reforms. However, the 
accession process leading to membership of the European Union and European 
Monetary Union ensures the implementation of reforms because the EU has significant 
leverage in this process (Gray 2009: 946). In addition, CRAs might also take 
membership of this regional organization into account because they expect that 
members are more likely to receive liquidity support in crises times. It remains an 
empirical question to test for which of these international agreements CRAs expect 
liquidity support and which they regard as credible signals given the agreement’s 
visibility, relevance, and costs. 
6.3 Content Analysis of Sovereign Rating Announcements 
Thus far, the literature has only tested for the importance of international agreements 
in surveys of CRA staff and in econometric studies. CRA announcements are a data 
source which has not been used systematically for empirical evidence thus far. The 
analysis of these rating announcements offers several advantages compared to 
previous empirical approaches. First, in contrast to surveys, an analysis of rating 
announcements can be more systematic based on more than one point in time.  
Second, the announcements are the relevant explanations given to policymakers for 
rating changes. CRAs cannot enforce international agreements if policymakers do not 
know that CRAs take international agreements into account. Rating announcements are 
the way in which CRAs tell policymakers what to do to get a better sovereign rating. 
Third, compared to the econometric analysis, an analysis of rating announcements does 
not run the risk of omitting important unobservables. In particular, all IMF programs 
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are started during economic crises. An econometric analysis cannot distinguish 
between the impact of the crisis and the IMF program if these two independent 
variables always coincide. In contrast to the other two empirical chapters, I will 
therefore only focus on the analysis of sovereign rating announcements.  
As in the analysis of economic liberalization policies, I code the frequency of rating 
drivers in this chapter focusing on international agreements. I analyze all 1,222 
announcements and code for the international agreements mentioned in the literature 
– the key financial standards, agreement with the IMF, and membership of 
international organizations and the EU. In addition to this frequency analysis, I also 
code for the reasons stated by CRAs why they have a taken a specific international 
agreement into account. In particular, I analyze whether CRAs refer to an international 
agreement because it leads to financial support or because it signals a government’s 
willingness to repay. 
As expected, international financial standards (section 6.3.1) and most agreements 
related to membership of international organizations (section 6.3.3) are not taken into 
account by rating agencies (see Table 57). In contrast, CRAs often refer to IMF-
supported programs, in many cases only due to the financial support that the program 
provides (section 6.3.2). In two thirds of all rating announcements for European states, 
CRAs refer to the EU or EMU, in most cases due to the accession process as a credible 
signal of a government’s willingness to reform (section 6.3.4). 
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Table 57: Number of Announcements by International Agreement 
Factors Covered in All 
Announcements (Total: 1,222) 
Number of Announcements 
International Financial Standards,  
of which: 
7 
- 12 key financial standards 3 
IMF programs,  
of which: 
258 
- only on IMF financial support 94 (36% of all IMF) 
IOs 22 
- UN Conventions 0 
- International Court of Justice 1 
- World Trade Organization 21 (only 2 on commitment) 
- World Bank sub-organizations 
IFC and ICSID 
0 
European Union,  
of which: 
245 (65% of 377 rating changes in Europe) 
- only on EU financial support 25 (10% of all EU) 
 
6.3.1 International Financial Standards 
Despite the expectation in the literature that CRAs enforce international financial 
standards, I do not find any evidence that CRAs take these standards into account. 
Although these standards are visible and relevant, international institutions and other 
states do not ensure substantive compliance with these standards. The few standards 
that are taken into account by CRAs are those for which substantive compliance is 
enforced with economic sanctions. 
Most of the literature focuses on the 12 key financial standards developed at the end of 
the 1990s. Since 1999, the IMF and the World Bank have published compliance reports, 
ROSCs, on these key standards for 160 countries. Although rating agencies have 
published rating announcements for 121 of these countries, they have referred to key 
standards for only three countries (see Table 58 and Figure 6). The two key standards 
analyzed in the previous literature, the SDDS (Mosley 2003b) and the fiscal 
transparency standard (Petrie 2003, Hameed 2005, Arbatli & Escolano 2012), are 
never mentioned in any of the 1,222 sovereign rating assessments. Of the 12 key 
standards, Basel’s Core Principles for banking supervision are mentioned twice, but not 
related to IMF or World Bank compliance reports.69 Moreover, the Financial Action 
                                                          
69 S&P: 2001_11_20_Panama, Fitch: 2000_09_28_Estonia 
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Task Force’s standard on anti-money laundering is taken into account once.70 However, 
this is exactly the one key standard that is enforced with sanctions (Drezner 2007: 142-
145, Simmons 2001: 605-609). The end of sanctions is also the reason why Fitch 
mentions the standard. In addition to these three references to key financial standards, 
S&P and Fitch mention in seven announcements that regulation is in line with 
international standards or follows international best practice, but they do not go into 
any details what these international standards are.  
As the more than 800 published IMF and World Bank reports on compliance with 
international key standards are easily accessible, lack of visibility cannot be the reason 
why CRAs do not take these standards into account. It is also unlikely that the issues 
addressed by these standards are not regarded as relevant by CRAs as many of the 
issues are mentioned by CRAs. For instance, all three CRAs take corporate governance 
reforms and fiscal transparency into account if these issues are part of an IMF program 
or the EU accession process (see section 6.3.2 and 6.3.4). The main reason why the key 
standards cannot serve as a credible signal is thus likely that international institutions 
or other states do not ensure substantive compliance with these standards. Attempts to 
introduce enforcement mechanisms for the key standards failed, such as the Group of 
7’s pressure to include the standards as a condition for IMF loans (Drezner 2007: 139). 
In addition to the anti-money laundering standard, only one other international 
regulatory initiative, the OECD’s pressure on offshore financial centers, is enforced with 
sanctions. And indeed, the enforcement of this international agreement, which is not 
part of the 12 key standards, is mentioned five times by CRAs – more often than all 
other standards combined.71 Financial sanctions can be costly for countries and are 
mentioned by CRAs 14 times in total. In one case, financial sanctions even forced CRAs 
to withdraw their rating for the country, which reduces the country’s ability to issue 
debt.72 Overall, these findings highlight that CRAs only take international financial 
agreements into account if the agreements are enforced by some international 
organization or other state. 
 
                                                          
70 Fitch: 2003_06_25_Ukraine 
71 S&P: 2004_08_05_Barbados, 2009_12_23_Bahamas, Fitch: 2002_02_01_Cyprus, 
2003_06_25_Ukraine, 2009_10_22_SanMarino 
72 Moody’s: 2002_06_03_Iran, Fitch: 2008_04_24_Iran 
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Table 58: References to International Agreements by Number of Countries 
Number of Countries with 
International Agreement since 1995 
Financial Stand. 
with ROSC 
IMF 
Program 
EU 
…with ROSC/IMF program/in Europe 160 111 44 
…and with at least one rating change 121 78 35  
…and with agreement mentioned by CRA  3 63 33 
 
Figure 6: References to International Agreements by Number of Countries 
 
 
6.3.2 IMF Programs 
In contrast to international financial standards, CRAs mention agreements with the IMF 
very often. IMF and potential IMF programs are mentioned in 258 of the 1,222 
announcements (21%, see Table 57). In some cases, the IMF program is so important 
that it is already included in the headline. For instance, the headline for S&P’s upgrade 
of Ukraine on 29 July 2010 is: “Ukraine Long-Term Sovereign Foreign-Currency Ratings 
Raised To 'B+' On IMF Program”. The approval of IMF programs can also explain the 
timing of sovereign rating decisions. In the Ukraine case, the rating was changed one 
day after the IMF decision. Fitch announced on 3 February 2010 that they will upgrade 
Jamaica if the IMF approved a new loan. As promised, Fitch increased the rating 
thirteen days later following the IMF approval of a new Stand-By Agreement. 
Although CRAs also refer to some potential future IMF programs, most statements are 
about the start of a program or a program which is already in place. Of the 111 
 6 Rating Agencies and the Enforcement of International Agreements  
 
159 
 
countries with IMF programs since 1995, 78 were rated by at least one of the three 
major CRAs (see Table 58).73 For 63 countries, i.e., 81% of the rated countries with a 
program, CRAs refer to the IMF program as a rating determinant (see Figure 6). About 
half of the 258 references to the IMF are at the start of an IMF program. 
CRAs refer to the IMF in 140 downgrades (64%) and in only 78 upgrades (36%) 
although there are overall more upgrades (606) than downgrades (424) since the mid-
1990s. But this correlation between downgrades and IMF programs does not show that 
IMF programs lead to worse ratings, as Nelson (2010) suggests in his econometric 
analysis. In almost all announcements, it is very clear that the IMF program is a positive 
rating determinant. For instance, Fitch states in its rating announcement for the 
Dominican Republic on 11 August 2003: “Approval and successful implementation of 
an IMF program would be positive for the sovereign's creditworthiness”. 
CRAs criticize IMF programs in few cases. S&P emphasized right from the start of the 
EU/IMF program for Greece that too much fiscal consolidation will depress economic 
growth.74 For some programs, CRAs also highlight implementation risks of IMF 
programs, in particular due to domestic resistance against IMF programs.75 But apart 
from these challenges, CRAs always view IMF programs favorably. A typical positive 
assessment of an IMF program is the one by Moody’s at the beginning of the IMF-
supported program for Greece: 
“The [Eurozone/IMF support] package effectively eliminates any 
near-term risk of a liquidity-driven default and encourages the 
implementation of a credible, feasible, and incentive-compatible 
set of structural reforms” (Moody’s: 2010_06_14_Greece) 
 
This statement also highlights the two major reasons why CRAs are in favor of IMF 
programs: as an indicator for credible reforms and due to the financial support they 
provide. First, financial support in liquidity crises is the most important reason why 
CRAs support IMF programs. In more than half of the announcements (137 of 258) with 
references to the IMF, financial support is mentioned as a key rating determinant. In 
more than two thirds of these announcements, CRAs only focus on the liquidity support 
that the program provides and do not mention any other aspects of the program. In 
                                                          
73 Data on the start and existence of IMF programs are in the following from Dreher (2006). 
74 S&P: 2010_04_27_Greece 
75 See S&P: 1998_10_12_Pakistan, 2001_08_06_PapuaNewGuinea, 2003_05_12_Indonesia 
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some debt crises, the likelihood of IMF disbursements becomes the most important 
rating driver, as Moody’s statement on Latvia highlights: 
“More importantly, given the government's tight liquidity 
position, Moody's rating is increasingly based upon the timely 
provision of financial assistance from the IMF and EU.” (Moody’s: 
2009_04_23_Latvia) 
 
As external financial support is a key rating determinant, Belke and Burghof (2010) 
have called for stand-alone ratings based only on country fundamentals without taking 
external financial support into account. Fitch distinguishes between standalone credit 
fundamentals and support ratings in a number of cases, but does not indicate what the 
standalone rating would be.76 
Second, in addition to the financial support that the programs provide, IMF programs 
are also a major rating determinant because they can serve as a signal of a country’s 
willingness to repay. CRAs emphasize the importance of IMF programs as commitment 
mechanisms in many rating announcements. For instance, S&P states in a statement on 
Venezuela’s IMF program: 
“Repeated delays in negotiations with the IMF over a 
macroeconomic stabilization plan and financing package cast 
doubt about the Caldera administration's commitment to 
implement reform, and over the long term, about the strength of 
its commitment to service its debt.” (S&P: 1996_02_23_Venezuela) 
 
CRAs highlight that IMF programs underscore a government’s “commitment to 
macroeconomic stability”77, show “a renewed effort to implement structural economic 
reforms”78, support “the momentum of reform”79, “signal the authorities' commitment 
to continued economic stability and reform”80, and “is testament to the authorities' 
long-term commitment to reform”81. Lack of progress in negotiations with the IMF and 
domestic resistance “points to a further loss of reform momentum”82, suggests some 
                                                          
76 See Fitch: 2004_07_07_Slovakia, 2006_10_23_Lithuania and section 6.3.4 on the European 
Union. 
77 S&P: 1997_09_03_Thailand 
78 Moody’s: 1996_11_06_Pakistan 
79 Fitch: 2000_04_27_Turkey 
80 Fitch: 2000_07_03_Azerbaijan 
81 Fitch: 2010_02_01_Seychelles 
82 S&P: 2001_08_06_PapuaNewGuinea 
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“weakening of the reform resolve”83, and shows that the country is “unwilling to 
undertake the necessary fiscal correction”84. 
CRAs also emphasize that IMF programs are credible signals because programs lock in 
reform efforts. For instance, S&P highlights that “the government, locked into a very 
restrictive IMF agreement, has built a track record of more orthodox economic 
management”85. According to S&P, IMF programs “anchor the government's 
determination to tackle any remaining structural reforms”86, “provide a strong policy 
anchor”87, create “an anchor for fiscal and structural reforms“88, and anchor 
“compliance with the new fiscal rules and its implementation of structural reforms”89. 
Moody’s suggests that a country needs to establish a fiscal rule due to “the absence of 
an external anchor like the IMF or EU”90. According to Fitch, IMF programs “help 
maintain policy discipline”91, “policy will remain guided by a new IMF programme”92, 
and an “upgrade is driven by strong prospects for continued policy discipline, 
underpinned by […] the adoption of a new IMF programme”93. 
IMF program targets are also used as benchmarks by CRAs. CRAs mainly refer to fiscal 
reforms, which are taken into account in 84 announcements. For instance, Fitch 
highlights on 23 February 2011 that the “upgrade reflects Seychelles' outperformance, 
by a wide margin, of the fiscal targets set for it by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) programme, for a second consecutive year.” CRAs remark that fiscal 
achievements were “better than the IMF had targeted”94, debt targets were achieved 
“under its IMF program two years ahead of time“95, the surplus exceeded “the target it 
agreed upon with the IMF”96, the reform agenda conforms “to a key structural reform 
benchmark under Ghana's current IMF programme”97, and a country “consistently met 
                                                          
83 S&P: 2003_05_12_Indonesia 
84 S&P: 2008_11_14_Pakistan 
85 S&P: 1998_11_23_Bulgaria 
86 S&P: 2002_10_07_Bulgaria 
87 S&P: 2004_08_17_Turkey 
88 S&P: 2011_01_14_ElSalvador 
89 S&P: 2011_03_16_Serbia 
90 Moody’s: 2010_01_08_Turkey 
91 Fitch: 2004_08_04_Bulgaria 
92 Fitch: 2004_11_17_Romania 
93 Fitch: 2005_01_13_Turkey 
94 S&P: 2008_01_31_Lebanon 
95 S&P: 2008_12_04_CapeVerde 
96 Fitch: 2005_01_13_Argentina 
97 Fitch: 2005_03_17_Ghana 
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the macroeconomic and fiscal benchmarks under its IMF program”98. Compliance with 
IMF targets is an important rating driver in many cases99, not only because IMF 
financial support depends on compliance but also because “failure to stick with the IMF 
programme would also send mixed signals over the future for structural reform”100. 
Overall, these findings confirm the expectations about IMF agreements. In contrast to 
the literature (Nelson 2010), I do not find that CRAs take the adoption of Article VIII of 
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement into account. However, IMF programs are a key rating 
driver, mainly due to the financial support provided by these programs. In addition to 
financial support, CRAs also regard IMF programs as a commitment mechanism that 
countries can use to signal their willingness to repay. 
6.3.3 Membership of International Organizations 
Agreements with other international organizations or membership of these 
organizations are seldom mentioned by CRAs. The agreements and organizations used 
in the empirical study of Euromoney and Institutional Investor ratings by Dreher and 
Voigt (2011) do not play a major role for sovereign risk assessments by the three major 
CRAs (see Table 57). First, the three CRAs never refer to any UN conventions. The 
International Court of Justice is only once mentioned because of its positive impact on a 
border dispute.101 CRAs refer to the UN twice because of its resolution of border 
disputes and 14 times because of its dispute with Iran and North Korea over their 
nuclear programs and the impact for the region. The UN and the adoption of UN 
conventions are not taken into account as a signal of a government’s willingness to 
repay. 
Second, the WTO is mentioned in only 21 or 1.7% of all rating announcements. CRAs 
mainly highlight the WTO’s positive influence on trade flows. For only two cases, CRAs 
mention that accession to the WTO could lock in reforms.102 For twice as many 
announcements, CRAs point to negative consequences of WTO membership.103 
                                                          
98 Fitch: 2007_07_27_Uruguay 
99 S&P: 1997_12_18_Peru, 2011_03_16_Serbia, Moody’s: 2003_12_11_Romania, 
2010_03_02_Jamaica, Fitch: 2010_11_23_Mongolia 
100 Fitch: 2003_02_04_Moldova 
101 Fitch: 2001_11_27_Bahrain 
102 Moody’s: 2005_07_06_Vietnam, Fitch: 2006_08_17_SaudiArabia 
103 S&P: 1998_03_02_Morocco, 1999_12_17_Barbados, Moody’s: 2007_05_21_Cambodia, Fitch: 
2001_11_19_Taiwan 
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Third, membership of the World Bank sub-organizations IFC and ICSID is never 
mentioned by CRAs. However, they refer to the World Bank in 35 announcements 
because of financial support that the World Bank provides. In most of these cases, 
World Bank financial support is dependent on compliance with IMF programs. For 15 
rating actions, CRAs also mention World Bank policies enforced with programs, but in 
all of these cases, CRAs refer to the IMF at the same time. Since 2007, Fitch has used the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Indicator for several countries.104 In contrast to the 
ROSCs, the World Bank provides a quantitative indicator for their measure of business 
deregulation, which is updated regularly. This makes it very easy for Fitch to include 
the indicator in their quantitative assessment. If IOs want to push for market 
enforcement of international financial standards, quantitative summary statistics could 
thus be a way forward even without external enforcement. Although the IMF uses 
quantitative indicators for its own assessments of fiscal ROSCs (Hameed 2005, Arbatli 
& Escolano 2012), these have not been published. 
6.3.4 EU and EMU Membership and Accession Process 
In contrast to the few references to most international organizations, CRAs take the 
European Union very often into account in their sovereign risk assessments. In 65% of 
all rating actions for European countries (245 of 377), CRAs refer to the European 
Union or European Monetary Union.105 The European Union is mentioned in 33 of the 
35 countries with rating changes in Europe (see Table 58 and Figure 6). The positive 
role of the EU and EMU is very obvious in sovereign rating announcements, as many 
headlines – which usually do not specify the reasons for rating changes – highlight: 
 “Bulgaria's FC Ratings Raised To 'BBB+/A-2' On Fiscal Discipline And EU Entry” 
(S&P: 2006_10_26_Bulgaria) 
 “Republic of Estonia LT and ST Ratings Raised To 'A' and 'A-1' on EMU 
Prospects” (S&P: 2004_11_17_Estonia) 
 “Republic of Slovenia L-T FC Rating Raised To 'AA' On EMU Entry Approval” 
(S&P: 2006_05_16_Slovenia) 
 “Moody’s raises Romania’s ratings as policies reflect EU integration” (Moody’s: 
2005_03_02_Romania) 
                                                          
104 Georgia, Kenya, Israel, Armenia, Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan 
105 Europe is in the following defined as the UN geographical region excluding Russia, but 
including Turkey and Cyprus. 
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 “Moody’s upgrades foreign currency ratings of eight EU accession countries” 
(Moody’s: 2002_11_12) 
 “Fitch Upgrades Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania And Slovenia On Credible Euro 
Convergence” (Fitch: 2004_07_07) 
 “Fitch Upgrades Cyprus and Malta on Final Euro Decision” (Fitch: 2007_07_12) 
Figure 7 shows that the EU or EMU are more often mentioned for upgrades than for 
downgrades. CRAs refer to the EU in 152 upgrades (70%) and in only 49 downgrades. 
In 57 of the 245 cases, the EU or EMU are only used as a comparison group. In most 
other cases, CRAs use the EU and EMU as a positive rating determinant. 
Figure 7: Rating Changes in Europe by Rating Action and References to the EU 
 
 
In contrast to the IMF, the EU’s financial support is less important with only 10% (25 of 
245) of the announcements focusing only on potential EU support, most of them in the 
sovereign debt crisis since 2009. However, the EU accession process is a key rating 
driver signaling a government’s willingness to reform. Of the 122 announcements with 
references to the EU before the beginning of the financial crisis in October 2008 and 
where the EU is not used as comparison group, 85% (103) are about the EU accession 
process. Compared to the high number of references to the accession process, EU 
membership is mentioned only seven times for old member states (five times for 
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Greece and once for Sweden, five days after its EU accession) and twelve times for new 
member states. For all other cases, CRAs focus on the accession process and not on the 
benefits of membership. According to the CRAs, the EU’s enforcement power in the 
accession process “with no absolute assurance of eventual membership […] is arguably 
even stronger than for those countries already comfortably inside the union”.106 
All three CRAs often emphasize the central role of the EU accession process as an 
information short-cut for a government’s willingness to reform. According to S&P, for 
“most of the new EU members that joined the Union in May 2004, prospective EU 
membership served as a strong policy anchor, which in turn resulted in ratings 
upgrades.“107 The EU accession process “provides an important anchor […] to pursue 
further reform”108 and “supported continued implementation of structural reforms”109. 
Countries’ reforms are credible due to “the discipline forged by […] EU aspirations”110, 
“against the backdrop of EU accession”111, “on the back of a modernization process 
accelerated by EU accession requirements”112, and “motivated by the prospect of EU 
accession”113. 
Moody’s also emphasizes that the EU accession process leads to a “stepped up pace of 
structural reforms”114, “provides both the framework and incentives to the government 
to continue along the path of reform and reduces policy variability”115, “provides the 
incentives for the country to continue on the path of reform”116, and “should also 
bolster reform efforts”.117 Fitch highlights that the demands of the EU accession process 
“spurred the country's politicians to sink their differences”118, led “to steady progress 
[…] with structural reforms as the government has sought to remain near the front of 
the race for EU accession”119, “enhanced the incentives to pursue sound financial 
policies and economic reform”120, “should support continued policy discipline”121, 
                                                          
106 Moody’s: 2005_12_14_Turkey 
107 S&P: 2004_07_30_Macedonia 
108 S&P: 2001_10_30_SlovakRepublic 
109 S&P: 2001_11_20_Estonia 
110 S&P: 1998_11_05_CzechRepublic 
111 S&P: 2002_04_22_Lithuania 
112 S&P: 2002_08_20_Latvia 
113 S&P: 1999_12_03_Cyprus 
114 Moody’s: 2001_12_19_Romania 
115 Moody’s: 2003_06_05_Bulgaria, Moody’s: 2004_11_17_Bulgaria 
116 Moody’s: 2003_12_11_Romania 
117 Moody’s: 2008_03_12_Montenegro 
118 Fitch: 1999_12_15_Slovenia 
119 Fitch: 2000_09_28_Estonia 
120 Fitch: 2000_11_16_Romania 
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“remains a big driver of policy discipline and hence improving creditworthiness”122, 
and “is a vital anchor to political stability, security, institution building and economic 
reform.”123 CRAs do not mention policy details of the accession requirements, but focus 
on their credibility due to EU enforcement. 
CRAs also often refer to the European Monetary Union as a positive rating driver, in 
total in 106 rating actions, for two main reasons. First, the EMU accession process is 
regarded as a credible commitment to reform signaling a government’s willingness to 
repay. As for the European Union, the process leading to membership requires credible 
reform efforts and not EMU membership as such. Compliance with the Maastricht 
convergence criteria is mentioned for 31 rating actions. The same compliance 
mechanisms for EMU members, the Stability and Growth’s Pact deficit criterion of 3% 
and the excessive deficit procedure, are mentioned for only five rating actions. This 
finding contradicts Mosley’s claim that the EMU convergence criteria and the 3% deficit 
acquired “independent status” (2003b: 334) for financial market participants. CRAs 
have taken this “most successful case of standard setting by an international 
institution” (ibid: 333) only into account as long as it was credibly enforced by other 
member states during the EMU accession process. 
Second, euro area membership also leads to better sovereign ratings because 
membership reduces balance of payment pressures and foreign exchange risk124 and 
because EMU members can expect to be bailed out in a debt crisis. Since 2008, the 
expectation of euro area bailouts is a key rating driver. EMU members “can rely on the 
availability of substantial external support […] a feature that supports the credit”125, as 
Moody’s highlights. Fitch “expects the adoption of the euro to increase […] ratings by 2-
3 notches”126. Fitch already assumed in 2001 that EMU members will “derive credit 
support from their membership of the currency union.”127 As for the IMF, CRAs take 
EMU membership into account because membership leads to financial support in a 
debt crisis. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
121 Fitch: 2004_08_04_Bulgaria 
122 Fitch: 2004_11_17_Romania 
123 Fitch: 2005_11_01_Macedonia 
124 S&P: 2001_03_13_Greece, 2004_02_05_Lithuania, 2004_05_13_Slovenia, 2004_07_29_Latvia, 
2004_11_17_Greece, Fitch: 2001_06_20_Greece, 2004_07_07 for several new member states, 
2009_12_08_Greece 
125 Moody’s: 2010_12_17_Ireland 
126 Fitch: 2004_07_07 in an announcement for Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
127 Fitch: 2001_06_20_Greece 
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Before the official introduction of the euro, S&P and Fitch also pointed to potential risks 
and demands of EMU membership. In particular, they highlighted the need for wage 
moderations, fiscal consolidation, and product market liberalization in response to the 
loss of the exchange rate mechanism for adjustment.128 Fitch even downgraded 
Belgium and placed Italy on a negative outlook ahead of the introduction of the euro in 
1999 due to the loss of monetary sovereignty.129 However, after the introduction of the 
euro, they put these doubts aside and only focused on the benefits of EMU membership 
as the potential downsides of monetary union membership did not materialize in the 
beginning.130 Once the European debt crisis started, CRAs began to realize again the 
downsides of a monetary union.131 In its most recent methodology, S&P even 
introduced a one notch downgrade for smaller members of a monetary union “to reflect 
that members of monetary unions generally have less flexibility relative to sovereigns 
with their own central banks” (S&P 2013a: 35). But overall, S&P and Fitch still view 
euro area membership favorably. S&P upgraded Estonia “on Eurozone accession”132 
and Fitch also sees “disadvantages, most noticeably the “one size fits all” nature of 
monetary policy […] being outweighed by the positives”.133 Moody’s never emphasized 
any risks or demands of EMU membership. 
6.4 Summary 
Many international institutions and scholars expect that rating agencies enforce 
international agreements by taking these agreements into account in their sovereign 
risk assessments. Based on the new comprehensive database of sovereign rating 
announcements, I show that rating agencies only care about international agreements 
under two conditions. First, CRAs take international agreements into account to the 
extent that these agreements lead to direct financial support. Second, the agreement 
has to be enforced by some other institution. Then, CRAs regard the agreement as a 
credible signal of a government’s willingness to repay. If the adoption and formal 
                                                          
128 S&P: 1998_05_06_Ireland, 1999_11_24_Greece, 2001_03_13_Greece, Fitch: 
1999_10_25_Greece, 2000_07_27_Greece 
129 Fitch: 2002_06_17_Belgium, 2002_06_17_Italy 
130 The only exception is an announcement by S&P for Slovakia: 2005_12_19_Slovakia. 
131 S&P: 2008_04_24_Cyprus, 2008_11_27_Slovakia, 2009_01_19_Spain, 2009_01_21_Portugal, 
2009_03_30_Ireland, 2010_06_10_Estonia, Fitch: 2007_07_12_Cyprus, 2007_07_12_Malta, 
2008_07_08_Slovakia 
132 S&P, 2010_06_10_Estonia 
133 Fitch: 2007_07_12_Cyprus, 2007_07_12_Malta 
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compliance with an international agreement is not enforced, a country’s promise to 
implement it is just cheap talk. 
As key international financial standards are not enforced by international organizations 
or other states, there are good reasons why CRAs almost never mention these 
standards. In contrast, IMF programs are a key positive rating driver to which CRAs 
refer for 63 of the 78 rated IMF program countries. For 36% of the 258 rating 
announcements with references to IMF programs, CRAs focus only on the financial 
support that these programs provide. For most other announcements, CRAs also 
emphasize that a country can credibly signal its willingness to reform by accepting an 
IMF program. The accession process leading to EU and EMU membership also shows 
that CRAs only take international agreements into account as long as these agreements 
are enforced. The EU is often used as a positive rating driver, a factor which has not 
been emphasized by previous empirical studies on the determinants of sovereign 
ratings. But the EU mainly matters during the accession process when the EU has 
leverage over a country. In the same way, CRAs take the 3% deficit limit only into 
account for EMU accession countries, but neglect this limit for EMU member states 
because states do not credibly enforce the deficit limits for member states. 
Overall, the empirical findings highlight the limited promotion of international 
agreements by CRAs. Governments should be wary of relying on market enforcement 
alone in the current new wave of setting international and regional standards for 
financial regulation and fiscal policy. If governments do not enforce international 
agreements themselves or link these agreements to financial support, market actors 
will also not take them into account in their risk assessments. 
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7 Conclusion 
Economic liberalization policies, political institutions, and certain international 
agreements are key political indicators that rating agencies use in assessing a country’s 
likelihood to repay its debt. In this chapter, I will summarize my main findings in 
section 7.1. In particular, I will highlight the central importance of political factors by 
merging the findings from the text analyses of the unique database of rating 
announcements. 
In the following section 7.2, I will discuss implications of these findings for rated 
countries and regulators. In order to gain a better sovereign rating, a country cannot 
only improve macroeconomic factors but also has to signal its investor-friendliness and 
impose institutional constraints on governments that are willing to default. For 
regulators, my findings imply that they should not rely on rating agencies to enforce 
international agreements. 
In section 7.3, I will outline how rating agencies and regulators have responded since 
2011 to criticism and challenges arising from the European sovereign debt crisis. Since 
rating agencies have good reason for taking political factors into account, they cannot 
simply neglect these criteria in response to public criticism. Instead, CRAs have tried to 
fend off criticism in the European debt crisis by becoming more transparent and by 
using quantitative political indicators compiled by other institutions (section 7.3.1). 
Regulators across both sides of the Atlantic have tried to promote alternatives to the 
main CRAs’ sovereign ratings, but have thus far failed to establish convincing 
alternative indicators (section 7.3.2). 
In section 7.4, I will highlight avenues for further research on sovereign rating criteria 
and on criteria that other financial market participants use. The mixed methods 
approach of this study, combining text and panel econometric analyses, could be an 
interesting avenue for future projects on the constraints that financial markets place on 
national governments. 
7.1 Political Factors as Key Rating Determinants 
The econometric and text analyses for 145 countries have demonstrated that political 
criteria are indispensable rating drivers. In this section, I will first briefly sum up the 
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specific findings for the three political indicators investigated in this study: economic 
liberalization policies, political institutions, and international agreements. I will then 
present the combined findings for all three factors based on the unique database of 
sovereign rating announcements. 
First, rating agencies take economic liberalization policies into account as signals of a 
government’s willingness to repay because these policies are easily interpretable and 
costly to reverse. Domestic economic reforms, in particular privatization policies that 
are especially difficult to reverse and hence the most credible signal, are most often 
mentioned by CRAs. 
Second, CRAs analyze the number of veto players of a country’s political system and 
closely follow domestic elections. CRAs reward political systems with a higher number 
of veto players. They argue that veto players can lead to political stability and impose 
constraints on the government if the government wants to default. In contrast, CRAs 
take a negative stance on the uncertainty and political business cycles associated with 
electoral competitiveness. It is not democracies that enjoy a rating advantage, but 
regimes with many domestic veto players. 
Third, CRAs do not take all international agreements into account that governments try 
to promote. Rating agencies only refer to such agreements if the agreement either leads 
to direct financial support for the rated sovereign or if some other institution, such as 
the IMF or the EU, enforces the terms of the agreement. As for economic liberalization 
policies, the adoption of and compliance with international agreements can only serve 
as a credible signal if it is costly for a country to reverse these policies. 
Overall, these findings show that political factors are an important and indispensable 
component of sovereign ratings. Political factors have two crucial functions in CRAs’ 
rating assessments. More than any other macroeconomic indicator, they are a clear 
signal that helps CRAs to assess a government’s willingness to honor its debt. 
Moreover, by taking into account the number of veto players as a proxy for the political 
system’s checks and balances, CRAs can evaluate the constraints placed on 
governments that are willing to default. 
Table 59 merges the findings of the text analyses in the previous three chapters and 
highlights the central importance of political factors in CRAs’ announcements. 
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Economic liberalization policies are mentioned in more than a third of all 1,222 rating 
announcements since the mid-1990s. CRAs take a positive stance on economic 
liberalization policies for more than 80% of their judgments on these policies. Political 
stability and elections are also key rating drivers mentioned in 250 and 297 
announcements respectively and overall in 475 announcements. Most international 
agreements are seldom mentioned. However, IMF programs and agreements with the 
European Union are often taken into account, each of these in about 250 rating 
decisions. Overall, political factors are rating drivers for 880, or 72%, of the 1,222 
rating changes since 1995 (see Table 59). 
 
Table 59: Number of Announcements with Political Factors 
Indicator 
Number of Rating Actions 
(Total=1,222) 
Economic Liberalization 450 
Political Stability, Elections and Veto Players 475 
International Agreements 468 
At Least One of the Three Political Factors 880 
 
Figure 8 compares the ratio of rating actions with political factors for all three CRAs. In 
chapter 4, I have already highlighted that Moody’s refers less often to liberalization 
policies and is more cautious about financial deregulation and capital account 
liberalization. Moody’s also takes political stability, elections, and international 
agreements less often into account. While S&P and Fitch refer to political factors for 
more than three quarters of all rating decisions, Moody’s only mentions these factors in 
56% of its announcements. This finding also holds when limiting the comparison to 
only those countries rated by all three CRAs and when controlling for the length of 
rating announcements. In its “crude analysis” (IMF 2010c: 102) of sovereign rating 
methodologies, the IMF finds that “Moody’s attaches a relatively higher weight to the 
ability to pay, whereas Fitch and S&P focus relatively more on willingness to pay” 
(ibid.). Moody’s lower attention to a government’s willingness to repay explains why 
they also focus less on political factors, which are central indicators for this willingness 
to repay. 
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Figure 8: Rating Actions with Political Factors by CRA 
 
 
Table 60 shows that CRAs refer to political factors to the same degree for countries that 
are up- and downgraded and for speculative and investment grade-rated countries. The 
previous literature makes a clear distinction between the criteria used by financial 
market participants for developed and developing countries (see, e.g., Mosley 2000, 
2003a). According to this literature, financial market participants consider few 
indicators, such as fiscal deficits and inflation, in their sovereign risk analysis of 
developed countries. My findings do not support this line of argument for one of the 
central sovereign debt market actors, credit rating agencies. Using the World Bank 
income classifications, CRAs refer to political factors to the same degree for low, 
middle, and high income countries. CRAs do not only analyze developed countries’ 
fiscal deficits and inflation rates but also refer to political factors for these countries. 
Political factors are a central rating determinant for at least one rating decision for 
almost all 137 countries.134 
According to the previous literature, market actors neglect a broader set of criteria for 
developed countries because default risk is only an important factor for developing 
countries. However, the recent European sovereign debt crisis has highlighted that 
default risk is also relevant for developed countries. CRAs thus need to analyze a 
                                                          
134 CRAs only mention none of the political factors in the announcements for Singapore and the 
three British overseas territories and dependencies Bermuda, Guernsey, and Montserrat. 
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country’s ability and willingness to repay in detail for both developed and developing 
countries. As Table 60 illustrates, CRAs in fact do this and use political factors as 
indicators for a country’s willingness to repay. 
Table 60: Rating Actions with Political Factors by Rating Level and Rating Action 
 Specul. Investm. Upgrade Downgr. New/WR 
Announcements with 
Political Factors 
503/682 
=74% 
377/540 
=70% 
444/607 
=73% 
288/423 
=68% 
148/192 
=77% 
 
7.2 Implications for Rated Countries and Regulators 
These findings have implications for both rated countries and regulators. If countries 
want to receive a better sovereign rating, they should not only aim to improve 
macroeconomic outcomes but also policies and political institutions. In the short-run, 
governments can use economic liberalization policies, such as privatizations and 
deregulation policies, to signal their investor-friendliness. Privatization plans have 
often not led to expected revenue increases, as the recent case of Greece shows (see 
Pisani-Ferry et al. 2013: 60ff.). But even though these policies do not lead to an increase 
in the ability to repay, a government still has an incentive to use these policies as 
signals to rating agencies and to investors more generally of its willingness to repay. 
In the same vein, IMF programs and the EU and EMU accession processes can increase 
investor confidence not only in a government’s ability to repay through financial 
support but also in its willingness to honor its debt. Even if a government is not 
convinced of the overall benefits of such agreements, they should not neglect the 
impact of these agreements on its sovereign ratings and hence on its refinancing costs 
on private markets. For rating agencies, the credible stamp of approval by the IMF and 
the EU matters. Therefore, governments can use IMF or EU backing to signal their 
willingness to repay. 
Political institutions also have an impact on a country’s sovereign rating. If a country 
wants to improve its rating, it has to establish institutional constraints on governments 
that might be willing to default. An independent central bank can become one 
important veto player. If the central bank decides independently about the eligibility of 
government bonds for its credit operations, it can put additional costs on a government 
that tries to default. A strong and independent domestic judiciary has the power to 
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enforce the property rights of bondholders even against a government’s interests and 
thus make a government’s promise to repay more credible. 
For regulators, the findings in chapter 6 imply that they should not rely on rating 
agencies to enforce international agreements. Most international agreements, 
especially on financial regulation, are not credibly enforced by international 
organizations. Hence, CRAs also have no incentive to care about these agreements. 
CRAs will only regard these agreements as credible signals if the agreements are 
backed by financial support or by some credible enforcement mechanism. In the debate 
about new international financial regulatory standards, regulators should thus be wary 
of relying on soft law and market enforcement alone and rather find other means to 
enforce regulatory agreements. 
7.3 Reactions to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis since 2011 
Beyond these implications of my study, the European sovereign debt crisis has led to 
further criticism of CRAs for their political judgments (see chapter 1). How have rating 
agencies and regulators responded to these criticisms since 2011? 
7.3.1 Rating Agencies’ Response 
As shown in this study, political factors are indispensable rating drivers and CRAs have 
good reason for incorporating them in their ratings as indicators for a government’s 
willingness to repay. For CRAs, this finding implies that they should not simply 
disregard their political analysis in response to criticism of their political assessments. 
Neglecting political factors would decrease the reliability of sovereign ratings. In 
response to criticism in the debt crisis, CRAs have instead opted to become first more 
transparent and second to rely more on quantitative political indicators compiled by 
other institutions. 
CRAs have become more transparent in recent years by publishing longer and more 
precise rating methodologies, by discussing changes to their methodologies with 
investors, and by providing additional reports to explain their decisions. All of these 
actions were attempts to fend off criticism of their “secrecy and vagueness” (Biglaiser & 
Staats 2012: 518) and their “opaque” work (Beaulieu et al. 2012: 731). 
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First, as analyzed in section 3.3, CRAs have published more extensive methodologies in 
recent years. Until the crisis in 2009/2010, rating methodologies by all three CRAs 
were about 7000 words or less (S&P 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006b, 2008, 2010b, 2011a, 
2013a, Moody’s 2006, 2008, 2012b, Fitch IBCA undated, Fitch 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 
2012a). In their most recent methodologies, CRAs now provide more than double that 
amount of text (ibid.). But these methodologies are not only longer, but also more 
specific on the indicators that CRAs use in their risk assessments. In its 2011 
methodology, Fitch has published a quantitative sovereign rating model for the first 
time (Fitch 2011b). Moody’s also revealed the weighting of sub-factors and details of 
specific indicators in its proposal for a new methodology in 2012 (Moody’s 2012b). 
Second, Moody’s proposal for a new methodology was also a new way for CRAs to 
engage investors. Moody’s specifically asked for “market feedback on a range of 
refinements” (2012b: 1). In a similar way, S&P had already requested comments on its 
new methodology in 2010 (S&P 2010c). These calls for comments are attempts by the 
CRAs to ensure that their sovereign ratings remain relevant to and accepted by 
investors. 
Third, in response to public criticism, CRAs have also published additional reports to 
explain their decisions in the European debt crisis. For instance, S&P published a 
research update on 22 June 2012 titled, “In the Debt Debate, Our Sovereign Ratings 
Have No Austerity Bias” (S&P 2012b) to convince the public that they do not demand 
harsh austerity measures. S&P also directly responded to criticism of its sovereign 
ratings issued in an academic working paper by Gärtner and Griesbach (2012) (S&P 
2012c). Moreover, S&P’s then Managing Director for European sovereign ratings, 
Moritz Kraemer, explained S&P’s decisions in many interviews, in talk shows, and as 
guest at political events (see, e.g., Grüne Bundestagsfraktion 2012). 
In addition to increasing transparency, in recent years, CRAs have also begun to rely 
more on quantitative political indicators compiled by other institutions. By using these 
external quantitative political indicators, CRAs can shy away from making their own 
assessments and claim to use objective indicators that are not based on their subjective 
political analysis. The introduction of new external quantitative indicators is evident 
for all three political factors analyzed in this book. 
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All three CRAs have started using some external quantitative indicator for the quality of 
a country’s economic liberalization policies. Fitch provides the World Bank’s stability 
and ease of doing business indicators in its sovereign risk database (Fitch 2012b, see 
also section 3.3). As shown in my text analysis, Fitch has used these indicators for the 
first time in 2007. S&P also mentions the World Bank’s Doing Business reports in its 
2010 and 2011 methodologies (S&P 2010b: 15, S&P 2011a: 12) although they suggest 
they still rely mostly on their qualitative analyses and have dropped references to these 
reports in their most recent methodology updates (S&P 2013a). Moody’s mentions the 
World Economic Forum Competitiveness Report for the first time in its 2008 
methodology and also takes this measure into account as one specific sub-indicator in 
its 2012 proposal for a new methodology. 
For their assessments of a country’s political institutions, all three CRAs have begun to 
refer to the World Bank Governance Indicators in recent years. As shown in the text 
analysis in chapter 5, Fitch mentioned this indicator for the first time in 2008 in a rating 
action for Israel and regularly only since 2010.135 Moody’s started to use the World 
Bank Governance Indicators in 2010.136 As for the liberalization policies, S&P only 
refers to this indicator in its 2010 and 2011 methodologies, but not anymore in its most 
recent methodology (S&P 2010b: 15, S&P 2011a: 12, S&P 2013a). S&P still sees a 
strong need for qualitative judgments in its assessments of political stability and 
elections (ibid.). 
In its most recent 2013 methodology update, S&P also introduced some external 
quantitative assessments for evaluating the compliance with international agreements. 
In contrast to the period up to 2010 that is investigated in this book (see chapter 6), 
S&P now started to refer to the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard as part of its 
balance of payments analysis (S&P 2013a: 21) and to compliance with Article VIII 
obligations as part of its monetary policy analysis (S&P 2013a: 31). 
It remains to be seen whether these recent methodological changes actually increase 
the acceptance of sovereign ratings by investors, policy-makers, and the general public 
without decreasing the quality of sovereign ratings. For now, these changes are one 
                                                          
135 Fitch: 2008_02_11 for Israel, 2010_02_16_Jamaica, 2010_08_24_Rwanda, 
2010_11_26_HongKong, 2011_02_03_Seychelles 
136 Moody’s: 2010_05_26_Nicaragua, 2010_09_22_SriLanka 
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way for CRAs to limit criticism of their qualitative political judgments without 
neglecting political factors completely. 
7.3.2 Regulators’ Response 
As I have argued in chapter 2, sovereign ratings derive at least some of their impact 
from regulatory endorsements. Public regulation forces financial institutions to use the 
sovereign ratings of the three main CRAs. In response to the debt crisis, policymakers 
have tried to reduce their regulatory reliance on credit rating agencies’ assessment of 
political factors. However, all attempts to reduce reliance on sovereign ratings on the 
international level, in the US, and in the EU have been unsuccessful. 
On the international level, policymakers and regulators have discussed reducing their 
reliance on the three main CRAs at several meetings without taking any clear decisions. 
The new Basel III framework did not remove the central role of rating agencies (BCBS 
2011: 51ff.) although the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision continues its 
discussions on this issue (see FSB 2013a: 1). In 2010, the Financial Stability Board 
passed a list of principles for reducing over-reliance on ratings (FSB 2010). The FSB 
published its most recent report and an interim peer review report on 29 August 2013 
for the St Petersburg G20 Summit (FSB 2013a: 1). Except for the US and the EU, the FSB 
sees a lack of progress in most jurisdictions (ibid.). 
In the United States, the Dodd-Frank financial reforms force the US regulatory agencies 
to find alternative indicators to the assessments of the three leading CRAs. For 
sovereigns, the US regulatory agencies wanted to use official sovereign ratings 
produced by the OECD (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2012: 21, BCBS 2012: 
23). As discussed in chapter 2, the OECD strongly objects to the US’ use of its country 
risk ratings and has simply stopped publishing any ratings for high income OECD and 
Euro area countries (OECD 2013c). This leaves US regulators without any alternatives 
to the sovereign ratings provided by the main CRAs. 
In the European Union, the European Parliament called for the creation of a European 
credit rating foundation in a resolution in 2011 (European Parliament 2011). But the 
European Commission has not followed up on this proposal. The European Union also 
shied away from promoting banks’ own internal sovereign risk assessments in the EU’s 
revision of the capital requirements directive (EC 2013a: 31). According to the EC, 
“sometimes external ratings – however imperfect – remain the best solution available” 
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(EC 2013a: 31). Moreover, they had learned from the US experience that it would not 
be appropriate “to remove references to ratings without having alternatives in place” 
(EC 2013b: 11). Instead, the European Union has passed three regulations since 2010 
with two main attempts to reduce reliance on the three main CRAs (see EC 2013b). 
First, the EU tried to promote rating competition. For this purpose, the EU has 
introduced a common registration procedure and publishes all ratings on a common 
platform (ibid.). The EC also discussed the introduction of a rotation model, which 
would have forced issuers to change CRAs and hire new ones (EC 2013b: 10). But in the 
end, the EC proposed this model for all ratings except for sovereigns and the European 
Parliament limited the rotation model only to the ratings of re-securitizations. It is thus 
unlikely that the new regulations will promote competition in the sovereign rating 
market. 
In particular, it is unclear how new competitors can finance their sovereign rating 
business as more and more states do not pay for their sovereign ratings. New 
competitors have therefore better chances in other niches, such as in the rating of 
insurance companies or specific financial products. Despite the wide attention to 
sovereign ratings during the European debt crisis, new competitors were mainly 
unsuccessful in entering the sovereign rating market due to a lack of financing. Only 
four of the 17 newly EU-recognized CRAs until the end of 2012 provide sovereign 
ratings and one of these CRAs, Capital Intelligence (Cyprus), has already withdrawn 
most of its sovereign ratings (ESMA 2013a). 
The German consultancy Roland Berger tried to establish a new independent European 
rating agency financed by a foundation backed by financial companies (Roland Berger 
2012). But their proposal failed due to a lack of investors (EU Observer 2013). The 
Bertelsmann Foundation also proposed a new sovereign rating agency financed by an 
international non-profit foundation (Bertelsmann Foundation 2013). Thus far, their 
proposal has not led to the creation of a new rating organization. It is also unclear why 
their new sovereign model should perform better than the sovereign risk assessments 
by the three main CRAs. The Bertelsmann Foundation suggests that the new competitor 
could produce better sovereign ratings if it paid attention to “qualitative indicators in 
addition to traditional macroeconomic data” and political indicators “such as 
governance” (ibid.). However, as argued in this book, the three main CRAs already take 
political factors into account in their rating assessments. 
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Second, the EU chose to regulate and supervise CRAs more closely. In an attempt to 
reduce the market impact of sovereign ratings, CRAs are only allowed to publish rating 
changes on Fridays after close of business (EC 2013b). Moreover, CRAs have to 
announce changes to their methodologies, ask for comments, and give explanations for 
their changes to the European Securities and Market Authority. ESMA can also 
investigate CRAs. In December 2013, the regulatory agency published its first results of 
a sovereign rating investigation. All of these measures increase regulators’ influence on 
CRAs’ choice of criteria (ESMA 2013b). 
However, conflicts of interest are apparent if governments attempt to meddle with 
their own sovereign ratings produced by private companies. Moreover, stricter state 
regulation could limit CRAs’ leeway to update their criteria and to base their decisions 
on important qualitative political factors, which could reduce the accuracy of sovereign 
ratings. The new common registration procedure and the regulation and supervision of 
rating methodologies also give the impression that ratings have an official seal of 
approval. Without regulatory endorsements, CRAs’ risk assessments would be one 
opinion on sovereign risk among many others. If the attempts to promote rating 
competition fail, the new regulations might thus even embed ratings more strongly into 
the regulatory system and force investors to use them. 
7.4 Avenues for Further Research 
The responses by policymakers and rating agencies to the European sovereign debt 
crisis open an interesting avenue for further research. Moreover, further research on 
sovereign rating criteria and the criteria used by other financial market participants is 
necessary to determine the constraints that financial markets place on national 
governments. The mixed methods approach of this book could prove a promising way 
forward in this area of research. 
As rating agencies become more transparent and precise in their methodologies, 
further research might be able to analyze sovereign rating criteria in even more detail. 
In chapter 5, I have shown that CRAs take the number of veto players into account in 
their sovereign risk assessments. In their announcements, CRAs most often mention an 
independent central bank and independent judiciary as central veto players that can 
prevent a government from defaulting. The role of specific veto players could also be 
tested econometrically if we develop a database on the constitutional rules and laws 
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that determine a country’s default decision. For each country, such a database has to 
identify who can constrain a government willing to default. 
As more sovereign ratings and announcements become available over time, it will also 
be possible to analyze changes in sovereign rating criteria over time. During the 
European debt crisis, rating agencies announced several changes to their 
methodologies. Do the CRAs follow up on these proposals and to what extent do these 
methodological changes influence rating decisions? 
If new competitors enter the sovereign rating market, it would also be interesting to 
compare their criteria to those of the established CRAs (see Fuchs & Gehring 2013). As 
shown in this book, the three main CRAs seldom differ on their choice of criteria. 
Political factors are indispensable rating drivers for all of them. Do new competitors 
also take political factors into account as a signal of a government’s willingness to 
default? 
The analysis of sovereign rating criteria is a promising first step in analyzing the 
constraints that CRAs as one important sovereign debt market participant place on 
national governments. However, to assess these constraints more broadly, we need to 
extend the analysis of political factors beyond the criteria used by CRAs. Do the political 
factors analyzed in this book play the same role for other financial market actors, for a 
government’s perception of its financing constraints, and for actual default risk? 
First, the importance of political factors can be tested for other financial market 
participants. Thus far, the literature mainly focuses on analyzing sovereign bond yields, 
spreads, and CDS spreads. Since these market indicators are imperfect measures of 
financial market participants’ assessments of sovereign default risk, it could be 
promising to analyze the reports published by banks and other financial institutions. 
Methodologically, this book has shown the benefits of combining econometric analyses, 
which have been the standard in the literature thus far, with detailed text analyses. 
Beyond CRAs, this mixed methods approach could also be a promising avenue for 
research for other financial market participants. 
Second, if we are interested in the extent to which governments are constrained by 
financial markets, we should aim to analyze actual financing costs of governments on 
primary markets. It is also important to understand governments’ perception of 
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financial market preferences. What do governments think that sovereign debt market 
participants, such as CRAs, demand from them? And do governments act accordingly? 
Finally, it could be interesting to extend the analysis of political factors from CRAs’ 
default risk assessment to the actual likelihood of default. Sovereign ratings give an 
indication of default risk. However, some scholars suggest that CRAs’ default risk 
assessment is biased because CRAs have developed their criteria based on a biased 
sample, which consists only of countries that seek a sovereign rating (Beaulieu et al. 
2012). As more defaults happen in rated and unrated countries over time, we can also 
directly test the impact of political factors on the likelihood of default. The longer track 
record of defaults could show us whether CRAs do not only have good reason but are 
also right in taking political factors into account as one indicator of a government’s 
willingness to repay. 
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